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ABSTRACT 
This thesis submits the relatively novel field of activity of health promotion. 
together with its underlying theoretical base, to ethical investigation. 
It begins with provisional sketching of what might be understood by 'health 
promotion', using the writing of a number of notable theorists at work in the 
British Isles. The history of health promotion (and the c1osel~· related traditions 
of public health and health education) are then charted. 
Major dispute and disagreement are identified within these theoretical and 
historical perspectives. Yet health promotion has been represented as a field 
unproblematic in a moral sense; or at the very least. capable of rohust moral 
defence and justification. A. defence of health promotion as a prima facie good is 
constructed for the purposes of critical examination. In particular, the idea that 
health promotion is such a good because of its frequent focus on 'empowerment' 
is subjected to scrutiny. 
The perceptions of a number of health promotion practitioners on the moral 
problems of the field, and how the)· emerge, are then described and discussed. 
These perceptions were elicited through a process of textual analysis- examining 
sonw of the assignment writing of the practitioners. who were also postgraduate 
students of health promotion. 
A return is then made to nloral theory in order to determine the leyel of help it 
nlight offer in undl'rstanding and dealing with the field's ethical difficulties. 
First. the actual and potl'ntial contribution of bioethics is discussed. Then tll'alth 
proillotion (as an occupational and possibly professional) acti, it~· is considered 
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in relation to arguments as to how it is possible to 'ground' professions in a 
moral sense. 
Finally, the experience of both practitioner participants in the research and the 
researcher in thinking about the ethical problems of health promotion is 
considered. 'Markers' for the possible moral reconstruction of the field are laid 
down. The value of writing as a tool to support reflection on. understanding of 
and ways of dealing with difficulties is discussed. 
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PREFACE 
In May 1989, I celebrated my thirtieth birthday. Adapting the poet Brian Patten 
slightly, it would have been best to have arrived at this age grinning and drunk. 
dressed in poor clothes and heads full of dragons. Instead, I was completely sober and 
fighting the inevitable onset of uncomfortable sleep on a transatlantic flight from 
Boston to London. I was also trying to come to a decision about the future direction 
of my career. 
Until this point, I had taken the notion of a 'career' rather easily and lightly. Several 
years earlier, I had trained as a Registered General Nurse. For various reasons, I had 
decided to leave nursing and as they say in the potted biographies of paperback 
authors, had gone on to do a succession of jobs. These included being a women's 
magazine 'agony aunt', working on a telephone help line run by a national medical 
charity and editing specialist holiday guides. They were all fun, but as I coasted along 
rather light heartedly with these jobs, other parts of my life were taking on a more 
serious character. If I'd been older and wiser, I would have recognised the jobs 
themselves as being pretty serious; but I was in my twenties and unable particularly to 
take life as a difficult business. Now, though, I was married. I had a mortgage. These 
things, I thought, needed to be accompanied by a 'proper' career. 
Several months before reaching 30, I had made what I thought was going to be a 
temporary move, to working as a health promotion officer with an inner London 
health authority. My plan was to leave this within about a year and take up a full time 
law course. Law seemed both tangible and serious. I would be a professional person. 
It would be easy to explain to people at parties what I did. ('I'm a solicitor' rather than 
'I'm an agony aunt, or a health promotion officer'. or whatever.) In short. it seemed 
like the 'proper' career I felt the need of. But as I read more and more law. getting 
ready for my planned course, I became less and less interested in its technici'a 
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structure and detail. At the same time, health promotion- a job which I thought I could 
do intuitively (in the same way that I'd done every other job I'd so far had)- presented 
itself to me as far more complex and interesting than I had ever imagined. To cut a 
long story short, I ditched the idea of law and carried on with health promotion. 
Yet if health promotion was complex and interesting, as I thought it to be, a serious 
approach to it was required. Believing that one route to seriousness (or at least to 
appearing more serious) was through academic study, I began a postgraduate 
diploma in health education course at what was then South Bank Polytechnic, 
London, in September 1989. 
During the first module of the course, I went on a week's placement to the Health 
Promotion Department in Hull. I enjoyed my time there. Days were an interesting 
mix: of talking to the friendly and knowledgeable staff; and of 'shadowing' some of 
them as they went about their work. The primary health care facilitator took me to a 
local general practice, where plans were finalised for a primary health care 'team 
workshop'. I went with one of the health promotion officers to the district hospital to 
discuss plans for a local campaign to promote breast screening with a consultant 
physician. The head of the Department (who I later realised was a notable figure in 
the world of specialist health promotion practice) drove me to a school where we 
talked through ideas for health education curriculum development with the PSHE 
(personal, social and health education) co-ordinator. I also went with him to a meeting 
to negotiate further funding for a voluntary group concerned with HIV and AIDS 
prevention. 
And evenings! I spent the evenings enjoying the slightly backwater atmosphere of the 
city that Philip Larkin describes often in his poems, including 'Here': 
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'Here domes and statues, spires and cranes cluster 
'Beside grain - scattered streets, barge- crowded water, 
'And residents from raw estates, brought down 
'The dead straight miles by stealing flat - faced trolleys, 
'Push through plate - glass swing doors to their desires .... '. 
Larkin was writing some time before 1964 (the poem appears in 'The Whitsun 
Weddings', published during that year). By 1989, the city had become de-
industrialised; quite a different place to the brash, busy port of 'Here'. Now Hull had a 
pedestrianised city centre, a flash marina (converted from the old docks) touching the 
edge of this and quite a number of designer bars. Yet although the 'grain- scattered 
streets' had disappeared, it was still great fun wandering around the place, not least 
because this was a bit of an exercise in nostalgia for me. I had spent 1978 to 1981 at 
the University there, completing a degree in philosophy. (The late 1970s were just 
about the last gasp of the city and port Larkin had been describing the decade 
previously. I can remember the Bolivian Consulate, a tatty house on the down at heel 
Beverley Road.) 
At the end of my week, I took the train back to London. On the way- I had to change 
at Doncaster and I remember there being delays- I read an article photocopied during 
one of my idler moments at the Health Promotion Department. It was entitled 'Health 
prornotion- caring concern or slick salesmanship?' (Wll,.LIAMS, 1986). 
At the time of writing the article, Gill Williams had been lecturing in health education 
at the former Chelsea College. And in fact she had come to talk to our group at South 
Bank a couple of weeks before my trip to Hull. As I read, I remembered I had been 
interested by what she had said at our lecture. (She had been talking about ethics and 
health promotion: and the philosophical content of her talk had stirred vague 
memories of my time at university). However. it had only been a mild interest. I 
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hadn't quite been able to see the connection between ethics - a subject I associated 
with abstract, possibly dry philosophers such as Peter Geach and Elizabeth 
Anscombe, two of the 'stars' of the discipline when I had been a philosophy student-
and the very practical activity of health promotion with which I was now involved. 
But as my delayed train finally quickened its pace and sped through the gathering 
dark towards London, I became gripped by the article. Those involved in health 
promotion, she was arguing, were setting themselves up as possessing 'expertise' in 
health. Quite what gave them grounds to do so, and what expertise in health actually 
entailed, was often unclear because the health promoters failed to try and make it so. 
The single understandable version of health promotion Williams had encountered, she 
wrote, was the 'hard sell' marketing approach developed in South Australia. I have re-
read this paper many times since that evening in 1989, and doing so just before 
writing this, I note again the way in which Williams describes 'hard sell' health 
promotion: 
'Health promotion .... is no different from any other form of "selling"; it requires either 
a ready market or the means to stimulate one; it requires concentrated efforts by 
expert communicators in the media and in the health services; and it requires a 
"market research" approach to evaluation to prove that it works .... This kind of health 
promotion .... focuses on the same kinds of methods which are available to those who 
sell other kinds of "goods" ... .' (Wll..LIAMS, 1986: 425). 
If this is the case, Williams asserts, then we should be entitled to ask of the health 
promoter the same kinds of questions we would ask any other salesman, namely: 
'I. What am I being offered or sold? 
'2. Is it necessaryl do I want it? 
'3. Does it work! do what is claimed? 
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'4. Might it do harml could I be worse off? 
'5. What's in it for the salesman .... ?' (WILLIAMS, 1986: 426). 
Health promotion, Williams claims, would fare rather badly if it tried to answer most 
of these apparently reasonable questions. In relation to the ftrst, health promotion 
offers the means to a desired, ideal end ('more health'), yet there is no evidence to 
suggest a proven link between health promotion means and health ends (whatever 
health ends might be understood as). With regard to question two, perhaps it could be 
assumed that most of us want or need to be healthy. But again with the third question. 
we are drawn back to the lack of evidence suggesting causal- or even likely-
connections between health promotion and eventual better health. In response to 
question four, there is a real risk that health promotion may produce harm as well as 
beneftt. (Williams uses the example of raising awareness of breast self- examination 
techniques. For some at least, self - examination will provoke considerable anxiety 
and tension.) Finally, Williams addresses the ftfth question and suggests, in the light 
of responses to what has previously been asked: 
'It is a sad reflection on a "caring profession" that the professionals or "salesmen" 
appear to be deriving more beneftt from the enterprise than are the clients. but there 
seems to be little evidence available to the contrary at the present time ... .' 
(WILLIAMS, 1986: 429). 
Reading the paper once again. I can see more weaknesses in it than I remember doing 
while returning from Hull in 1989. Against a historical perspective, it is clear that to 
some extent Williams was railing against the new form of words. 'Health Promotion'. 
In the United Kingdom. many previously titled health education departments 
switching during the mid- 1980s to this new nomenclature. This was largely. it 
seemed. to give themselves an easy metaphorical lick of new paint while mostly 
doing what they had always done. Williams is clearly an aficionado of education for 
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health and did not like what was happening, even if it was just in name only. 
Moreover, she does not justify her attachment to health education in a particularly 
robust way; it could be argued that many of the accusations levelled at health 
promotion apply equally to health education (or at least to certain conceptions of 
health education). Finally, her reliance on one particular approach to health promotion 
(the 'hard sell') is a caricatural device inevitably supporting her own arguments: straw 
men can easily be knocked down. 
Despite these weaknesses, nine years later I am still struck by the force of Williams' 
claims and the extent to which they remain plausible. Despite relatively high levels of 
attention in recent times to the issue of health promotion's effectiveness, very little is 
still known about the connections between what it does and actual improvements in 
health. In my experience, the suggestion that health promotion might actually provoke 
harm is often met with resistance and unwillingness even to consider this as a 
possibility. There is even a view, I have found, that health promotion has 'considered 
ethics' and, finding itself not wanting, can move on with an easy conscience. 
My main memory of that journey back to London, though, is of the almost 
overwhelming excitement from reading the article. I felt excited for two reasons. 
First, what Williams had written seemed directly relevant to me and to what I was 
doing. I had just spent the week 'shadowing' people involved in promoting breast 
screening, schools health promotion, and funding organisations concerned with HIV 
prevention. When I finished this module of study, I would go back to 'proper' work, 
where I was to plan and implement a campaign promoting childhood immunisation 
uptake. Yet where was the justification for this work? What did I actually know about 
its effects, beneficial or otherwise? More broadly, what did I really know about the 
purpose of health promotion. and of the department where I worked? 
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The second reason for being excited was probably even more significant. ~early a 
decade before my return trip to Hull, I had finished studying philosophy there. Almost 
up to this point, I had not only finished studying philosophy; but had also finished 
studying full stop. For eight years I had avoided academic work, believing that I 
needed to get on with 'real life' and assuming that study couldn't or shouldn't play any 
part in this. The Williams article, though, had provided one of the sparks that made 
me recognise academic study was both enjoyable and valuable. It could indeed help 
me understand the world (and perhaps philosophy could be of particular help). I'm 
sure I wasn't fully aware of it as I got off the train at King's Cross station late on that 
October evening in 1989, but my life was beginning a fundamental change. 
I finished the first module of the course and went back to work. I got on with the 
immunisation campaign. I also started the module assignment, a 2500 word essay. I 
wrote about an ethical issue or dilemma from my practice. My focus was the 
difficulties involved in using a 'lifestyle questionnaire' I had developed with some 
other people in the health promotion department where I worked. We used this 
questionnaire at 'health fair'- type events to engage people in discussion about their 
health behaviour- smoking, drinking, diet and so on. The aim was to encourage 
thinking about health risk and health choices; but it also seemed to me that in trying 
to identify risk we were undertaking an activity which could be regarded as screening. 
In the assignment, I argued that it seemed sensible to ask a number of questions about 
the use of the questionnaire as a kind of health screening: was it of benefit?; was there 
the chance of it causing harm?; did it respect the individual? These questions were a 
bit like those asked by Williams of her 'health promotion salesman'. They were also 
connected to so- called principles of biomedical ethics developed in the United States 
by Beauchamp and Childress ( 1994), although up to this time the principles had 
largely been applied to the moral problems of 'acute' health care. 
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I can no longer find the assignment I actually submitted, but I do remember 
concluding there was good reason to believe use of the lifestyle questionnaire did 
raise moral problems. In particular, it was often (perhaps it was always) impossible to 
track a definite relationship between health promotion activity and health 
improvement. How, then, could we be sure that what we were doing was of benefit? 
And if we weren't sure about benefit, shouldn't we be looking more closely at the 
potential for harm held by the activity? 
My tutor encouraged me to turn the assignment into an article and a conference 
presentation. The conference to which I presented it was the 1990 annual seminar of 
the Society of Health Education and Health Promotion Officers (as it was then 
known), held in April at Warwick University. I am looking at the text of the 
presentation now and can remember finishing off my talk to the 60 or 70 delegates-
who I guessed were mostly health education and health promotion practitioners-
gathered in the lecture theatre: 
'These .... questions I've asked about screening all raise major worries on its ethical 
implications. At the very least, these worries should cause the question with which I 
started- should we be participating in pre- symptomatic screening for coronary heart 
disease?- to be treated more seriously than might otherwise be allowed ... .'. 
I suggested that while we might be caught between the demands of practice and 
concerns about its moral implications; understanding and thinking about these 
implications might actually be positive for what we did. I stopped speaking and sat 
down. 
There was silence. The person chairing the session asked for questions. There was 
just one. I can't remember it exactly. but it was along these lines: 'You have posed 
what you consider to be a practice dilemma. We do not have any real choice about 
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practice in this area- "lifestyle questionnaires" and associated activity are fashionable 
things and doing them is in part one of the ways in which Health Promotion 
Departments can become "acceptably visible". What do you propose we should do'~ 
Give up on them altogether? Refuse to get involved?' 
It was a rhetorical question and I could very easily see its point. Given we had to get 
involved with things like lifestyle questionnaires, wasn't there something perverse in 
trying to get people worried about what they were doing? 
The conference participants drifted out of the lecture theatre, off to workshops with 
very practical, useful- sounding titles like 'Management', or 'Marketing', or 
'Performance Indicators'. I went back to London. I spent a long time waiting for a taxi 
to take me to Coventry station. On the train, I sat and worried about the question I had 
been asked. The certainty I had felt about the relevance and importance of ethics to 
health promotion arriving at King's Cross on the evening of my 'revelation' had 
vanished. In its place, as my train from the Midlands approached Euston station on a 
sunlit Spring afternoon, there was doubt. 
In time, the article I had based on my assignment was accepted and published by the 
Health Education Journal (DUNCAN, 1990). I had by now switched jobs. From 
working in Inner London, I was managing a small Health Promotion Department, 
based in a Wiltshire cathedral city but with a mainly rural constituency. I was 
spending the weeks in Wiltshire and the weekends at home in London until we 
managed to find somewhere to live closer to my new work. Thoughts on ethics and 
health promotion were given up to the demands of this temporary period of trying to 
live in two places at once. 
It was early in 1991, about the time of the Gulf War. I remember being woken up one 
night by the phone ringing. It was my wife, calling to tell me that the allied forces 
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were bombing Baghdad. I put the phone down, thinking that the world was ending 
and that I would never see her again. 
I was relieved to wake up the following morning, and to find things still in their place. 
While I was chatting to a colleague over lunch, she remarked, 'Did you see the reply 
to your piece in the Health Education Journal? I'm not sure he got what you were 
saying right.' 
I went to the hospital library and looked at the latest edition of the Journal. In it there 
was a letter to the editor, entitled 'Screening': 
'Peter Duncan's article in the last Journal (HEJ 49/3) should not go unchallenged lest 
its publication in a respectable journal gives further ammunition to those who argue 
that resources currently allocated to health promotion would far better be spent on 
more proven technologies such as cardiac surgery, monitoring equipment, 
streptokinase and so on. 
'Firstly, of course, the evidence that health promotion works is far stronger than Peter 
Duncan allows .... More importantly, however, I disagree with Duncan's basic 
proposition that what is going on in cardiovascular prevention clinics is screening: it 
is not. What is going on is counselling. As Duncan makes clear, screening for 
cardiovascular disease, among the general population of the UK, would be a very 
problematical activity. We may of course come across the occasional person with 
frank disease or gross abnonnality who needs further investigation and treatment. But 
our basic aim should be to chat to everyone about themselves, explore their views and 
say how we think they can make life more healthy and enjoyable. 
'We can say to people: "Hey, have you thought about regular exercise: You'll feel a 
lot better for it"; or "Look. I've cut down on the salt I use in cooking. and now I can 
20 
really taste some flavours I never realised were there: how about you?" All this can be 
done with full respect for the person's own values and beliefs: and without any fear of 
psychological damage. 
'Let us not forget that moral paralysis is itself culpable if it subverts efforts, based on 
reasonable judgement, to help people enjoy life to the full, free- as far as possible-
from the burden of cardiovascular disease ... .' (JESSOP, 1991: 52). 
The writer was a Director of Public Health, a figure of relative influence, albeit in a 
neglected area ofNHS activity. Yet the more I read the letter, the more I disagreed 
with it. Jessop claimed the evidence health promotion works was far stronger than I 
was allowing. But where was the evidence that his 'ethically clean' version of health 
promotion worked? What he was talking about, branded as 'counselling', seemed to 
be some kind of strange cross between an agony aunt's advice and a good chat over a 
pint at the pub. If Jessop was interested in health promotion that worked (for the sake 
of argument, effective health promotion); it was hard to see how his preferred version 
was in fact likely to be effective, or even measurable. Paying people NHS money to 
chat seemed an unlikely idea. I was much more prepared to believe that Health 
Service cash was going to be spent on a version of health promotion along the lines of 
Williams' 'hard sell'. 
I agreed with my colleague that he hadn't got right what I'd been attempting to sayo I 
wasn't trying to supply ammunition to those sceptical about health promotion's 
effectiveness. My claim was more fundamental: that the conceptual and practical 
basis of health promotion required examination; and that ethical investigation might 
form one part of such scrutiny. 
Jessop's letter appeared to be demonstration of a prominent view of health promotion-
that in a moral sense it was. essentially. OK. My experience at Warwick had shov"on 
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another sort of response to attempts at raising ethical difficulties with promoting 
health; namely that harassed practitioners should not be exposed to this kind of 
debate, because there is little they can do to change practice or priorities. 
I knew of course that such views weren't unifonnly held by those involved in health 
promotion; there were people who were interested in the moral dimension of this sort 
of work and who wanted to engage in debate and discussion about it. But health 
promotion was a relatively novel field of activity and academic endeavour. There 
were still essential uncertainties about its theoretical base and its rationale. In this 
context, it was worrying that there were some who felt there was no need for moral 
examination; or that such examination would somehow be unfair on practitioners. 
This worry eventually overcame my diffidence in approaching an area quite clearly 
occupied to some extent by people with highly partisan views, about which they were 
very sensitive. I became more and more concerned to try and find my own answers to 
what I thought were two fundamental questions: what exactly are health promotion's 
moral problems?; and why is health promotion morally problematic? More than three 
years after I had started to think about these questions, my circumstances cleared 
sufficiently to allow me to register as a part - time MPhill PhD student. Within the 
constraints of a full - time job and home commitments, there was now some 
opportunity properly to engage with the questions. 
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PLOTTING THE DIRECTION OF THE THESIS 
The preface described the roots to the investigation this thesis represents. My intuitive 
feeling, based on experience of practice and the strong reaction aroused when the 
issue was mentioned, was that health promotion was an area in which moral 
investigation was important. 
My first task, however, involved being clear about what health promotion actually is. 
I was engaged in activity that I thought was health promotion and could identify other 
things that might be seen as such. Was I, however, simply identifying activity and 
approaches that, because of my perceptions, had already been cast in my mind as 
problematic? Clearly, it would be easily possible to imagine some things that some 
people regarded as 'health promotion' and were obviously problematic- strongly 
coercive activities, for example. So I sought the 'voices' of a number of theorists to 
give me a provisional framework for understanding what health promotion is. These 
voices were also the first in a number of mediators through the thesis. I was exploring 
the understanding of others and not relying on my own construction of the world. 
Even at this early stage, dispute about what health promotion actually is became 
evident at both theoretical and practical levels. Why was there such dispute? 
Arguably, part of the answer to this lay in separate interpretations of key concepts 
related to health promotion, and of its purpose. But these in tum might be better 
understood through considering the history of the development of the field and its 
underlying theory. I thus sought help for my problem through the examination of 
history. 
One key struggle in this history was that of those involved in health promotion trying 
to convince others of the authenticity of their work- that it represented an important. 
arguably professional. activity. I therefore particularly explored the history of health 
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promotion's development as such an activity. Although I wasn't yet clear how and 
why, it seemed to me that the 'profession' of health promotion had important things to 
say about the morality- or otherwise- of the field. 
By now, I had enough certainty of what health promotion was to imagine how it 
might be defended in a moral sense. Indeed, a number of the theorist voices I was 
listening to had constructed accounts of health promotion which- even if only 
implicitly- could be seen as elements of a supposedly robust 'moral case'. I therefore 
constructed such a case, using these voices. It was also sufficiently clear by now that 
the idea of attacking health promotion as an unambiguous good was unrealistic. There 
obviously were 'health promotion' activities problematic in an ethical sense. What it 
was important to explore was whether health promotion could be understood as a 
prima facie good. 
My discussion (in Chapter Four of this thesis) identifies difficulties even with this 
claim for the nature of the good of health promotion. But at this stage, I was 
preoccupied again with the issue of whether it was simply my own perceptions and 
interpretations dominating. So I decided to explore the extent to which my views 
were shared by a number of health promotion practitioners. Was it as far as they could 
see a morally difficult field? If so, how did problems emerge? 
Following this empirical work, which confirmed a shared view of problems, I 
returned to theory. In particular, I identified bioethics and the overlapping area of 
professional ethics as possible sources of help in understanding and dealing with the 
moral problems identified. It seemed important to explore assistance that might be 
available from bioethics because this is essentially the field exploring the 
assumptions. values and difficulties emerging from health care- of which health 
promotion has traditionally been seen as part (as my exploration of history 
confirmed). ~Iy interest in exploring possible help from the broad overlapping area of 
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professional ethics stemmed from my view- developed early on- that the possibility of 
'professing' health promotion might form an important area of moral consideration in 
relation to the field. 
Having gained some help from both bioethics and professional ethics, I took stock of 
my position, as well as those of my practitioner research participants. They had 
similarly been concerned not only to identify problems; but also to understand and 
possibly deal with them. We had all, then, charted our way around a reflective cycle: 
of practice, its review and a return to practice helped by a more robust understanding. 
Importantly, the processes by which we had done so- in particular our consideration 
of moral theory and our engaging in thought about practice and theory through the 
experience of writing- had supported this reflective cycle .. 
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CHAPTER ONE- WHAT IS HEALTH PROMOTION? 
1. Introduction 
The task of understanding and analysing the moral problems of health promotion 
must begin with an attempt to clarify what health promotion actually is. Can 'health 
promotion' be regarded as a definite article? If we are examining 'health promotion', 
are we in fact simply looking at particular activities that we might want to express a 
judgement about, or to which we might want to attach a value? 
Certainly, there are some activities deemed to be 'health promotion'; and there are 
some people who do (either as all or as part of their job) work that they (and possibly 
others) see as 'health promotion'. Much of my thesis is concerned with deconstructing 
both these activities and these roles, as ways of becoming clearer about moral 
difficulties and what might be done about them. In this sense, the entire work is about 
asking the question, 'What is health promotion?'. My purpose in this chapter is to 
offer a broad account of how 'health promotion' has been conceptualised: how it 
might appear in practice; and who might be doing it. This will serve as a starting point 
for much more detailed exploration of these areas. 
But even at this early stage, the profound confusion and dispute cloaking the 
promotion of health becomes apparent. Is 'health promotion' an 'it', or is it just 
'things'? Does this matter for a project of moral enquiry? If 'health promotion' is 
conceptualised as a definite article, what values does this demonstrate: and what 
values are being displayed in competing conceptualisations? 
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2. 'Health Promotion Is •••. ' 
Some theorists have suggested that health promotion is something (a coherent entity): 
and that it can be defined in a relatively straightforward and circumscribed way (in 
other words, it is amenable to definition): 
'Health promotion is any planned measure which promotes health or prevents disease. 
disability and premature death ... .' (WHITEHEAD AND TONES, 1991: 5); 
'The tenn health promotion can be usefully employed .... as covering a realm of 
activity which is different in emphasis from the current power bases in health 
services, which indeed transcends health services and other formally provided 
services, and in which lay competence, the relevance of public opinion, the need for 
community involvement and the illusory nature of free rational choice are given due 
recognition ... .' (TANNAHILL, 1984: 196). 
Thinking about 'health promotion is ... .' definitions raises problems in relation to the 
two interrelated issues of definability; and whether there is indeed a coherent entity to 
define. Consider the definitions above. In the case of the first, it is neat but 
tautologous; 'health promotion is any planned measure which promotes health' is a bit 
like saying my black bag is black. In the second, while the definition is longer and 
appears more substantive, this impression is only superficial. What is actually meant 
by health promotion 'transcending health services and other formally provided 
services'? What exactly should be understood by health promotion giving 'due 
recognition' to the 'illusory nature of free rational choice'? It all sounds rather 
metaphysical. The speed with which tautology and metaphysics have been 
encountered even through just limited probing of these definitions suggests that health 
promotion is both hard to define~ and may not actually constitute a coherent entity. 
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Within both example definitions is the suggestion that health promotion entails action 
or activity of some kind. A different approach to the question, 'What is health 
promotion?', then, might be to try and classify or categorise the sorts of actions being 
done by people who try to promote health. (I am leaving aside for the moment the 
difficult question of actions that unintentionally might promote health.) 
Since about the early 1980s, much energy has been devoted by some theorists (as well 
as some practitioners) to developing models (and taxonomies of models) which aim 
to describe and explain the territory of health promotion activity. I understand a 
model of health promotion to be something that tries to: 
'Identify the common characteristics of a set of items or related processes which, 
when considered together, effectively provide a generalised representation of those 
items or processes ... .' (SIMNETT, 1991: 35). 
Models can be either iconic (representing things as they are); or analogic (attempting 
to describe the world as if it resembled the model) (RAWSON AND GRIGG, 1988). 
Health promotion models are often presented within taxonomies, or systems of 
classification. Writers concerned with taxonomy development frequently attempt 
through their systems not only to describe, but also to compare and contrast the 
different models presented. As I will later argue, this is often in order that they can 
express (even if only implicitly) their support for the ideologies or values 
underpinning particular models. 
I have drawn on the work of a number of well known writers to identify four clear 
models of (or approaches to) health promotion (EWLES AND SIMNETI. 1992: 
TONES, 1983, 1986a, 1986b. 1990; TONES. TILFORD AND ROBINSON. 1990; 
TONES AND TILFORD, 1994; BEATTIE, 1984, 1991: NAIDOO AND WILLS. 
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1994). Although there is some variation in terminology between these (and other) 
writers, they all broadly suggest the following health promotion models: 
i. The Medicall Behaviour Change Model 
People or populations are persuaded or strongly encouraged to alter or modify their 
behaviour if it is health- hanning; and to take up preventive services for early 
detection or avoidance of disease. Service planning and implementation of activities 
are undertaken by the 'expert' health professional; and directed towards a lay 
'audience' which passively receives, accepts and acts on what is offered or given. 
There is little or no question within such transaction. 
An example of an activity which could be regarded as medical or behaviour change 
health promotion is childhood immunisation. Public health medicine professionals, on 
the basis of epidemiology and evidence of the efficiency and efficacy of vaccination 
in reducing certain infectious diseases of childhood (for example, measles, mumps 
and rubella) implement local immunisation programmes. Vaccination is widely 
available and parents are strongly encouraged to have their children protected in this 
way. Advice and information is often presented in a didactic way and parental choice 
is often assumed; parents will have their children immunised because it is 
undoubtedly the best course of action. Little if any time is spent in dwelling on any 
uncertainties that might surround the intervention or anxieties that parents or 
guardians may have. 
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ii. The Educational Model 
Knowledge and information is provided to individuals or groups to ensure 
understanding of issues and factors affecting health. This eventually facilitates 
informed choices and decisions about health and health- related behaviour. Although 
the person providing the information may still have 'expert' knowledge, the emphasis 
on facilitating choice means that they may see themselves- and hopefully will be 
seen- as a kind of 'gate keeper'. The model implies educational processes of teaching 
and learning, freely entered into. Arguably there is greater equality in the relationship 
between educator and learner. 
An example of activity based on the educational model might be school sex 
education, subject to certain conditions of delivery. If the educator sees the learners as 
individuals with whom it is possible to engage for the development of their 
knowledge and skills: if they are seen as possessing the ability freely to choose a 
course of action (say, whether to have sex or not); and if learning and teaching is 
about promoting informed choice; then this might be activity promoting health 
according to the educational model. However, there are a range of variables in this 
kind of potential situation. This is not to mention the influence of others beyond the 
learning environment, some of whom might ultimately be controlling it. Such 
considerations may lead to the belief that educational model health promotion in the 
genuine sense of teaching and learning for informed choice might be difficult to 
achieve. 
iii. The Participant- Centred or Empowerment Model 
Individuals. groups or communities are empowered to change and develop their 
society (if this is what they wish) so that possibilities for health are improved. Supptlrt 
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leads to co-operative participant-led work which identifies and meets health and 
health- related concerns. One of the aims of this model would be to ensure that it was 
'lay' people rather than professionals who were determining and controlling the 
agenda. 
The following might be an example of activity based on this model. A sprawling and 
run down housing estate suffers from a range of social and health problems including 
crime and levels of teenage pregnancy much higher than the national average. 
Workers encourage a group of residents to meet and discuss these and other issues. It 
emerges that the 'health need' of most concern is a safe play area for children. 
Workers support a residents' group in lobbying the local council for this kind of 
provision. The group is eventually successful in gaining resources. It plans, develops 
and manages the play area itself. 
iv. The Social Change Model 
Focusing explicitly on the wider social and political determinants of health, this 
model advocates change to social, economic and environmental structures to improve 
health. It supports activity likely to achieve this kind of change. Activity might 
include policy and legislative development: fiscal control and regulation; and creation 
or alteration of environmental structures. Direct political action to achieve change 
would be permissible according to this model. The activities this model suggests 
would be undertaken by 'social changers' who would not necessarily consult much 
with the individuals or populations for whom they feel they are working to change 
structures. 
Governments and other statutory bodies can of course be agents for social change 
through the kinds of mechanisms described above. It is also a role some voluntary 
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organisations are happy to adopt. An example of social change health promotion 
comes from the voluntary sector. A particular organisation is concerned to limit car 
use and promote public transport. It works with, and lobbies, a range of other 
organisations and bodies likely to be influential in this area including national and 
local government, employers, retailers and trades unions. Over a long period of time, 
it builds up support that is eventually sufficiently powerful to constitute political 
force. The government of the day acknowledges this and introduces planning 
legislation to limit car use and promote public transport provision; as well as fiscal 
incentives to abandon private transport. 
3. Models as Expressions of Values: Some Initial Comments 
Some theorists have tried to cast models as neutral and purely descriptive 
constructions. Others have argued it might be possible objectively to choose between 
models and the activities they suggest: 
'In our view, there is no "right" aim for health promotion, and no one "right" approach 
or set of activities. We need to work out for ourselves which aim and activities we 
use, in accordance with our own professional code of conduct (if there is one), our 
own carefully considered values and our own assessment of our clients' needs .... ' 
(EWLES AND SIMNETT, 1992: 37). 
Others argue a contrary position; that it is impossible to see models as anything other 
than expressions of ideology and preference for particular kinds of values. For 
example, different models imply different kinds of relationships between the person 
promoting health and her or his 'client', whether that is an individual. a group. a 
community or a population. Different relationships entail different sorts of power 
balance between those involved. If I believe that a health professional (for example. a 
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general practitioner) should control a particular health promotion activity. it is at least 
in part because I place value in the established role and position- the 'expert' status- of 
this professional. Alternatively, if I consider that it is individuals who should control 
their own lives, then I place value on their status and potential as skilled human 
beings rather than on any 'expert' professional. Models are also expressions of values 
in other ways. They try to claim certain things about the nature of health (that it is the 
absence of disease, that it is socially determined, that it is down to individual life 
choices and so on). In doing this, they attach value to particular activities likely to 
produce 'more health' according to the 'authentic' version of the concept they propose. 
Ewles and Simnett's position- not unreasonably characterised as 'anything goes'- is 
therefore problematic for two reasons. First, it assumes the possibility of being able to 
choose completely rationally between approaches based on radically different sorts of 
values. Yet choices about which values are important to us are not determined 
completely rationally. Why someone has chosen consistently to support the values 
expressed by the Labour party as opposed to those of the Conservatives is complex. 
Certainly, though, the choice will be bound up in feelings, emotions and attitudes as 
well as in any reference to 'rational facts'. Equally, someone's preference for 'medical 
model' ways of working over 'empowerment' approaches is not solely the result of 
rational choice. Ewles and Simnett are not presenting an adequate account of how 
choices in doing health promotion are made. 
Second, assuming 'anything goes' (even with the sort of caveats mentioned) removes 
normative purpose from health promotion. This could have alarming results, at least 
in part because of the potential for disputing the object of health promotion. A British 
National Party member could carefully consider his values and the 'needs' of his 
clients and come to the conclusion that the right health promotion action is the 
forcible repatriation of large numbers of the ethnic minority population from this 
country. If there is no 'right' health promotion aim or approach. then every approach 1~ 
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equally right. Yet if considering health promotion models reveals anything, it is the 
belief that subscribers to particular models are strongly attached to certain kinds of 
values. A principal concern of this enquiry is to examine those values and consider 
their moral implications, which are frequently highly problematic. But suggesting 
choices about health promotion action can be mostly or wholly rational is even more 
deeply disturbing in an ethical sense. 
4. Developing an Understanding of 'Health Promotion': The Emerging 
Problematic 
I suggested earlier that in considering the question, 'What is health promotion?', it 
might be helpful to try to identify and classify activities which could be undertaken 
by those trying to promote health. Yet models and taxonomies describe such a broad 
range of possible activity that it is natural to ask, 'Can all this be seen as "health 
promotion"?' An obvious response- yes, if it promotes health- simply leads back to 
the tautologies with which I began (and possibly to difficulties of the 'anything goes' 
variety as well). 
There are at least two options at this point in understanding what health promotion is. 
First, it can be accepted that it might comprise all the things implied or made explicit 
by the models or approaches described above, and attempting close justification of 
this acceptance. Second, it could be argued there are some things within this very 
broad range that can more properly be understood as 'health promotion'. Both these 
options pose problems. 
If I accept that the very broad range of things is 'health promotion'. I leave myself 
open to at least two accusations. The first is of failing to be clear about why I am not 
concerned to examine activities which 'promote health' unintentionally (CRIBB. 
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1993). The second is of accepting that arguably very un- health promoting things (for 
example, highly coercive action literally forcing people to give up smoking) are in 
fact 'health promotion'. These accusations are deeply problematic for the moral 
enquiry I propose. I am bound to be led to the obvious conclusion that some kinds of 
'health promotion' raise more ethical dilemmas than others and that because of this all 
activity should be treated, at least initially, with scepticism. Further, if 'unintentional' 
health promotion is allowed (and there is no clear reason why it should not be, if the 
'all things' approach is taken), I am faced with the unenviable prospect of having to be 
sceptical, in a moral sense, about any activity which could conceivably have some 
sort of impact on health. But how useful would such a conclusion be? It seems to 
provide little sense of the landscape's light and shade, of complexity and difficulty, 
things which above all I am concerned to try and reveal. It is rather like undertaking a 
moral investigation of 'war' in a general sense. The researcher reaches the conclusion 
that because of what 'war' is (pain, suffering and so on), we must always be ethically 
inclined against it. But sometimes a war (fought against an oppressor or a tyrannical 
regime, for example) can be seen as moral; or rather, the purpose of a particular war 
can be seen as such. The most fruitful ethical examination of 'war' is likely to be that 
which moves beyond examination of its general features (bound to be repugnant in a 
moral sense) towards a deeper understanding of particular cases. 
This might also be the case with 'health promotion'. As a first step to such deeper 
awareness, we might be inclined to accept the second option in understanding what 
health promotion is; there are some things which should more properly be regarded as 
'health promotion'. Yet this also holds problems. If I accept some of the range of 
activities as more properly constituting 'health promotion', on what basis have I made 
this selection? If it has been made at random, it will be impossible to justify in any 
rational sense and I will be subject to accusations of relying solely on personal 
preference or value. Such accusations will apply whether I eventually end up 
regarding the activities sympathetically or not. If they are viewed in a gentle light. 
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there will be an inclination to think, 'I told you so- he chose these things as "health 
promotion" because he a priori believes them to be acceptable.' If they are seen 
harshly it will be, 'They are "health promotion" because he refuses to see the worth of 
this kind of activity'. Alternatively, if I apply certain criteria to my selection of what 
constitutes 'health promotion', what will they be? The extent to which the activity 
actually improves health? But how will this be measured and what is meant by that 
anyway? The extent to which autonomy is promoted or protected? But again, how 
will this be measured and in any case isn't this once more making moral judgements 
before the fact? Objective criteria for deciding on the legitimacy of activity in this 
area are extremely hard to corne by and any produced will be liable, as before, to 
accusation of bias. 
To summarise the problematic emerging from these initial difficulties in definition 
and description for a moral enquiry into health promotion. If 'anything and 
everything' is health promotion, it is likely ethical difficulties identified will be very 
general (and thus their revelation not especially helpful for practice). If attempts are 
made to 'pin health promotion down', then that selectivity could well be seen as 
shaping the nature of the enquiry. 
For the moment, I want to set out in broad terms my strategy for managing the 
problematic. What I plan to do is to use others' understanding of 'health promotion'. 
as far as possible, as the basis for my moral examination of the field of activity. Later 
on, I will be building a putative ethical argument for health promotion. This will be 
derived from theorists influential in the field. I will also be considering, again through 
my understanding and interpretation of important theorists, ways in which the field's 
'moral problems' have so far been understood and interpreted. Yet another part of my 
thesis will involve analysis of health promotion practitioners' perceptions of the 
ethical difficulties they face. It can therefore be seen that a variety of voices will be 
articulating the nature of 'health promotion' and mediating between it and myself as a 
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researcher with particular questions to ask and with my own particular values. It may 
still be argued, of course, that my particular choice of supposedly mediating 'voices' 
in fact suits my own agenda. I acknowledge the possibility of 'researcher bias' and 
will continue to reflect on this as my thesis develops. 
5. Who Does Health Promotion? 
During this moral enquiry into health promotion, I will at various times be discussing 
activities undertaken by occupational or professional groups that could be called 
'health promotion'; as well as exploring the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings 
to such activities. A good case could be made for seeing 'health promotion' as an 
international endeavour and a force for global change (WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANISATION, 1984: 1986). However, my work will centre almost exclusively 
on the United Kingdom (UK) experience. I concur with those who view the 
promotion of health as a global effort. A given society, its politics and its culture, 
though, are important explainers of the moral dilemmas health promotion contains 
and represents. I am interested primarily in the way in which the construction and 
operation of UK society has shaped the ethical problems facing the field with which I 
am concerned. 
It is important to draw a central distinction between the different kinds of people who 
have a professional or occupational role in health promotion within the UK. The 
distinction is between the health promotion specialist (HPS); and the health 
promoter. The Society of Health Education and Health Promotion Specialists 
(SHEPS) draws the distinction thus: 
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'Within the field of health promotion, there are two groups of workers. 
'The first group are called health promoters. For this group, health promotion is part 
of a wider professional role. They come from a range of agencies and include 
teachers, health visitors, environmental health officers, practice nurses etc., and are 
usually involved in promoting health to the public directly .... 
'Health Promotion Specialists promote health in several ways including: 
'* By supporting health promoters (see above) in their health promotion role. This 
may involve training, advising or helping develop and evaluate specific health 
promotion projects, or providing audio- visual aids; 
'* By working with decision- makers and managers to assess need, develop policies 
and strategies to make healthier choices easier choices; 
'* By developing campaigns and working with the media to raise awareness about 
health issues with the public directly; 
'* By working and consulting with communities and voluntary groups to enable them 
to have more control over their health; 
'* By co-ordinating multi- agency work ... .' (SOCIETY OF HEALTH EDUCATION 
AND HEALTH PROMOTION SPECIALISTS, 1997a). 
It is likely the exact nature of the HPS 'job description' supplied by SHEPS could be 
disagreed upon. It reflects the way in which this occupational association idealises the 
work its members do. My own experience as a HPS was of spending much more time 
on some of the activities described and much less (or none at all) on some of the 
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others. However, the distinction between HPSs (in some areas titles vary between this 
and others such as health promotion officers, advisers or co-ordinators) and health 
promoters can be accepted. Health promoters work directly with members of the 
public (patients, pupils, parents and so on) and have the promotion of health as part of 
their professional role. HPSs generally work with and through professionals (health 
promoters), have a co-ordinating and facilitating role and spend most or all of their 
occupational lives working on health promotion. It will become clear as my thesis 
develops that this distinction between roles in health promotion has an important part 
to play in understanding and interpreting its moral difficulties. 
6. A Brief Note About History 
Health promotion is an aspect of public policy. The kinds of things both health 
promoters and HPSs do are driven by political decisions. Nor is the conceptual and 
theoretical development of health promotion immune from policy making and policy 
changing. For example, the recent resurgence of interest at policy level in the 
relationship between social inequalities (of income, access to education and so on) 
and health status has led to different ways of interpreting and relating theory to 
practice. (See, for example, SOCIETY OF HEALTH EDUCATION AND HEALTH 
PROMOTION SPECIALISTS, 1998a.) 
Rapidly altering political and social contexts cause difficulties for those who are 
writing about health promotion. I began the research leading to this thesis in 1993, 
shortly after the publication of a (then Conservative) government white paper on 
health improvement (SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HEALTH, 1992) vigorously 
criticised by some for its 'lifestylism'. As I write this chapter. a little less than six 
years later, the political landscape has altered and new policy priorities are being 
shaped. 
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As I understand them, difficulties connected with rapid change relate less to the 
applicability of argument and more to the practicalities of deciding on historical 
scope. I am confident that the application of moral philosophical enquiry to this field 
will be of relatively enduring help. It should become clear that while detail may 
change, fundamental problems (for example, determining the extent of individual and 
state responsibility for health) remain remarkably consistent. But accounts and 
analyses of health promotion have to stop somewhere in time, much like accounts of 
any other sphere of theory and activity. One of the focuses of this thesis is on a 
number of health promotion practitioners who describe and discuss the ethical 
problems they face in their work. These views were collected from 1995 to 1997. It 
would seem sensible to suggest provisionally that this latter date provides the 'cut off 
for historical scope. However, it would also be wise not to suggest that history ended 
in 1997; and to provide at least pointers to events and happenings between then and 
now (that is, the time at which this thesis took the shape it finally has). I will therefore 
try to provide these, while suggesting there are good reasons for concentrating mainly 
on rather earlier times. 
7. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have briefly outlined the nature of health promotion, using so- called 
models and the activities they imply as a way of doing so. Given the deeply contested 
and value- laden nature of the field, I have outlined a key problematic facing anyone 
trying to examine it.; to what extent are personal interpretations and values 
influencing the way examination is undertaken? This issue will remain of central 
importance within this research and reflection on the moral problems of health 
promotion. 
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CHAPTER TWO- THE DEVELOPMENT OF HEALTH PROMOTION: A 
SHORT HISTORY 
1. Introduction 
In Chapter One I sketched out a preliminary description of health promotion. But 
even at this early stage it is clear there are major difficulties in understanding what 
health promotion is and what it invoives. These problems of definition and 
description are likely to have a significant impact on moral enquiry into this field. 
Building further an understanding of health promotion and its complexities is likely to 
be supported by considering its history. How has health promotion developed? In 
what ways has it influenced- and been influenced by- the political, social and cultural 
environment of which it is part? I will address these questions as further preparation 
for my examination of moral problems. 
There are some difficulties in constructing a history of health promotion. Secondary 
sources in the fonn of direct historical accounts are rare, although a number do exist. 
(See, for example, SUTHERLAND, 1979: BLYTHE, 1986; EWLES, 1993; 
NAIDOO AND WILLS, 1994; KATZ AND PEBERDY, 1997. I have used all of 
these to support my own account.) Such sources tend to be brief and descriptive. They 
are not interpretative in any substantial sense. There is a much larger number of 
secondary sources indirectly relating to health promotion which I have used. I have 
also had access to a collection of primary sources which particularly relate to 
developments in the occupational association for health promotion specialists over 
roughly the last decade and a half. 
From these sources it is possible to construct a chronology of events important in the 
development of health promotion. It is also possible to identify five recognisable and 
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closely interconnected dimensions to a history of the field of activity and its 
conceptual and theoretical underpinnings: 
* The dimension of the wider social and political context within which health 
promotion takes place (YOUNG AND WHITEHEAD, 1993); 
* The dimension of the history of epidemiology and the control and treatment of 
disease (given the field of health promotion is frequently, for better or worse, 
associated with disease prevention) (TONES, 1993); 
* The dimension of the history of debate about what health promotion is and what it 
involves; 
* The dimension of the history of health promotion's development and practice in 
various settings (for example, primary health care and schools); 
* The dimension of the history of health promotion's development as an occupational 
activity (or as an activity undertaken as part of an occupation). 
In this chapter, I explore mainly the first four of these dimensions of a history of 
health promotion. In Chapter Three, I focus specifically on the fifth historical 
dimension; the development of health promotion as an occupational (possibly a 
professional) activity. 
2. Key Chronological Landmarks in the Development of Health Promotion 
One prominently held view is that health education is a long- established field of 
activity; whereas health promotion is a relatively novel phenomenon (DOWNIE. 
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TANNAHILL AND TANNAHILL, 1996: 27). This view depends on regarding both 
health education and health promotion, together with their histories, in a certain way. 
Health education, according to this view, is a kind of 'sub- category' of health 
promotion, mainly concerned with the use of educational methods to convey health 
messages. It has been argued that the recent history of this sort of activity can be 
traced back through the twentieth century, with some roots in the nineteenth 
(BL YTHE, 1986). On the other hand, health promotion addresses imperatives for 
heath improvement in a much broader way. It embraces the 'sub- category' of 
education for health, but also concerns itself with trying to influence social, economic 
and environmental policy in favour of health. This broader concept and field of health 
promotion is generally thought to have emerged in the early 1970s (KATZ AND 
PEBERDY, 1997: 58). 
However, the notion of a 'health education-then-health promotion' account of history 
is problematic. It fails to include, or offer explanation of, an important phase during 
which the health of the population of the United Kingdom dramatically improved. 
This was the period of the great Victorian public health refonns (ASHTON AND 
SEYMOUR, 1993). 
If a comprehensive history of initiatives for health improvement in the UK (distinct at 
the moment, for the sake of argument, from health promotion) was being assembled, 
I argue it would have to try and account for at least the following phases: 
* Nineteenth century public health reform (from about 1840 onwards); 
* The growth of health education (from about the end of the nineteenth century): 
* The emergence of health promotion (from the early 1970s). 
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The literature shows little evidence of attempts to provide coherence in historical 
accounts of UK health improvement activity. Blythe's (1986) account- admittedly 
focusing on health education- is nevertheless almost paradigmatic in its separation of 
the three phases I have argued require attention. He begins almost at once by 
distinguishing health education, as he sees it, from public health: 
'Modern health education practice in Britain has virtually grown up with the twentieth 
century, with a number of penetrating nineteenth century roots. The fIrst roots formed 
at the time of "the cholera" which visited the country in three fearsome epidemics 
between 1831 and 1868, to which period the distribution of the earliest health leaflets 
can be traced ... .' (BLYTHE, 1986: 105). 
Blythe suggests that health educational practice (here leaflet distribution) is distinct 
from the activity of what in his next paragraph he terms 'the public health movement'. 
At the end of the paper, several pages on, he wonders: 
'Perhaps the greatest barriers in this field are, however, still the same as a century ago: 
the low appeal of prevention and the considerable ignorance surrounding health 
promotion .... ?' (BLYTHE, 1986: 115). 
It could be asserted that a further barrier is the lack of conceptual clarity and historical 
interpretation which has led Blythe to 'sandwich' health education between public 
health and health promotion. I will later argue for an interpretation of history which 
allows greater coherence and a stronger notion of 'tradition' to emerge for the fIeld of 
health improvement as a whole. This interpretation also has some power in explaining 
the rich seam of dispute running through the history of health improvement 
understood as 'health promotion'. For the time being, though. I will in tum briefly 
review each of the phases I have identified above. 
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Victorian public health reforms and action were responses to the new and 
fundamental dangers to health posed by the industrial revolution; and by the rapid 
urbanisation of large parts of Britain from the beginning of the nineteenth century 
onwards (YOUNG AND WHITEHEAD, 1993). Much of this new urban population 
existed in conditions of gross poverty, continually subject to disease on epidemic 
scale. Legislative action- in particular the 1848 Public Health Act- followed 
connections made, for example by Chadwick (1842) between poverty and ill health. 
But this action was not primarily for reasons of social justice. Rather, improvements 
in such things as sanitary conditions and water supply were dictated by a desire to 
maintain and improve national economic efficiency through keeping populations 
strong enough to work. There was also a substantial imperative for social and moral 
stability. 
Whatever reasoning lay behind it, by the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th 
centuries public health reform had resulted in a general decline in environmental 
hazards. In addition, the very beginnings of what might now be termed 'the welfare 
state' were emerging. The Liberal government of Lloyd George introduced national 
health insurance provision in 1911 (although once more this was largely for 
economic, as opposed to intrinsically health, reasons). 
These public health developments coincided with rapid progress in the field of what 
could be called 'personal medicine'. This progress extended well into the twentieth 
century. First came development of the germ theory of disease, from which followed 
immunisation and vaccination. Then the 1930s and 1940s saw the advent of the 
therapeutic era. including the discovery and eventual mass production of penicillin 
(RIEDMAN AND GUSTAFSON. 1995). Medicine assumed a profound confidence 
in its ability to counter cases of individual illness and disease (YOUNG AND 
WHITEHEAD. 1993: ASHTON AND SEYMOUR, 1993). This focus on personal 
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medicine and its 'magic bullets' meant reconception of public health and its purpose. 
It shifted from its environmental roots largely to playing a supporting role to the 
enterprise of personal medicine (FRENCH, UNPUBLISHED). 
The high tide of medicine, perfectly matched to the modem age, meant that it alone 
claimed credit for the undoubted dramatic improvements in health (by almost any 
indicator) enjoyed by the UK population in the first half of the 20th century. The 
corollary to this was a remarkable decline in the belief that health could be improved 
by focusing on environmental and social measures. The view that health improvement 
depended on personal medicine and its continuing advance was widespread (a view, 
as will be seen, later to be challenged). 
Given this state of affairs, it was natural that the 'medical model' should dominate 
health education during this period (TONES, 1993). Individuals were to an ever 
greater extent seen as holding personal responsibility for their health: for co-operating 
in its maintenance through the expertise of preventive medicine; and for submitting to 
medical treatment when things went wrong (SUTHERLAND, 1979). Health 
education simply played its small and relatively insignificant part in medicine's grand 
project. 
If there were any 'high water marks' for health education in the first half of the 20th 
century, they were probably around the periods of the First and Second World Wars. 
For war brought threats to health unconventional in the sense that personal medicine 
was not wholly or partly able to provide the solution. During the First World War, it 
was reported that up to 200/0 of Britain's military personnel were suffering from 
venereal disease (YO). This alarming news resulted in the first ever Government 
support grant (equivalent to almost £1 million in today's tenns) being given to the 
National Council for Combating Venereal Disease in support of its health education 
efforts against YO (BLYTHE. 1986). Equally, World War Two military planners 
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were concerned that mass bombing of cities (never before a feature of warfare) would 
result in disease of epidemic proportions. The Central Council for Health Education 
(CCRE), previously a peripheral organisation, took on a more central importance and 
worked with the Ministries of Health and Infonnation on plans for campaigns- for 
example to promote immunisation against diphtheria (this in fact resulted in a rise in 
such immunisations of children from 8 to 620/0 during the period 1940-45) (BLYTHE, 
1986). 
In 1945, following the end of the Second World War, a Labour government was 
elected to power. It set about creating a coherent welfare state, aiming to banish 
Beveridge's 'five giants' of Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness (HIS 
MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE, 1942). The National Health Service (NHS) 
was created in 1948; community health services (the public service grouping most 
naturally inclined towards health education) took their place in local authorities. From 
this base, professionals such as health visitors were involved in health education 
according to the 'medical model'- didactic advice and infonnation giving and so on. 
They were themselves under the control of aptly titled medical officers of health. 
Nominally the Ministry of Health had strategic responsibility for health education: 
there was little supporting national or local policy work; and there was hardly any 
attempt to move towards a critical understanding or awareness of the scope and limits 
of health education (EWLES, 1993). With the receding of unconventional threats to 
health, the field of health education returned to the backwaters. These were hardly 
disturbed by the arrival, for the first time, of a tiny occupational group (less than 
twenty for most of the 1950s)- health education officers. 
There were only two important interruptions to a period of roughly twenty years 
(from the early 1950s to the early 1970s) during which largely unevaluated, medical 
model health education was the order of the day. The first was the publication of the 
Cohen Report (MINISTRY OF HEALTH. 1964). the product of the committee of 
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national enquiry into health education chaired by Lord Cohen. This had been 
prompted by a number of developments, including a growing concern of local 
authorities for more robust health education services. It recommended limited- and to 
some extent independent- development of health education structures. These included 
the establishment of a central health education board for England and Wales. stronger 
than the emaciated CCHE. This board was eventually formed as the Health Education 
Council (HEC) in 1968, although in its relationships it had much the same odd hybrid 
character as the CCHE. It was neither independent from, nor part of, central 
government. Cohen also recommended the development of specialist health education 
structures at local level. 
The second interruption was the publication of 'Prevention and Health: Everybody's 
Business' (DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY, 1976). This 
was the closest a UK government had yet come to a policy statement on health 
improvement. While it was still heavily in thrall to the medical model- its emphasis 
firmly on individual lifestyle change as the route to better health for the nation- it did 
at least provide some sort of strategic focus for health education. 'Prevention and 
Health' was in part inspired by mounting political concern at the escalating costs of 
treatment and care in health services (HAM, 1985). Concern increased as the fortunes 
of the UK economy declined in the early to mid- 1970s. 
The publication of 'Prevention and Health' was followed, three years later, by 
'Rethinking Community Medicine' (UNIT FOR THE STUDY OF HEALTH 
POLICY, 1979). This report suggested much more radical action to address the 
negative social and economic determinants of heath. Perhaps more accurately than 
'Prevention and Health', it reflected a growing view (in some circles) that medicine by 
itself could actually have very little impact on the overall health of western 
populations. 
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There were two roots to such a view. The first was the increasingly accurate mapping 
being undertaken of the relationship between social and economic circumstance and 
health. This was exemplified by The Black Report (TOWNSEND, DAVIDSON AND 
WHITEHEAD, 1988). Black presented compelling evidence- rejected at the time of 
his report's 1980 publication by what was now a Conservative government- that 
health depended on much more than access to basic medical services or the ability to 
change aspects of lifestyle. 
The second root involved fundamental attacks on the primacy of medicine itself. In a 
seminal and model study, McKeown (1976) presented evidence for the case that 
decline in tuberculosis (TB) mortality- a major killer for much of the preceding 
hundred years- should in fact be mainly explained by the vast improvements that had 
taken place in social and environmental conditions over this period. Medical advance 
had really been of secondary importance in countering TB. 
McKeown's compelling empirical evidence was amplified by even more radical 
challenges to medicine which were mounted at around the same time. Critics, most 
notably Illich (1977), argued it was not only the case that the effects of medicine on 
health had been overblown; but also that its activities had been positively health-
harming- iatrogenic. 
This radical questioning- together with the growing belief that health and illness were 
complex social phenomena not understandable purely through pathology and 
aetiology- combined to produce an effective challenge to traditional medical practice. 
By implication this challenge embraced both 'medical model' health education and 
dominant conceptions of public health. (As recently as the end of the decade before 
that in which Illich was famously writing. it was being argued that the primary 
function of public health was to support individual adjustment to an unhealthy 
environment (MORRIS. 1969).) Although it would be impossible to argue that 
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traditional conceptions of medicine and health were completely overturned by lllich. 
McKeown and other writers, there is little doubt that their work- together with the 
cumulative effect of the political-economic climate of the time- led to the beginning 
of what Ashton and Seymour (1993) regard as a new phase of public health. 
There are a number of early landmarks representing the so-called 'New Public Health'. 
These include 'A New Perspective on the Health of Canadians' (LALONDE, 1974). 
Marc Lalonde, then Canadian Minister of Health, argued that social and 
environmental improvements, perhaps more so than medical services, were likely to 
yield better health for the citizens of Canada. 'A New Perspective on the Health of 
Canadians' is often seen as having provided the stimulus for World Health 
Organisation (WHO) declarations during 1977 and 1978. The 1977 declaration, 
'Health for All by the Year 2000' (WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION, 1977) 
committed member governments of WHO to ensuring that their main social targets 
should relate to attainment by all their citizens of levels of health by the year 2000 
such that they would be able to lead economically productive and socially fruitful 
lives. Importantly, the eventual European targets for 'Health for All' (WORLD 
HEALTH ORGANISATION, 1985) embraced social and environmental ones as well 
as those concerned mostly with disease reduction. The 1978 (Alma Ata) declaration 
underpinned 'Health for All' by putting primary health care at centre stage as the 
vehicle through which it would be delivered. 
Seven years were to elapse from the publication of the first set of European targets 
until the then UK government produced its own targets for health improvement for 
England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (HEALTH PROMOTION WALES, 
1992: NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE, 1992; SCOTTISH OFFICE, 1992; 
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HEALTH, 1992). I will focus more closely on these, 
their pOlitical and social context and their relationship to the supposedly newly 
emerging concept and field of health promotion in the following sections. 
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At this point, however, it is worth adding an interesting and important coda to the 
mapping of the rise of health promotion in the context of society and medicine. It can 
be argued that health promotion emerged at least partly because of a mistrust in 
medical power alone to deal with illness and disease; and because of a growing belief 
in the importance of social influences on health. Ironically, though, it was disease that 
can be seen as largely responsible for the relatively exponential increase in public 
expenditure on the field of activity from the mid- 1980s onwards. The disease was, of 
course, HIV/ AIDS. The arrival of the AIDS pandemic in the early part of that 
decade, together with the failure of medicine immediately to 'deal' with it in terms of 
'discovering a cure' alarmed politicians in both the United States (SHILTS, 1988), the 
United Kingdom (BERRIDGE, 1996a, 1996b) and other developed countries. 
Berridge, writing about the UK situation, argues that the seeming powerlessness of 
medicine prompted government action on the prevention! health promotion front 
(BERRIDGE, 1996b: 21). This action may largely be characterised as 'medical model' 
health education (partly because of the nature of the times, and partly because of the 
nature of the disease). Again, while other non- governmental organisations and 
groups certainly approached HIV/ AIDS in more radical ways (for example, through 
methods of community participation); at their core they were always focused on 
disease prevention. The greatest irony of all is that in the midst of the era of the 'New 
Public Health', health promotion's biggest triumph was to attract the attention of 
politicians and public because it provided hope in protecting individuals against 
disease. 
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3. Disputed Territory (1): Approaches to Health Promotion in the 1980s and 
1990s 
My account of the historical development of health promotion in its social and 
epidemiological context has been broken at a particular point- towards the end of the 
1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. Some theorists suggest a sudden flowering of a 
new genus- health promotion- around this time. For example, Yeo (1993) talks of the 
emergence during this period of a 'reform movement' trying to influence economic, 
social and environmental policy in order to achieve 'Health for All'. Macdonald and 
Bunton (1992) assert that health promotion 'as a term and concept' first appeared at 
the time of Lalonde (1974). 
Persisting with what I will later argue is the mistaken 'health education- then- health 
promotion' interpretation of the history of the field, it is natural to suggest that the late 
1970s and early 1980s were a watershed in this history. Health promotion now having 
been 'born', it is possible to move to historically accounting for this supposed 'new' 
entity. Yet even if there were such a thing as a clear cut 'birth' of health promotion, 
there is great uncertainty about what actually emerged, as much of the 1980s and 
onwards were filled with debate and dispute about its nature, what it involves and 
what it excludes. 
Debate was partly to do with demarcation; there were many attempts to define and 
describe the legitimate scope, limits and activity of health promotion. (For example, 
see TANNAHILL, 1985: DOWNIE, TANNAHILL AND TANNAHILL, 1996; 
FRENCH, 1990.) But debate about demarcation often also contained dispute about 
ideology, either implicitly or explicitly. Some academics and practitioners expressed 
regret and surprise at the way in which 'health promotion'- doubtless being seen as 
bestowed from on high by Lalonde, the WHO and the likes- had been enthusiastically 
taken up by specialist UK health education practitioners (FRENCH. 1985). In an 
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important article, Williams (1986) argued there was no coherent version of 'health 
promotion', save one that was likely to entail heavy handed 'selling' and marketing. 
This writer claimed that such activity was in lamentable contrast to the honest job of 
individual development undertaken by those involved in health education. 
There was not only doubt and disagreement about the apparent wholesale 
'replacement' of health education by health promotion. There was also dispute about 
the question of what health promotion should be trying to do. Some of this related to 
different political perspectives. For example, libertarians such as Anderson (1990) 
argued that health promotion should simply be encouraging individuals to take 
responsibility for their own health behaviour. On the other hand, people of 
communitarian or collectivist persuasion (bolstered by things such as the reasoned 
enquiry evident in the Black Report) advocated broad societal changes based on their 
view that ill health and disease were largely caused by structures. 
The relative intensity of this dispute in the UK is in part explained by the nature of the 
political times in which it took place. The 1980s were politically and socially very 
different from any other post war decade. 'Economic realism' on the part of the 
Conservative government elected in 1979 led to at least the perception of new and 
dramatic curbs in public expenditure. (Although 'cuts' are now associated in the 
public eye with the advent of the Conservatives in that year, the previous Labour 
administration had placed tight reigns on public spending (COLE, 1995: 178).) 
Spending curbs represented a fundamental breach in what up to that point had been a 
political consensus on the role and nature of public services. Before 1979, both major 
political parties had by and large agreed that the welfare state and services associated 
with it were essential factors in maintaining social and economic stability. Mrs 
Thatcher. Prime Minister from that year onwards, sought to implement policy based 
on the requirement of the individual to make provision for her or his survival and 
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thriving. Accompanying this was the belief that those who wanted had a perfect right 
to choose whether to use public services. or to opt for another form of provision. 
(Some commentators- for example, Hutton (1995)- have argued that the needs of 
those unable to exercise those kinds of choices were irrelevant to the policy makers.) 
Measures were taken deliberately and continually to ensure pluralism, deregulation 
and privatisation in almost every aspect of what had previously been seen as the 
preserve of public service (LEATHARD. 1990). 
Such political libertarianism strengthened and gave credence to libertarian ideologies 
within health promotion. In the same way that the creed of libertarianism in the wider 
political arena was arguably never effectively challenged for much of the 1980s; so 
those pressing for more radical structural approaches to health promotion were never 
able to shift the essentially libertarian nature of policy in this area. (For examples of 
such policy, see Secretaries of State (1987); and Secretary of State for Health (1992).) 
For the structuralist, it must have seemed as if the devil was the only one able to play 
any tunes at all. Indeed, it has been suggested (MCKEOWN, 1995) that theoretical 
arguments on the nature and focus of health promotion in effect played into the hands 
of Conservative politicians; more effort was spent on this debate than on challenges 
to structures causing ill- health. 
The ideologies and actions of the dominant UK political force in the 1980s did not 
only have the effect of characterising the nature of 'official' health promotion. Public 
expenditure curbs and public sector 'deregulation' also directly affected how, where 
and with what limitations health promotion practitioners worked. To demonstrate this 
it is necessary to consider the development of health promotion during this period in 
key 'settings'- the fourth dimension of my history of health promotion. 
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4. Disputed Territory (2): Settings for Health Promotion in the 1980s and 1990s 
Settings can be understood as catchment areas for approaching a specific population 
group such as primary health care patients or school students. More technically. they 
can also be regarded as a framework for planning health promotion activity; their 
features and structures can actively support the promotion (or demotion) of health 
(BARIC, 1996). My use of the term here is mainly in the former sense. In an 
influential review of the effectiveness of health promotion, Tones and Tilford (1994) 
identify five settings. However, this historical account will concentrate on just three. 
They are those where it is reasonable to believe the consolidation or development of 
health promotion has been most marked; or alternatively most disputed or 
problematic. My concentration is on the settings of health care (mainly primary health 
care): communities as represented by local authorities (although I acknowledge the 
limitations of such representation); and schools. 
Health promotion probably developed most strongly during the 1980s and early 1990s 
in the primary health care setting. In the early 1980s, a number of reports by the 
Royal College of General Practitioners (RCGP) were influential in establishing the 
view that primary care allowed the opportunity to influence individuals to change 
their health behaviour, particularly those aspects of it thought to be linked to 
cardiovascular disease (ROYAL COLLEGE OF GENERAL PRACTITIONERS, 
1981, 1983, 1986). Given the Conservatives' desire both to promote individual 
responsibility and to reduce health care costs, it was quite natural that the 
development of so- called 'anticipatory care' should be encouraged. Such 
encouragement was confirmed by the publication of the White Paper, 'Promoting 
Better Health' (SECRET ARIES OF STATE. 1987). This was billed as the 
government's programme for improving primary health care and had a strong focus 
on health promotion, where this is understood as specific preventive activities and 
lifestyle advice. In particular. the White Paper proposed a system of incentive 
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payments to general practitioners (GPs) to run so-called 'health promotion clinics'. In 
practice, these 'clinics' usually involved a practice nurse (rather than a GP) giving 
advice on a range of topics (for example, smoking cessation or the prevention of 
obesity) to individual patients or sometimes to small groups. Implementation of the 
system was not without problems. In particular, it was vulnerable to the criticism that 
it was impossible to be quite certain about the quality of the interventions being 
undertaken; while some general practices would certainly be taking their 
responsibilities seriously, others might be 'cashing in' on the system (EWLES, 1993). 
General practitioners who were keen on health promotion could well have been 
distracted by the major change that swept the NHS in 1990. The NHS and 
Community Care Act of that year (preceded by the White Paper, Working for Patients 
(DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 1989» enforced a 'split' in health service 
organisation and the creation of a so- called 'internal market' for health care. On the 
one hand, there were to be bodies responsible for 'buying' health care for their 
populations ('purchasers'); and on the other there were to be bodies responsible for 
providing this health care ('providers'). I will discuss the 1990 changes in more detail 
in the following chapter when I consider their impact on practitioners of health 
promotion (particularly health promotion specialists). For the time being, it should be 
said that GPs were to be pivotal in this new system. Despite the frequent conspicuous 
absence of appropriate training or experience: and despite the 'independent contractor' 
mentality pervading this occupational group; family doctors were encouraged to take 
on a 'purchasing'- type role. In its most acute form, this involved general practices 
becoming 'fund holding' and taking direct responsibility for purchasing health care for 
the patients on their lists. Successive waves of practices became fund holding almost 
from the beginning of the reforms and as they did it became harder for the remainder 
to resist pressure to go the same way. Fund holding GPs used their financial power to 
extract the best possible services for their own patients, frequently at the expense of 
those on the lists of neighbouring, but non- fund holding, practices (HUTION. 1995). 
56 
The reality was that both fund holding and non- fund holding general practitioners 
were increasingly occupied by the rig ours of the quasi market place for health care 
(FRANCOME AND MARKS, 1996). 
England's health improvement White Paper, 'The Health of the Nation', was published 
in 1992 (SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HEALTH, 1992), along with equivalent 
documents for other UK countries (HEALTH PROMOTION WALES, 1992: 
NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE, 1992; SCOTTISH OFFICE, 1992). Although 
specific targets and target areas varied between the documents, there were broad 
proposals for action in all of them around the key areas of cardiovascular disease: 
cancers; mental health; accidents; and HIV I AIDS. Primary health care was 
emphasised once more as a key vehicle for health improvement. The White Papers 
were accompanied by guidance on what was required to support meeting of disease 
reduction targets set- for example, through the 'novel' method of alliance working 
(DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 1993b). The health improvement White Papers gave 
the government an opportunity to change the increasingly ridiculed 'health promotion 
clinics' system. Practices were supposedly to be rewarded in a progressive manner, 
according to the level of work they undertook and the extent to which this embraced 
the needs of the population they served (as opposed to individual patients). The 
replacement system appeared to allow more flexibility in how health promotion was 
interpreted and undertaken, but it was still centred on individual lifestyle change (not 
least because the White Papers themselves were so firmly in this mOUld). The system 
was changed yet again before the eventual defeat of the Conservatives in the 1997 
General Election. 
A little before this date, evidence was published suggesting that despite policy 
concentration on primary health care, its ability genuinely to promote the public 
health was extremely limited. General practitioners were tied to conceptions of health 
based on individual responsibility~ and unable even to do much in this respect because 
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of accounting, financial and other organisational demands placed on them by the 
internal market (RUSSELL, 1995). It seemed that more than a decade after the RCGP 
had identified the bright promise of prevention held within primary health care, the 
importance of its role in health promotion (particularly when this was interpreted as 
extending beyond individual responsibility) was often questionable. 
Moving from primary health care setting to local authorities, it is possible to see 
health promotion also developing in this setting during and beyond the 1980s 
(although again not without difficulty). In 1974, local authorities- up to this year 
having responsibility for community health services-lost this role to the NHS. There 
was a certain irony in the fact that as the case against medicalisation became more 
and more clear, community health care professionals (who were possibly those most 
likely to work with alternatives to the medical model) were subsumed into the state 
monolith arguably preoccupied with its perpetuation. However, the research evidence 
gathering in the late 1970s and early 1980s on the strong connection between poverty 
and ill-health prompted some local government re- assessment of its role in health 
improvement. Once more, the Black Report and related work- despite rejection on 
ideological grounds by central government- assumed influence. It pointed, for 
example, to the profound impact on health of traditional local authority 
responsibilities such as housing. 
The emergence of health promotion on the local authority agenda during the 1980s 
was also inspired by the 'Health for All' movement, which also had as its focus 
structural causes of ill- health rather than individual 'risky lifestyles'. The collectivist-
type agenda of 'Health for All' appeared attractive to some local politicians. This was 
especially so for those in metropolitan areas where evidence of health inequalities was 
frequently most compelling: and where elected representatives together with their 
officers were often of different ideological persuasion to the Conservative central 
government. Inevitably, national policy- making demonstrated hostility towards local 
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efforts to influence health at structural level (MORAN, 1986). In any case. the 
Conservatives, while ambivalent about it at the beginning of their period in 
government (YOUNG, 1990), were gripped by the middle 1980s with what turned out 
to be their own grand project of privatisation, with the attendant notions of 
deregulation and pluralism in service provision. Clearly this was in marked contrast to 
the aspirations and practice of 'Health for All' . (There was, however, a paradox here. 
Conservative hostility to local authorities with 'Health for All' agendas belied the fact 
that Mrs Thatcher's government was itself a signatory to the 38 European targets.) 
The final health promotion setting whose development will be briefly reviewed is that 
of the school. State education provision was traditionally a local authority (county or 
metropolitan borough) responsibility. This setting was also, therefore, heavily 
influenced by the political orthodoxy of libertarianism; and the desire to deal with all 
opposition to the orthodoxy through centralisation. Increasingly interventionist 
government policy resulted in legislation- particularly the Education Reform Act 
1988 (DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE, 1988)- which as a by-
product had profound implications for schools health promotion. 
Central government education reformers moved in two kinds of ways to strengthen 
their control of the state school system. The frrst way can be thought of as 
organisational or managerial. In particular, schools were encouraged to 'opt out' of 
local authority control, the incentive for doing so being that it was possible to receive 
favourable grants directly from central government (HUTION, 1995: 215). The 
second way was through control of the curriculum. A national curriculum was 
introduced, which carefully prescribed what was to be taught and emphasised 
concentration mainly on Maths, Science and English. 
Changes in the source of power over schools' organisation and the curriculum made 
coherent planning of health promotion in the setting difficult. Local authorities had 
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developed- sometimes quite extensively- advisory services for schools under their 
control. These offered support for teachers implementing curricula- for example. 
through the provision of in service training (INSET). Frequently this kind of help \Vas 
available for personal, social and health education (PSHE) programmes; many PSHE 
advisory posts had been created in local education authorities (LEAs) through finance 
for HIV and drugs prevention. But 'opted out' schools, with greater financial freedom 
and no direct line of accountability to the LEA, had no obligation to 'buy in' to such 
services. Many might not have felt they wanted to do so because of the nature of the 
National Curriculum. This viewed PSHE as a 'cross curricular theme' rather than a 
subject with protected curriculum time (NATIONAL CURRICULUM COUNCll.., 
1990). The importance given to PSHE within particular schools depended to a large 
extent on the interest and commitment of individual teachers. Even if a teacher was 
committed, it might be difficult to get a head's endorsement (in the case of 'opted out' 
schools) to 'buy in' advisory teacher help. It was much more likely to go to examined 
core curriculum subjects such as Maths and Science; a school's success in attracting 
pupils (and therefore more funding) depended on success in examination 'league 
tables'. 
All schools- and not just those which had 'opted out'- were affected by the impact of 
educational reform on their actual or potential health promotion activity. LEAs found 
it harder and harder to sustain advisory services; and where they did they tended to 
focus on what the market wanted. Generally, this was support for core curriculum 
subjects. A weakened advisory service affected every school in the area it served. The 
National Curriculum (with its capacity to 'squeeze out' health promotion) was of 
course to be implemented in all state schools, regardless of their organisational status. 
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s. 'The Third Way'?: Health Promotion in the 'New' Political Context 
An account of the development of health promotion through the 1980s and into the 
1990s seems to be characterised by dispute and paradox. There was sustained 
disagreement about the nature of health promotion and what it should be attempting 
to do. Paradox existed in many policy decisions and directions: for example, the 
neglect of inequalities at a time when the empirical evidence for seeing them as 
essential determinants of health had never been stronger; and the focus on 'medical 
model' health promotion (for example in the primary health care setting) when the 
previously almost mystical power of medicine was being challenged in a very 
effective way. 
Health promotion was certainly developing, but within strong constraints and 
limitations, including theoretical confusion and political ambiguity or even hostility. 
It has been argued that the pinnacle of British health improvement policy in the 
second half of the 20th century- 'The Health of the Nation' (together with related 
Welsh, Scottish and Northern Irish documents)- marked the high point of the 
dominance of the medical model of health promotion, with focus very much on 
disease prevention and individual lifestyle (TONES, 1993: 127). 
Health promotion- as this history also demonstrates- is an intensely political activity. 
Its practice cannot be divorced from the political environment in which it takes place. 
This observation is one of the starting points for my enquiry into the field's moral 
problems. As Easton (1953) notes, however, political policy is dynamic. Policies 
change over time. New policy making regimes replace those that have run their 
course. In the UK during the 1990s, there were effectively two 'regime' changes with 
consequent policy shifts and implications for health promotion. 
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The first was the Conservative party's removal of Mrs Thatcher, and her replacement 
by John Major. There was a widespread feeling among the party in the very early 
1990s that the need for the acute ideology of the former had ended (COLE, 1995): 
and a period of greater pragmatism was required. It is true that in broad terms the 
policy of the Thatcherite era towards public services largely continued under Mr 
Major. However, there were some changes including- in the dying days of the 
Conservatives' 18- year rule- a greater willingness than before to consider links 
between social circumstance and individual health. Carefully referred to as 'variations 
in health', a sub- group of the Chief Medical Officer's 'Health of the Nation' Working 
Group' produced a report on the impact of what others talked about as inequalities 
(DEPART~NT OF HEALTH, 1995c). 
Mr Major's Conservative regime was replaced, following a spectacular election 
victory in May 1997, by a Labour government. This had come to power on a 
manifesto promising both economic prudence and a commitment to 'restoring' public 
services like education and health. Its pre- election policy document on the NHS was 
rich in rhetoric: 
'A truly national health service no longer exists. It has been replaced by a health 
market led by accountants, a patchwork of businesses competing with each other, 
dependent for their funding, and their very existence, on their success in winning 
orders and making money .... The values that underpin the NHS- a comprehensive 
health service, free at the point of use, based on need, not the ability to pay- have been 
betrayed ... .' (LABOUR PARTY, 1996: 1). 
Several months after the election win, important policy documents were produced 
outlining the future direction of health services and health improvement policy. The 
first was 'The New NHS' (STATIONERY OFFICE. 1997). This White Paper laid out 
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government plans for the new organisation of the Health Service. In particular, while 
it saw continued demarcation between 'commissioners' and 'providers' of health 
services; it claimed to be getting rid of the internal market through its requirement for 
collaboration between health service and other organisations. Longer term 'service 
agreements' were to replace 'contracts'. Primary health care would be the focus for 
commissioning, through Primary Care Groups (PCGs). These were to be groups of 
general practices working together to commission services for the population they 
served, with input to this process from community and local authority representatives. 
There would be new mechanisms for gathering and disseminating information on 
effective clinical practice; and a Commission for Health Improvement would have the 
power to step in and take control of health services failing to deliver effective and 
efficient services. 
'The New NHS' was followed by a consultation (Green) paper on health improvement 
for England, 'Our Healthier Nation' (SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HEALTH, 
1998); and similar documents for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
(NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE, 1998: SCOTTISH OFFICE, 1998; WELSH 
OFFICE, 1998). 'Our Healthier Nation' and its equivalents were markedly different 
from 'The Health of the Nation' (and its equivalents) in a number of ways. 'Our 
Healthier Nation', particularly, proposed a much smaller range of health 'targets', 
based on the four key areas of coronary heart disease and stroke: mental health; 
accidents; and cancers. It explicitly acknowledged, and encouraged awareness of. 
social determinants of health and the persistence of inequalities. Emerging from this, 
it proposed that individuals, communities and government all had responsibilities and 
a part to play in promoting and improving health: 
'To help bring the nation together in a concerted and co-ordinated drive against poor 
health. the government proposes a national contract for health. The contract sets 
out our mutual responsibilities for improving health in the areas where we can make 
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most progress towards our overall aims of reducing the numbers of early deaths, 
increasing the length of our healthy lives and tackling inequalities in health ... .' 
(SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HEALTH, 1998: 29). 
Both 'The New NHS' , 'Our Healthier Nation' and its equivalents for the other 
countries of the United Kingdom were representative of the much vaunted policy 
approach of the 'Third Way'. 'New' Labour was separated by 18 years from the last 
Labour administration, which had been severely tainted by a long period of industrial 
unrest and deeply unsatisfactory economic performance. Public perception was that 
this administration had been powerless to do anything about the gloomy state in 
which the UK found itself in 1979 (COLE, 1995). Determined not to succumb to this 
sort of perception again, 'New' Labour rejected the old creeds of collectivism, 
monolithic state provision and acquiescence to union power. Equally, however, it did 
not accept Thatcherite libertarianism. The 'Third Way' sought a distinctive direction 
that was neither altogether libertarian; nor altogether collectivist (KAY, 1998). 
What does the 'Third Way' mean for health promotion? Given that many health 
promotion practitioners work in or from the NHS, 'Third Way' principles applied to 
Health Service organisation are clearly relevant. These revolve (at least in rhetorical 
terms) around establishment or strengthening structures to promote and ensure 
effectiveness (not simply conceived of as cost- effectiveness); and consumer 
centredness. In terms of health improvement strategy and the direction of health 
promotion, the attempt to recognise the limits of both individual and state 
responsibility for health is probably of most importance in defining the difference of 
the 'Third Way' (PINTUS, 1998); along with a reinvigorated approach to partnership 
for health (DARK, 1998). 
It could be suggested that this new policy direction is a support to the reconciling of 
separate perspectives on the nature of health (on the one hand, the view that it is 
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determined by individuals; and on the other, that it is determined by structures). This 
history has identified these separate perspectives as being principal causes of the 
disagreement and dissension strongly characterising my account. I will later argue 
that they are also intimately connected to moral difficulties emerging from the theory 
and practice of health promotion. Whether reconciliation of the perspectives (as the 
'Third Way' appears to try and propose) is in fact possible- and whether this can 
contribute to our ability to deal with ethical problems in the field- will also be 
discussed. For the moment, it is necessary to note the promise for health promotion 
contained by 'Our Healthier Nation' and related documents- the 'New' Labour 
government was, after all, the first explicitly to set out its hopes for health 
improvement within months of taking office. But it is also necessary to note the 
difficulties. These range from practitioners facing yet further organisational tunnoil 
(HEALTH SERVICE JOURNAL, 1997); through to problems in transforming the 
new commissioning engine of primary health care to one with a genuinely public 
health (as opposed to treatment and care) perspective (PECKHAM, TURTON AND 
TAYLOR, 1998). 
6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have considered the first four of my 'dimensions' of a history of 
health promotion: the history of the social and political context in which it emerged 
and has taken place; the history of epidemiology and disease control, with which it is 
strongly connected; the account of the debate about what health promotion is and 
what it entails; and of its development in particular 'settings'. 
In reviewing these historical dimensions, it will already be clear that the field and its 
nature is both highly disputed; and subject to the demands of public policy and other 
expressions of value. I now move to consider the fifth and final dimension of my 
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history- an account of the way in which health promotion has developed as a 
'professional activity'. 
66 
CHAPTER THREE- OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN HEALTH PROMOTION: THE FIFTH mSTORICAL 
'DIMENSION' 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I consider what I am calling the 'fifth dimension' of a history of health 
promotion. This is the account of health promotion's development as an occupational 
activity. 
To introduce this account, I return to the distinction I made in Chapter One. This is 
between health promotion specialists (HPSs- those whose occupational role is mainly 
or wholly the promotion of health); and health promoters (those who promote health 
as part of another occupational or professional role- for example, doctors or nurses). 
Here I sketch out key aspects of the history of the development of health promotion as 
an occupational activity for both of these groups. I particularly focus on the last 20 
years or so. 
Such a focus is deliberate. For about this period, a number of those within the 
occupation of specialist health promotion have been pursuing what I term a 
'professionalisation project'. They have been attempting to tum their occupation into a 
profession. Health promoters- already part of another occupation (or profession)-
have not been actively engaged in the project of professionalising specialist health 
promotion. 
This distinctive difference between health promotion specialists and health promoters 
makes it possible to identify two different accounts within the broad historical 
dimension of health promotion's development as an occupational activity. There is an 
account to be given of the 'professionalisation project' (directly involving only health 
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promotion specialists); and also one to be given of how other occupational or 
professional groups have developed their health promotion role. Of course, there are 
connections between the two. This must be so, given that both specialists and health 
promoters have the common purpose of promoting health (albeit with the major 
caveat that what this actually means might be understood between and within the 
groups in different ways). However, the separate accounts of health promotion's 
development as an occupational activity can be related to important conceptual 
distinctions that it is necessary to make when exploring the territory of occupational 
development: 
* The term profession is both descriptive as well as one carrying ideological 
connotations (HOYLE, 1980; ERAUT, 1994). Professionalisation is the process by 
which members of an occupational group attempt to take on the values and attributes 
of a profession in order that they become members of a 'new' profession. An 
occupational group aspiring to become a profession might conceive of things like 
formal training, regulation of entry and development and protection of specialist 
knowledge as descriptive components supporting their aspirations. The activities of 
some in the occupational group of health promotion specialist can be understood 
through this conceptualisation. 
* Professional development constitutes processes through which the skills and 
expertise required to practice and to improve service to clients are developed 
(HOYLE AND JOHN, 1995). It is clear that health promotion specialists will be 
interested in professional development: for some (but not necessarily for all. as my 
history will show), this interest will connect to the desire to professionalise. But 
given- as I showed in Chapter Two- there has been over time a growing policy and 
public interest in health promotion; health promoters are also likely to have interest in 
professional development in this field. 
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So there are practical distinctions to be made between the interests of health 
promotion specialists and health promoters in relation to the broad area of 
occupational development; and these are connected to important conceptual 
distinctions. As I will later argue (in Chapter Eight), such practical and conceptual 
distinctions have importance for attempts to strengthen, in a moral sense, the field of 
health promotion. Thus both because the story of the 'professionalisation project' and 
the story of professional development can to some extent be regarded as different: and 
because that difference possesses ethical import; I have structured this chapter in a 
particular way. 
I begin by describing and discussing the history of specialist health promotion's 
'professionalisation project', ending this with an impression of how the occupation 
was left in the early to mid- 1990s (my historical 'cut off point, as I discussed in 
Chapter One). I then move to consider particularly the recent history of professional 
development for health promotion. Again, it should be noted that this structure is at 
least to some extent artefactual. There are, as I have remarked, connections between 
the 'professionalisation project' and professional development in health promotion. 
Nevertheless, the differences- and their importance for my enquiry later on- warrant 
the way in which I have chosen to tell the story of the development of health 
promotion as occupational activity. 
2. Specialist Health Promotion's 'Professionalisation Project' 
Health education and health promotion, I have already argued, possess relatively long 
(even if not very well recognised or adequately charted) histories. It is only in fairly 
recent times (from about the 1950s onwards. as already noted) that the sort of role or 
occupation now thought of as specialist in these fields of activity started to emerge. 
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The 'professionalisation project' of specialist health promotion can only be clearly 
charted for an even shorter period- from about the end of the 1970s and the be(7innin (7 o 0 
of the 1980s. In Chapter Two, a number of historical landmarks in the post- war CK 
development of health education and health promotion were noted. These included 
the Cohen Report (MINISTRY OF HEALTH, 1964) which proposed the 
development of limited structures to carry forward specialist health education at both 
local and national level. It was imagined this would consolidate and strengthen the 
capacity of the literally tiny numbers of people who had been employed as health 
education officers by local authorities since the 1950s; and of the fragile national 
Central Council for Health Education (CCHE) (BLYTHE, 1986). In fact, the CCHE 
was replaced by the Health Education Council (HEC) in 1968. In 1976, the Labour 
government of the day published what might be regarded as the first statement of 
health education policy and strategy intent (albeit with well- recognised major flaws). 
This was 'Prevention and Health: Everybody's Business' (DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY, 1976). 
These and other landmarks helped quicken the pace of development of specialist 
health education services. By the early 1970s, a significant number of areas within the 
UK had access to specialist health education resources of one sort or another, even 
though services and activities (from a retrospective point of view) appear quite 
limited. In 1970-71, there were still only 91 specialist health education officers 
(HEOs) in post (SUTHERLAND, 1987: 52), still mostly employed by local 
authorities. HEOs in local authorities were under the control of Medical Officers of 
Health (later to become community physicians) who in theory had a quasi- public 
health role and a limited degree of strategic and policy influence (FRENCH. 
UNPUBLISHED). The role of the HEO at this time seems to have been one of 
supplying leaflets, giving talks and organising local health education campaigns 
(EWLES. 1993). 
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The 1974 NHS Act effectively removed operational health services from local 
authority control. HEOs, along with community health services and community 
physicians, moved to NHS Area Health Authorities, becoming part of the same 
organisation that controlled hospital and acute health services. This was the English 
situation, with degrees of difference in other UK countries (HAM, 1985). 
As already discussed in Chapter Two, the mid- 1970s also witnessed the supposed 
'birth' of health promotion with the landmark document of Lalonde (1974) followed 
by a string of declarations from the W orId Health Organisation running well into the 
1980s (WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION, 1977: 1978; 1985; 1986). This period 
saw many health education officers and the departments in which they worked 
involved in switching their titles to reflect the growing importance (at least in a 
rhetorical sense) of the 'novel' concept of health promotion. Thus a health education 
officer became a health promotion officer or health promotion specialist (HPS); and 
the department where she or he worked a health promotion department. Whether, 
however, this signified changes in roles and responsibilities wasn't clear (FRENCH, 
1985). 
The advent of the 'new' movement of health promotion and its eager welcome by 
some in the UK probably did little to strengthen the organisational position of 
specialist services or increase resources to them. It could, after all, be seen as a 
'reform movement' (YEO, 1993), wishing to change structures as well as (or possibly 
even more than) individuals. This idea was likely to be anathema to what was now a 
Conservative government committed to thorough- going economic and social reform. 
but through a philosophy of libertarianism rather than one of state intervention. 
However, from the mid 1980s onwards, this government became increasingly 
concerned about HIV and AIDS. It was this threat from disease which prompted 
relatively massive increases in resources to health promotion departments at about 
this time. 
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HIV infection and AIDS had originally been thought of as homosexual- specific 
disease. By 1986, though, it was clear that the general population was at risk; it 
seemed that HIV could be spread through contaminated blood and blood products. as 
well as through sexual contact (BERRIDGE, 1996a). There was neither cure nor the 
prospect of one, forcing the government to put its trust in prevention and health 
education. On the back of 'ring- fenced' finance for HIV prevention (LEA THARD, 
1990), many local health promotion departments slowly expanded. At English 
national level, the HEC became the Health Education Authority (HEA), with a brief 
for nation-wide co-ordination of public education, although this move to greater 
governmental control was largely due to lack of trust (BERRIDGE, 1996 (b): 
TOWNSEND, DAVIDSON AND WHITEHEAD, 1988).) 
By the mid- 1980s there were probably about 500-1000 people working in HPS roles. 
Here was a gathering- and still developing- 'critical mass' of individuals concerned to 
define and develop their occupational role further. For some of these at least the idea 
of professionalisation would have appeared attractive. Lawn (1996) argues that if a 
project of professionalisation is to be successful, the professionalising occupation 
requires a grouping- an association or organisation- to carry forward its claims and 
represent itself to the public as worthy of performing its occupational function. For 
HPSs, this was the Society of Health Education Officers (SHEO), later to become the 
Society of Health Education and Health Promotion Specialists (SHEPS). The Society 
can be seen as both the principal representative of, and the main force behind. the 
HPS 'professionalisation project'. Its function in these respects has, however. been 
weakened by the fact that during this history it has never had any more than between 
a quarter and a third of HPSs in membership. In 1996, for example, there were only 
350 members of SHEPS (SOCIETY OF HEALTH EDUCATION AND HEALTH 
PROMOTION SPECIALISTS, 1998c). Further, as will be seen. even the minority of 
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HPSs actually in membership of the Society did not unanimously hold the view that 
the project was a legitimate one. 
From the early to mid 1980s onwards, professionalisers within the Society tried to 
move the project forward in three main kinds of ways: through development and 
agreement on a code of conduct for HPSs; through construction and maintenance of a 
professional register of specialists; and through encouragement and promotion of 
appropriate education and training for the occupational group. These can all clearly be 
seen as descriptive elements of a profession, things likely to be important to 
professionalisers (ERAUT, 1994: HOYLE, 1980) 
Work on the code of conduct and the professional register was begun by the Society's 
Code of Conduct sub- committee in the early 1980s. The first version of the code 
appeared in 1985 (SOCIETY OF HEALTH EDUCATION OFFICERS, 1985). 
Progress with the idea of the professional register appears to have been much slower, 
with no record of any important development and a register only finally being 
published in 1991 (SOCIETY OF HEALTH EDUCATION AND HEALTH 
PROMOTION SPECIALISTS, 1991). 
Plans to encourage, promote and possibly control access to appropriate education and 
training had begun against the background of a report from the National Staff 
Committee for NHS Administrative and Clerical Staff (1981). 'The Recruitment, 
Training and Development of Health Education Officers' (better known as The Kirby 
Report) recommended that the postgraduate diploma in health education be adopted 
as providing the basic education and training for HEOs. (Postgraduate training in 
health education had begun at London's Institute of Education in 1954, although 
diploma courses recognisable to those familiar with current provision did not begin to 
emerge until 1971 (Leeds Polytechnic), followed in 1974 by South Bank Polytechnic 
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and, in the early 1980s, by Bristol Polytechnic.) The Society established an education 
and training sub-committee to monitor and contribute to these developments. 
This impression of gathering pace in the 'professionalisation project' is not just 
attributable to the presence, for the first time, of a sufficient 'critical mass' of those 
engaged in the occupation. Arguably it is also due to events at the time in the NHS, 
which still employed by far the greatest number of HPSs. The mid- 1980s saw the 
Health Service undergoing profound change. Before the Conservatives' election in 
1979 under Margaret Thatcher, there had been broad political consensus on the NHS. 
with the view that it was acceptable for it to be an administered service. But early in 
the 1980s, Sir Roy Griffiths (of the Sainsbury supennarket chain) was asked to chair 
an enquiry into Health Service management. The introduction to his 1983 report is 
now famous: 
, "If Florence Nightingale were carrying her lamp through the corridors of the NHS 
today .... she would almost certainly be searching for the people in charge" ... .' 
(TIMMINS, 1996: 409). 
The report recommended shifting the NHS to managerial accountability. 
Recommendations took less than two years to implement (LEATHARD, 1990). 
Within this time scale the Service had moved, at least in theory, from being one 
where professional autonomy was unchallenged, to one concerned with control, 
quality standards and perfonnance indicators, applied by general managers. For 
HPSs, this was likely to have been a worrying time. They possessed little in the way 
of 'professional' status and were therefore more vulnerable than many other groups to 
the wind of managerial change. 
A policy workshop held in Harrogate in February 1988 provided a further focus and 
impetus for the 'professionalisation project'. Sponsored by the HEA and organised by 
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the Society, the preface to the workshop report clearly marks it out as an attempt to 
capitalise on the times (this was the period when HIV prevention monies were in full 
flow): 
'Recent developments in the National Health Service, the rapid increase in the 
expansion of health education knowledge and practice, and the finning up of health 
education theory has created a more urgent need for review and reappraisal than ever 
before ... .' (SOCIETY OF HEALTH EDUCATION OFFICERS, 1988). 
The outcome of the workshop was a plan for 'professionalisation I centred around three 
strongly connected areas: registration; recruitment (together with linked subjects such 
as education and training); and the maintenance and development of standards for 
professional practice. The agenda sounds very much like the one pursued by the 
Society from the beginning of the 1980s. The difference lies in the fact that the 
connection between the areas was more strongly emphasised; and there was now 
official 'sponsorship' (by the REA) for the project. 
The workshop proposed that a register of HPSs should be established, with those 
eligible to appear on the register having to fulfil certain criteria such as possession of 
appropriate qualifications, levels of experience and skills. Educational provision for 
postgraduate training and qualification in health education and health promotion 
would be supported (at this time, provision was confined mainly to a handful of 
institutions offering the postgraduate diploma qualification). Those already within or 
planning to enter the occupation of HPS would be encouraged to seek postgraduate 
qualification. The appropriateness and quality of courses offered would be monitored 
and a validation or accreditation system for these would be introduced. Eventually. 
possession of a postgraduate qualification from an institution accredited by the 
Society would be part of the requirement for registration: practice would be 
contingent on registration. Registered practitioners would have a duty to adhere to the 
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principles and articles to be set out in a new code of conduct. This programme of 
'professionalisation' was accepted by Society members at its Annual General Meetina 
e 
in April 1988. 
In 1989, the Society published a document committing itself to the implementation of 
a formal registration scheme for HPSs and outlining in more detail how this might 
function (SOCIETY OF HEALTH EDUCATION AND HEALTH PROMOTION 
OFFICERS, 1989). This was probably the catalyst to the most explicit expression of 
anti- professionalisation sentiment yet identified. A small number of practitioners 
wrote an open letter to the HPS community arguing that professionalisation was 
likely to restrict the benefits brought by the diversity of skills and experience to be 
found in the range of people entering the occupation: 
'We believe that health education benefits from this diversity, and this will be 
discouraged or prevented by the introduction of standardised formal requirements and 
registration ... .' (CHAND, TILSTON AND VERRALL, 1989). 
Underlying this and similar statements is deep ideological unease on the part of some 
involved in the occupation. This unease can be detected right the way through the 
history of the 'professionalisation project'. If entry to the practice of health education 
and health promotion is restricted, this could be seen as a betrayal of principles of 
empowerment, a conceptual and practical cornerstone of the fields of activity. For 
some, professional ising was tantamount to removing the philosophy and purpose of 
health education and health promotion. 
There seems to have been little response to this open letter. Recruitment to the 
Society neither dramatically increased nor declined now that it was explicitly 
committed to professionalisation. This can reasonably be interpreted as lack of 
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interest among the majority of members of the occupation, while relatively few were 
actively for or against the project. 
This lack of interest is apparent through much of the remainder of the project's 
history. The Harrogate programme of registration, education and training, and 
professional standards was carried forward by three Society sub- committees. 
The Membership and Registration sub- committee eventually produced a 'Register of 
Health Education and Health Promotion Specialists' (SOCIETY OF HEALTH 
EDUCATION AND HEALTH PROMOTION SPECIALISTS, 1991). The Register 
was a symbol of unhappy compromise in the debate about education and training and 
authority to practice. Relatively few HPSs possessed postgraduate qualification in 
health education and health promotion. Many more were practising without such 
qualification but with skills and experience deemed appropriate for the work. All 
these people- whether possessing a 'formal' qualification or not- were allowed to 
appear on the Register. Thus it failed to create any kind of seal between training and 
practice. Importantly, in terms of the Harrogate plan, publication of the Register was 
not accompanied by a commitment to ensure that an individual's inclusion in future 
depended on their possessing postgraduate qualification. 
Another Society sub- committee worked on the issue of education and training. 
Criteria were established for the validation of academic postgraduate courses in health 
education and health promotion. These criteria related to such things as admission 
policy, health promotion background of teaching staff, links between the practice and 
academic settings and so forth. The number of courses recognised increased 
incrementally. By 1997, 26 postgraduate courses were Society- validated (SOCIETY 
OF HEALTH EDUCATION AND HEALTH PROMOTION SPECIALISTS, 1997d). 
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Once again, however, this work faced difficulties, particularly when seen as part of a 
strategy for professionalisation. Courses were developed by individual higher 
education institutions; there was no national guidance or direction (from the Society 
or any other body) as to what learning they should try to deliver. Combined anyway 
with uncertainty and dispute about the nature and content of knowledge in health 
promotion (RAWSON, 1992), the result was that provision varied, sometimes 
markedly, between institutions (BREMNER, 1994: COTTER, 1994). Coherent and 
nationally agreed provision looked impossible to achieve. This meant that even if it 
was possible to assert that ability to practice should be contingent on registration 
linked to training, this was likely to be followed by difficult questions. What training? 
To be offered by whom? 
The final component of the Harrogate programme was the maintenance and 
development of standards for professional practice. This issue was addressed by the 
Code of Conduct committee, which had now become the Standing Committee on 
Professional Practice (and was later to change its name again to the Standing 
Committee on Principles of Practice). Its key task was revision of the Society's Code 
of Professional Conduct and Principles of Practice, which had first appeared in 1985. 
Towards the end of 1989, however, the wider background was further, and 
dramatically, coloured. A slowly unfurling crisis of funding in the NHS had reached 
its peak (at least in terms of media attention) during the previous winter and had 
prompted government plans for reform of the Service, far beyond the scope even of 
the Griffiths Report. The White Paper, 'Working for Patients' (DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH, 1989) described legislation eventually introduced as the National Health 
Service Act 1990 (DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH. 1990). This created an 'internal' or 
quasi- market in health care, within which 'purchasers' (health authorities and some 
general practices) bought services from 'providers' (usually NHS hospital or 
community trusts). 
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The refonns were radical in conception and execution, although probably not as 
radical as the prime minister of the time, Margaret Thatcher, would have liked 
(COLE, 1995). Their purpose was to transform previously hierarchical relationships 
into those of the market place, primarily through the mechanism of contracts for 
services. They were, of course, driven by the Conservative Party's continuing 
ideology of economic liberalism. Opponents of such ideology had no trouble in 
painting a bleak picture of the road down which the reforms would lead: 
'Access to doctors and hospitals will become increasingly dependent upon the general 
health of the catchment area in which one lives, the policy of one's GP and his or her 
skill in negotiating contracts with "providers". Inequality in health provision will 
become more marked, and the health of the poor will become worse ... .' (HUTTON, 
1995: 213). 
This sort of view might have especially alarmed HPSs, for two reasons. First, where 
was the place for the often vague and frequently unquantifiable 'health promotion' in a 
market place likely by definition to be interested in tangible goods? Second, even if 
'health promotion' was something in which the market was interested, where was the 
place for specialist health promotion services? Did they belong with 'purchaser' or 
with 'provider'? Despite some strategic work (SMITH, 1993) and much practitioner 
thought, this question was never satisfactorily answered. 
Against this rapidly changing and arguably hostile background, the Principles of 
Practice Committee consulted with SHEPS membership on revision of the Code of 
Conduct (PRINCIPLES OF PRACfICE COMMITIEE, 1992; SOCIETY OF 
HEALTH EDUCATION AND HEALTH PROMOTION SPECIALISTS. 1992). The 
revised Code and Principles of Practice were eventually published in 1993 and 
revised again in 1997 (SOCIETY OF HEALTH EDUCATION AND HEALTH 
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PROMOTION SPECIALISTS, 1993: 1997b). The difficulty, however, was that the 
Code was only one part of the programme for professionalisation which had emerged 
from Harrogate back in 1988. Without mandatory registration contingent on practice, 
linked to accepted qualifications, it was essentially a 'toothless tiger'. 
The idea of mandatory registration was as far away from realisation as ever. The 
Registration Committee consulted with SHEPS membership over the issue during 
1992-3, having identified two possible routes to the goal: parliamentary (or primary) 
legislation; and regulation through the Secretary of State for Health (secondary 
legislation) (FAGGE, 1993). A ballot on whether to continue investigating the issue 
of mandatory registration was held among SHEPS members in early 1995. From a 
membership of 450, the turnout was 35.4%, with 60.6% (about 95 members) in 
favour of continued investigation. 
It was hard to interpret this result as representing anything other than widespread lack 
of interest. The Registration Committee continued its explorations, but in July 1996, 
under the heading 'Mandatory Registration on Hold', the SHEPS Newsletter made the 
following announcement: 
'Following last year's mandate from the membership to continue looking at the 
possibility of establishing a mandatory registration scheme for health promotion 
specialists, the Executive Council has now voted to indefinitely delay any further 
action. Following discussions with the Department of Health and other organisations 
over the issue the possibilities for further progress were seen to be very limited. It was 
decided therefore that the Membership and Registration Standing Committee's 
priority for work over the coming year shift to building the membership of SHEPS ... : 
(SOCIETY OF HEALTH EDUCATION AND HEALTH PROMOTION 
SPECIALISTS, 1996: 3). 
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Two issues need to be considered in the interpretation of this decision. The first. as 
already mentioned, is the evident lack of interest in mandatory registration (for which 
read a fundamental part of the 'professionalisation project') on the part of many HPSs. 
The second is the realisation on the part of the SHEPS leadership that the Department 
of Health- driven by a Conservative government intent (to some degree) on limiting 
and diminishing professional power- was hardly likely to be supportive of attempts to 
create a 'new profession'. 
This decision by SHEPS effectively to abandon its explicit 'professionalisation 
project' (at least as this was conceived from the mid to late 1980s onwards) was made 
almost at the provisional 'cut off point for history which I discussed in Chapter One. 
However, it is worth briefly describing what has happened since 1996. The change of 
political landscape in 1997, following the election of the New Labour government, 
has not led to an alteration in the SHEPS position on the pursuit of registration and 
professionalisation. A discussion paper produced almost immediately after the 
election did not even mention these issues (SOCIETY OF HEALTH EDUCATION 
AND HEALTH PROMOTION SPECIALISTS, 1997c). 
Arguably this was in part because- despite key differences in style and substance over 
many policy matters (including health) between the old and new governments-
Labour was as dubious about 'professionalisation' as the Conservatives. Proposals for 
Health Service refonns (DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 1998) contained strong 
elements of even greater requirements of accountability on professions. in particular 
clinical accountability. These followed in part from a number of prominent scandals 
which reached public attention in the last days of the Conservative government-
especially the so-called Bristol Heart Babies affair (HEALTH SERVICE JOUPu'lAL. 
1999b; HaL, 1999). 
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Further, the new government's agenda for health represented a relatively radical shift 
from the 'medical model' to something more akin to a 'social model', with far greater 
recognition of the possible range of influences on health beyond individual lifestyle 
(SECRET AR Y OF ST ATE FOR HEALTH, 1998). This has led to the view that there 
is at least the possibility of new roles being required to meet this new agenda. In 
particular, attempts seem to be emerging to re- define (and support) the role of 'public 
health specialist' (DENT, 1999). Exactly what this means, for who, and where, is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. What is clear is that continuing shifts in roles and 
responsibilities, and continuing political scepticism, combine to create an enormously 
difficult climate for any kind of 'professionalisation project' for specialist health 
promotion. 
3. The Professionalising Occupation of Specialist Health Promotion: Snapshot of 
a 'Moment in Time' 
By now it will be clear that the history of specialist health promotion's 
'professionalisation project' contains as much dispute and ambiguity as the other 
historical dimensions discussed in Chapter Two. In the following chapter, I argue that 
this dispute and ambiguity relates centrally to values. As such, health promotion is an 
intensely probtematic field in a moral sense. In Chapter Six, I 'listen' to a number of 
practitioner 'voices' who confirm this analysis; before attempting to seek ways of 
understanding, in Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight, how health promotion might be 
morally 'reconstructed'. One way I explore is whether it might be possible to conceive 
of health promotion as a moral 'profession'. Although my argument at this stage is 
basically theoretical, it is informed by my understanding of the place of health 
promotion in the UK context; and by the understanding of the practitioners to whom I 
have been 'listening'. 
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These practitioners were sharing their understanding with me during the mid- 1990s. 
If this understanding underpins argument on the nature of health promotion as a 
'moral profession', it is important to be clear about how that 'profession' appeared at 
the time the practitioners were forming their perceptions. What was the nature of the 
occupation (the embryonic profession) of specialist health promotion in the mid-
1990s? The following is a snapshot that might have been taken during this time. 
By far the largest number of HPSs were employed within the NHS. Before the 
Health Service reforms of 1990, specialists generally worked in health promotion 
units (HPUs), which were located in almost all of the health authorities in England 
and Wales, health boards in Scotland and health and social services departments in 
Northern Ireland. By and large, HPUs undertook the kind of unified health promotion 
planning, enabling and supporting role I described in Chapter One (with greater or 
lesser emphasis on parts of that role according to local influence and interest). 
Organisationally, they tended to be part of either the public health directorate or 
community unit of the health authority. 
As already discussed, the 1990 reforms split the Health Service into 'purchasers' on 
the one hand, and 'providers' on the other. From survey work undertaken during the 
summer of 1993, Adams (1993) identified 36% of responding United Kingdom (UK) 
HPUs as purchasers, 38% as providers and 22% as having been 'split' in some way to 
perform both functions. (The extent to which the survey elicited responses from all 
UK HPUs is not clear, partly because of the organisational confusion existing at the 
time.) Generally speaking, those identified as purchasers were managed within the 
public health directorates of health authorities; those as providers were within NHS 
community trusts. Health promotion managers (those running HPUs) were 
accountable themselves to a range of others. including directors of public health. chief 
executives of health authorities or trusts and directors of nursing. 
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It has been notoriously difficult to define what exactly' purchasing' and 'providing'. 
health promotion constitutes (ADAMS, 1993: SMITH, 1993). Adams, in the 
summary of her 1993 survey, writes: 
'Many health promotion specialists do not feel that health promotion fits the 
purchasing and providing model. Whilst undertaking health promotion is part of 
many health workers' roles, a health promotion specialist function is just that. It is a 
strategic, catalytic, advisory and consultancy function, concerned with district- wide 
programmes, healthy alliances, healthy public policy ... .' (ADAMS, 1993: 4). 
In practice, although it is hard to discover documentary evidence, it is likely that there 
was greater or lesser emphasis on components of this unified function depending on 
where HPSs were organisationally located. For example, a HPS working within a 
purchasing health authority was likely to have a role more focused on needs 
assessment and policy formation; while one working for a provider trust was probably 
more concerned with implementing and managing programmes. 
Adams' work draws out a number of additional features of the form and function of 
specialist health promotion at this time. Respondents suggested that the ability to 
work in strategic and multidisciplinary ways was being eroded by the growing sense 
of competition between, for example, separate NHS Trusts. Specialist health 
promotion services were increasingly being managed, at a remove, by people with 
neither experience nor formal training in the occupation. The significant relationship 
between public health and health promotion functions was often good but sometimes 
undermined by feelings of 'threat' or lack of equality (ADAMS. 1993: 2-1). 
In summary. a snapshot of specialist health promotion at this time shows an 
occupation divided by the NHS reforms. The division is both in terms of 
organisational position: and practical function. It appears to be adversely affected hy 
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the themes of competition and deregulation dOminating the Service at this point in its 
history. In this context, as already discussed in the previous section, a small number 
of the occupational group are attempting to implement a 'professionalisation project' 
with its particular components of mandatory registration, formal training and the 
development of professional standards. Others in the occupational group believe that 
this project militates against the purpose and principles of health promotion. In any 
case, the context- particularly of deregulation and competition- appears directly to 
contradict the project. The overall impression, from this snapshot of the occupation in 
the early to mid- 1990s, is of lack of unity, fragmentation and a consequent sense of 
threat. Such a picture needs to be carried to Chapter Eight and considerations of 
whether and how the 'profession' of health promotion can be strengthened as part of a 
moral reconstruction of the field. 
4. Courses, Competences and Qualifications: Professional Development and the 
Health Promoter 
My concern now is briefly to chart the recent history of professional development for 
health promoters as the second part of a survey of how the occupational activity of 
health promotion has developed. As I have made clear, the distinction between the 
history of the 'professionalisation project' and professional development is somewhat 
artefactual. Certainly it would be a mistake to regard them as being completely 
divorced from each other. 'Professionalisers' were interested in professional 
development; and those involved in professional development, but not health 
promotion specialists. may well have had an interest in the 'professionalisation 
project'. Nevertheless. the distinction is important enough conceptually and 
practically- particularly as I advance towards moral arguments for 'professions' - to 
justify progression through history in this way. Having given an account of atl~mpts 
to professionalise specialist health promotion; I move to a brief sketching of 
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professional development for those engaged as part of their role in health promotion 
activity- health promoters. 
Almost any occupational or professional group could be seen as having a health 
promotion role; and therefore might possess a history of professional development in 
relation to this field. Attempts at a comprehensive history, then, might be both time-
consuming and, in the end, too vague or diffuse. For this reason, I have chosen to 
focus my account on professional development for two key professions whose 
practitioners are likely to have health promotion as part of their role- medicine and 
nursing. This is partly because attitudes towards health promotion on the part of these 
professional groups are enormously important for the field of activity; and partly 
because the nature of their relationship to health promotion has important 
implications for later theoretical arguments I make. Towards the end of this section, I 
will also discuss the recent history of the development of national occupational 
standards (NOS) for health promotion. If it is agreed that NOSs generally describe 
what needs to happen in employment (MITCHELL, HARVEY AND ROLLS, 1998); 
it can be argued that the history of standards development for health promotion is 
likely to influence the practice in this area of a range of occupational groups. 
To begin with the recent history of professional development for health promotion in 
the profession of medicine. Conceptions of the nature, purpose and relative 
importance of components of medical education were dramatically changed by the 
seminal 'Tomorrow's Doctors' (GENERAL MEDICAL COUNCIL, 1993). This set 
out to establish in detail what it was reasonable to expect a medical practitioner to be 
able to do. An important expectation was the contribution of doctors to illness 
prevention and health promotion. The General Medical Council (GMC) proposed 
opportunities in undergraduate medical education to develop understanding of the 
principles and methods of health promotion; and of skills related to the promotion of 
health (for example. information giving. counselling and risk assessment). The G~IC 
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also proposed a re-orientation of medical educational processes away from 
concentration on 'facts learning' to the encouragement of critical thinking and 
personal development; and from bio- mechanical accounts of disease to the 
development of understanding which put health and illness in their socio- cultural 
context. If this re- orientation was to be achieved, it too would be likely to be broadly 
supportive of the development of health promotion in the profession of medicine. 
Toon (1998) sees a number of issues emerging from the GMC's direction for medical 
education. Undergraduate medical education has to provide the basis for a variety of 
more specific postgraduate vocations (in both acute and primary health care contexts). 
It may therefore be hard to define a common core of generally required health 
promotion- related knowledge and skills. He also identifies a tension between the 
competing goals of medical education. On the one hand, it is to provide a basis for 
independent practice; on the other, it is to produce safe, competent hospital house 
officers. Arguably, for those operating in this role it is often hard to see illness related 
to the social context in which it is produced. Although there are clearly difficulties in 
developing a place for health promotion at all levels of formal medical education, 
Harden (1995) and Parle et al (1997), among others, write encouragingly about 
positive trends in this area. 
Thinking on the nature and purpose of initial professional education for nurses has in 
recent times undergone a 'paradigm shift' rather similar to that of medicine and 
'Tomorrow's Doctors'. In organisational terms at least, the shift has probably been 
even more profound. The United Kingdom Central Council for Nursing. Midwifery 
and Health Visiting (UKCC) Project 2000 (P2000) moved nurse training from an 
apprenticeship, 'learning on the job' model to a concurrent system, in which periods of 
professional practice were built into a higher education diploma level course. P2000 
was seen as: 
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'The means of producing a "knowledgeable do-er". To achieve this, skills of critical 
analysis and reflection have been seen as crucial ... .' (RIVERS, AGGLETON A~D 
WHITTY, 1998: 8). 
It is clear from considering P2000 that health and wellness promotion is viewed as 
central to the nursing role. Thus, academics and others in nursing feel able to make 
statements such as: 
'Any [nursing] interaction has the potential to be health promoting ... .' (LA TIER, 
1998). 
As well as the radical shift in favour of health promotion at the level of initial 
professional education, the mid- 1980s onward also saw nursing having the benefit of 
continuing professional development activities with a strong health promotion 
flavour. These included Health Education Authority (HEA) 'training the trainers' 
initiatives such as 'Look After Yourself (LAY) and 'Helping People Change'. 
Although narrow in focus- concentrating mainly on the development of mechanistic 
techniques aimed at changing 'risky' individual health behaviour- they have 
nevertheless encouraged many nursing professionals to become more directly 
involved in the promotion of health (LAWRENCE, 1999). 
It is also the case that courses with a broader focus continued or were developed 
during this period. An example was 'Promoting Health: Skills, Perspectives and 
Practice', the product of an educational partnership between the HEA and the Open 
University (OU) (OPEN UNIVERSITY, 1997). Clearly a primary market for this was 
the profession of nursing. as successful completion of the course allowed for 
registration of an award with the UKCC. 
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The kinds of developments described here give an impression of slowly increasing 
opportunities for the professional development of nurses with regard to that part of 
their occupation connected to the promotion of health. The landscape of professional 
development for all those involved in health promotion has also been changed by 
recent attempts to describe competence in this field of activity through standards- the 
so- called National Occupational Standards (NOS). 
These Standards are attempts to describe perfonnance- what people are expected to 
do in employment (MITCHELL, HARVEY AND ROLLS, 1998: 158). They are 
developed on behalf of an occupational group by that group's Lead Industry Body 
(LIB). The LIB undertakes a functional mapping of the occupation. This is: 
'A process of analysis which defines and delineates the parameters of the occupation 
or sector by defining the key purpose of the sector: identifying the functions required 
to be undertaken by the occupation or sector as a whole, to achieve the key purpose; 
developing the national occupational standards and competences required to achieve 
these functions ... .' (ROLLS, 1995: 12-13). 
Once standards have been developed, the Lm, together with an awarding body, puts 
forward proposals for a qualification based on the standards (and the competences 
they identify) to the National Council for Vocational Qualifications (NCVQ) and the 
Scottish Vocational Education Council (ScotVEC). If accepted, a National Vocational 
Qualification! Scottish Vocational Qualification (NVQI SVQ) related to those 
competences becomes available. 
In 1992, the HEA commissioned a three year 'Competences for Professional 
Development in Health Education' project. Objectives for the project included the 
identification of competences for different professional groups involved in health 
education and health promotion; and the development of methods of comretency 
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measurement and assessment. There was a strong strategic concern on the part of the 
NHS that Health Service activities should benefit from Standards development and 
related NVQs/ SVQs (ROLLS, 1995). 
When the project was completed, further work was begun (in November 1995) to 
develop National Occupational Standards for health promotion. This work was 
explicitly set within the framework of the Department for Education and Employment 
(DfEE) National Standards Programme (ROLLS, 1995) and carried out under the 
auspices of the Care Sector Consortium (CSC), the Lm for the health and social care 
sector. 
The Standards were developed by a multidisciplinary group, including health 
promotion specialists, environmental health, occupational health, nursing, midwifery, 
social work, complementary medicine and professions allied to medicine 
(MITCHELL, HARVEY AND ROLLS, 1998). They were eventually published as 
'National Occupational Standards for Professional Activity in Health Promotion and 
Care' (LOCAL GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT BOARD, 1997). The Standards 
attempted to describe performance in relation to three broad areas: the foundations of 
professional activity; the context of professional activity; and a range of particular 
activities themselves. Within each of these areas are a number of roles against which 
detailed standards have been developed and described. 
Following publication of the Standards, they were 'piloted' at a number of 'test sites' 
including a university medical school and a postgraduate health promotion course 
(HEALTH EDUCATION AUTHORITY, 1998a). Results of this exercise were 
published towards the end of 1998 (HEALTH EDUCATION AUTHORITY, 1998a. 
1998b). 
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There has been a well rehearsed debate about the problems and possibilities with 
Standards (and related qualifications) in general; and those for health promotion and 
care in particular. For some, Standards are crude tools, blunt instruments incapable of 
allowing for the complexities of practice (ELLIOT, 1993). This is an especially 
problematic criticism for the Standards for Health Promotion and Care, given the 
deep complexity and disputability of this field of activity, at both conceptual and 
practical level. At least one professional association, responding to the Health 
Promotion and Care Standards, has expressed the worry that they will promote 'the 
generic therapist' (MITCHELL, HARVEY AND ROLLS, 1998: 167). Such a person. 
possibly attractive to politicians and managers concerned with cost- effectiveness. 
may be alarming to professions anxious to mark out and maintain their territory. 
Others, however, have suggested that the applicability and transferability of the 
Standards between different occupations may promote inter- professional and 
multidisciplinary collaboration. Against this background of expression of both 
possibilities and concerns related to the Standards, it is unclear as to whether an 
infrastructure will be present to support both their development, and that of the 
framework within which they are operated (MITCHELL, HARVEY AND ROLLS, 
1998). 
Standards are most frequently and easily regarded as a tool for management- attempts 
to describe performance expectations. In this sense they are nonnative. As such. they 
bear more than a passing similarity to other kinds of nonnative expression- for 
example, of moral obligation. In Chapter Seven. I consider some of the problems and 
possibilities related to attempts to construct a set of moral obligations for those 
involved in the practice of health promotion. While the language of the National 
Occupational Standards for Health Promotion and Care might be different from that 
of moral philosophers attempting to establish obligations for health promotion 
practitioners: problems and possibilities with both might be more closely connected 
than imagined. In particular. I will later consider the accusation made against so-
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called 'obligation ethics' that it is too blunt an instrument to be used with any 
reliability, particularly in the complex and ambiguous field of health promotion. This 
sounds like an echo of the voice, reported above, that has been raised against the 
National Occupational Standards. 
5. Coda to the History: The 'Disrupted Tradition' of Health Promotion 
I have now reached the end of my account of the five 'dimensions' of a history of 
health promotion. Both the conceptualisation and recounting of this history pose 
complex problems. At this stage of my thesis, there are particular difficulties. History 
telling raises again the questions of what is being discussed here, and where exactly 
the moral problematic lies. If it does nothing else, analysis of the five 'dimensions' 
demonstrates profound tensions between competing understandings of- and actions 
for- 'health promotion' on the part of different people and organisations. For example, 
some people (a small number of health promotion specialists) have believed that the 
occupation of specialist health promotion is amenable to 'professionalisation' 
(arguably the 'protection' of the occupation through mechanisms such as mandatory 
registration and training). Other have asserted that this conception of the occupation 
(and thus, in part, of the nature of health promotion) is completely wrong- headed. 
There are many other instances of opposing 'voices' that I have heard while 
assembling this history. How is it that such oppositions and differences exist now and 
have existed for much of certainly the recent history of the field of health promotion '! 
I suggest that interpretation of the history itself supports an answer to this question. 
Consider this beginning to Alastair Macintyre's 'After Virtue': 
'Imagine that the natural sciences were to suffer the effects of a catastrophe. A sc:nc:s 
of environmental disasters are blamed by the general publi~ on the scientists. 
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Widespread riots occur, laboratories are burnt down, physicists are lynched, books 
and instruments are destroyed. Finally a Know- Nothing political movement takes 
power and abolishes science teaching in schools and universities, imprisoning the 
remaining scientists ... .' (MACINTYRE, 1985: 1). 
Macintyre imagines further. He describes the advent of a movement of enlightenment 
which rebels against the destruction and tries to piece science back together again, 
although its members have largely forgotten what it was and have only fragments of 
the past with which to attempt their reconstruction. After great effort, the re-building 
of science is complete and people in the 'new' world go about making use of it. But 
what they are doing is not in fact natural science: 
'For everything that they do and say confonns to certain canons of consistency and 
coherence and those contexts which would be needed to make sense of what they are 
doing have been lost, perhaps irretrievably ... .' (MACINTYRE, 1985: 1). 
Macintyre's imagined world of the destruction and reconstruction of science fonns the 
prelude to the major argument of 'After Virtue'; that morality and its language are in 
the same disrupted and confused state as the language of science in his fictional 
scenario. Like science in the story, morality and moral philosophy enjoyed a period of 
flourishing during which the nature of their construction and purpose were clear. Like 
science in the imaginary world, these were destroyed and are now reconstructed in 
damaged form. 
I suggest that Macintyre's account of the 'disruption' of morality might be useful in 
explaining and understanding the history of health promotion. Most straightforward 
historical accounts of the latter work on the assumption that health education has a 
relatively extensive tradition; while health promotion is to all intents and purposes a 
novel concept. Floating somewhere within them is also the notion of public health. 
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The health education- then- health promotion version of history, as I argued in 
Chapter Two, is problematic because it fails to take account of much activity that took 
place during the mid- nineteenth century and whose purpose was protection of the 
health of the public (albeit for a mixture of political ends, some unrelated to health). If 
this era is identified at all within accounts, it is as a separate and different phase of 
'public health' (ASHTON AND SEYMOUR, 1993). We now have, even more 
unhelpfully, four possible 'protection of the health of the public'- related concepts 
with which to grapple: the Victorian phase of public health: the modern phase of 
public health; health education; and health promotion. I acknowledge the clumsiness 
of my own phraseology to embrace all four concepts; but my wish at the moment is to 
avoid using one in particular at the expense of the others. 
My argument is this. Activity aimed at protecting the health of the public extends at 
least from the mid- nineteenth century and embraces both 'Victorian' and 'modern' 
phases of public health; as well as health education and health promotion. Such 
activity should therefore be seen as possessing a unified history. 
What should this unified history be called? Theorists have usually suggested that 
health education is a component of health promotion, the latter extending beyond 
educative processes to include health promoting public policy and protection 
measures (DOWNIE, TANNAHILL AND TANNAHILL, 1996: EWLES AND 
SIMNETT, 1992; NAIDOO AND WILLS, 1994; TONES AND TILFORD, 1994). A 
complete history of activity aimed at protecting the health of the public could not, 
therefore, be called a history of health education. Could it be called a history of public 
health? If I stick with my clumsy but encompassing phrase- and also stick with my 
intention to use others' voices to understand meanings- then it often sounds as if 
people talking about 'public health' (as distinct from public health medicine) are 
speaking of a broad range of activity aimed at protecting the health of the public 
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(ASHTON AND SEYMOUR, 1993: REID, 1999). Equally, though, so does 'health 
promotion' (consider Downie, Tannahill and Tannahill and the other writers cited 
above). So my claim for the unified history of activity aimed at protecting the health 
of the public could be called 'The History of Public Health' ; or The History of Health 
Promotion'. My own preference is to call it the latter, but I can see no reason other 
than partisanship for this. This would apply to someone making the alternative 
choice. The central point is that the idea of the unified account should be accepted. If 
it is not, then we would return to the unhelpfulness of accounts suggesting that the 
history of health promotion begins round about 1974. 
Such accounts are unhelpful because they lack the power to explain the persistent 
disputes about what health promotion is and what it involves. My suggestion of a 
unified account, and of the 'disrupted' nature of the history of health promotion as it is 
frequently presented, claims to offer some insight into these disputes. 
Caricaturing the history I have described in this chapter and in Chapter Two, it is 
possible to suggest that there are two key- and opposing- versions of what is to count 
as 'authentic health promotion activity'. One is the healthy public policy view of 
health promotion; and the other is the individual- centred, medical model approach. 
Each inspires loyalty from different groups and each is disputed, with varying degrees 
of ferocity, by its opponents. (Of course, this view is highly caricatural. It is possible 
to have public health policy based on the medical model- for example, 'The Health of 
the Nation'. It might also be that we have some sympathy with the view of a writer 
such as Armstrong (1993) who claims that the demand for 'health surveillance' 
renders public policy and medical model health indistinguishable.) 
History- and this interpretation of it- helps to identify the reasons for such dispute. On 
the one hand, people who adhere to healthy public policy are returning to the 
historical roots of health promotion. although these are seldom. if ever. identified as 
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such. On the other hand, people adhering to the medical model are aligning 
themselves to the individualistic 'health care' approach to health promotion which has 
profoundly dominated recent times (and which is itself the by-product of an 
immensely powerful medical tradition concerned with the individual). If health 
promotion's history is seen as 'disrupted', disputes and differences become more 
understandable, for the opposing sides can each reasonably see themselves as heir to 
the 'legitimate' tradition. The difficulty is that the nature of the tradition, and in 
particular its disrupted character, has not been adequately identified. Developing an 
understanding of health promotion as a 'disrupted tradition' will be important as I 
move to presenting proposals for a moral argument in support of the field; and begin 
substantively to question this. 
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CHAPTER FOUR· MORAL ARGUMENTS FOR HEALTH PROMOTIOl\: 
PROPOSALS AND SCEPTICISM 
1. Introduction 
Dispute about what is meant by health promotion and what kinds of activities it can 
reasonably be said to involve took up a sizeable amount of my chapters on history. 
The story told so far will also have made clear that the promotion and improvement of 
health is at the very least a strong human aspiration stretching back certainly through 
the twentieth century as well as much of the nineteenth. If the nature of that 
aspiration, and policies and practices which might support it, are disputed; fertile 
ground for moral enquiry appears to exist. In this chapter, I begin my enquiry by 
building up, then critically examining, a 'moral case' for health promotion. 
Before this process can be started, however, I need to address the question, 'What is 
understood by "moral"?' The Concise Oxford Dictionary suggests that 'moral' is: 
'Concerned with goodness or badness of character or disposition, or with the 
distinction between right and wrong ... .' (OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1978). 
Lacey agrees with this view, writing that 'moral' is: 
'Concerning habits, customs, ways of life, especially when these are assessed as good 
or bad, right or wrong. Etymologically, the Latin "moral" corresponds to the Greek 
"ethical". They both mean "concerning habits etc.". Among things we call moral are 
theories, arguments, outlooks, rules, reasons. men, books. actions. intentions and 
perhaps desires and feelings ... .' (LACEY, 1976: 138). 
97 
On this etymological basis, then, I use the term 'moral', the associated one of 
'morality' and that of 'ethics' interchangeably. A moral enquiry into health promotion 
thus becomes, seemingly, an enquiry into whether it is good or bad, right or wrong. 
At this point, however, I re- encounter a difficulty introduced in Chapter One. What 
exactly is the 'it' that I am talking about and trying to assess the morality of? Dispute 
about what the 'it' actually was, and is, characterised my history- writing, as I have 
said. Is health promotion an idea or a set of activities? Could it be both? If it is a set of 
activities, what exactly is the nature and character of that set? Despite extensive 
thought about the character of health promotion through examination of its history, I 
continue to struggle with these questions. 
The dilemmas posed in the first chapter, when I tried provisionally to build an 
understanding of health promotion, become very pertinent here. Models provide some 
descriptive sense of health promotion, but essentially- perhaps above all else- they are 
rooted in values. As I start to build and examine a 'moral case' for health promotion, 
the problematic becomes acute. If I base my understanding on models, they provide 
conflicting accounts of 'authentic' action; for example, that conceived according to the 
medical model as opposed to that according to the empowerment model. Whatever I 
choose, I could be accused of bias either for or against health promotion's 'moral 
case'. If, on the other hand, I try to embrace everything that could be regarded as 
'health promotion', the subject of my enquiry becomes so general as to be hard to 
focus on. Further, problems already mentioned such as establishing whether 
unintentionally health promoting activities should be regarded as health promotion 
are reinforced. How can I reasonably construct a 'moral case' either for or against 
health promotion that includes consideration of activities which have no intention of 
promoting health (but somehow incidentally do)? 
98 
There is a further important problem related to this one of health promotion's 
descriptive slipperiness. In establishing, and then challenging, a 'moral case' for health 
promotion, what exactly am I doing? Am I arguing against health promotion being 
seen as an unproblematic or unambiguous good? The view that health promotion is an 
unproblematic or unambiguous good is rather a wild one. It is relatively easy to 
imagine activity that could be thought of as 'health promotion' that contains moral 
difficulty or ambiguity. Such activity need not be bizarre or outlandish. Consider, for 
example the introduction of a smoking policy in a workplace with little or no staff 
consultation on the matter. Or again, breast screening, poorly conducted and badly 
explained to the patient. 
Given this, challenging a 'moral case' for health promotion founded on the view that 
it is an unambiguous good is rather pointless. It tells us nothing because we know- or 
could easily find out- that health promotion is not such a good and argue without 
trouble against anyone making such an assertion. But there is another, more complex 
position on the good of health promotion. It is that, generally speaking and everything 
else being equal, it is worth engaging in health promotion. In other words, health 
promotion is a prima Jacie good. 
This is the kind of view expressed by some practitioners (for example, JESSOP, 
1991); and by some theorists (for example, DOWNIE, TANNAHILL AND 
TANNAH~L, 1996). It is the sort of position- because it seems so reasonable- that 
troubled me most as I was developing my sense of the moral complexity of health 
promotion, described in the preface to this thesis. 
What else would need to be equal in order for health promotion to be a prima facie 
good? Presumably. such things as a shared belief in the worth or value of the 'health' 
being promoted: a respect for the autonomy of those with whom we are engaging on 
health promotion; and a desire for them to play at least as much part as ourselves in 
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activities undertaken and believed to be health promoting. If these sorts of things 
were in place, health promotion would be likely to be a prima facie good. 
These are, in fact, elements of the 'moral case' for health promotion I start off by 
building. So the claims of the case must be seen in the context of a more complex 
view of health promotion- as a prima facie good. A major point, however, in critically 
examining the case, is to suggest that there are fundamental reasons to believe that 
everything else is not equal at that point when the good of health promotion is being 
determined. 
In building the 'moral case', I use the understanding and writing of a number of 
prominent (mostly UK) health promotion theorists. I take their views on the nature of 
health promotion, what it involves and why it is of value. Their understanding 
suggests a picture of health promotion as a prima facie good. This is a much more 
difficult position with which to critically engage; if there is doubt about health 
promotion as such a good, then concerns about its moral value must run deeper than 
the capacity we easily have to identify some problematic examples from practice. 
Using these theorists' understanding also helps me with the difficulties I have in 
'describing' health promotion. By listening to their 'voices' (rather than relying on my 
own), I claim to avoid the accusation of 'bias' in the way health promotion is 
presented. I am not easily knocking down an artificial construction of my own 
making. I am arguing against the understanding of careful and influential theorists. 
So far I have suggested that my moral enquiry is about whether health promotion 
(here as understood by prominent theorists) is good or bad, right or wrong. At the 
moment, I have not introduced any views about what constitutes 'good' or 'right', or 
'bad' or 'wrong', action. In Chapter Seven, I consider a number of normative systems 
of ethics and use them in part as background for a response to the substantial flaws in 
the' moral case' identified later in the present chapter. I am deliberately not outlining 
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particular ways of thinking, in a moral sense, about actions and ideas at this stage. ~ty 
reason is simple. First of all, I want to allow 'my' theorists themselves to express their 
arguments for health promotion as a moral enterprise. It is quite possible, of course. 
that they will have been heavily influenced themselves by normative ethical projects. 
But at the moment it is primarily their voices, rather than those of moral 
philosophers, in which I am most interested. 
2. The 'Moral Case' for Health Promotion Summarised 
It is possible to imagine someone broadly convinced of the morality of health 
promotion feeling able to offer a robust summary of the 'moral case' for the field. 
What follows initially is my own construction. It will become clear though, as the 
case is drawn and examined in detail after this summary, that I have not simply spun, 
or- re-used, rhetoric. The summary is crudely representative of detailed ideas 
developed by prominent theorists. It is as follows: 
Health is a value and consequently valuable. At the very least, therefore, it must 
be considered as something worth preserving and enhancing. This is the primary 
goal of health promotion which thus becomes in itself a valuable activity. 
However, health promotion is not obsessed with health at all costs. In fact, its 
major goal is to encourage individual and population awareness of health choices. 
so that people can 'choose' health if they wish. Accompanying this is work for 
structural changes so that social and other environments become health 
promoting; as the maxim goes it is then the case that 'Healthier Choices become 
Easier Choices'. So the values central to health promotion include, for example, a 
concern to respect and encourage autonomy. Indeed, the task of supporting self 
empowerment is a practical necessity for health promotion: if individuals are 
empowered. they are more likely to make 'healthy choices'; if they are not, the 
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effectiveness of the whole enterprise of health promotion is put into question. 
Finally, health promotion recognises the potential for conflict between the public 
health and private good and works to resolve this conflict. The methods of health 
promotion- empowering people as active participants in their own health 
improvement- themselves ensure that there is alignment between the public health 
and private good. If health promotion is properly applied, what is not for the 
pri vate good will not be for the public health. 
3. The 'Moral Case' : Detail and Objection 
The 'moral case' outlined above has three essential and closely connected 
components. The detail of each needs to be described and assessed: 
1. Health is a value; 
11. The goal of health promotion is 'more health'; 
111. A principal strategy of health promotion- empowerment- increases the 
likelihood of 'more health' being achieved and underpins the morality of activity. 
(Of course, each of these components underlines again the fact that the 'moral case' is 
founded on the belief that health promotion is a prima facie- and not an 
unambiguous- good. If it is hard to substantiate the claim that health is a value. in one 
way or another, for example, then health promotion's prima facie goodness is 
lessened.) 
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i. Health is a value 
Health is clearly an important societal value. Consider the prominent place 'health' has 
in the consciousness of very many people (DINES AND CRIBB, 1993). Consider 
also the relatively large resources that are devoted, one way or another, to 'keeping 
healthy' and to trying to restore health when it is lost. The pursuit of health has been a 
major concern of successive post war governments (TIMMINS, 1996); it also 
preoccupies many individuals (BUNTON, NEITLETON AND BURROWS, 1995). 
We would probably be inclined to regard 'health' as a normative value; it is sought as 
a norm by and on behalf of individuals, communities and populations. 
While we can fairly easily see the value of 'health' as normative, this does not explain 
why we believe 'health' has value. Dworkin (1995) offers a helpful way of 
understanding different kinds of values. We value some things because of their 
usefulness, their capacity to help us get other things we happen to want or need 
(instrumental values). Other things have subjective value; they are valued simply 
because they are wanted, irrespective of any thought of their utility (these might also 
be called preference or 'liking' values). Intrinsic values are also not reducible to 
notions of utility or purpose, but this is because they are so fundamental that such 
reduction would appear absurd. For example, there is arguably an intrinsic value to 
human life- at least in the sense that it is hard to offer a complete account of the value 
of life that depends simply on assessing its utility or purpose. 
What sort of value is 'health'? It is hard to piece together a coherent account on the 
nature of 'health' as a value. There is some empirical evidence whose interpretation 
could suggest its nature as subjective (GLASSNER, 1995). Some philosophers have 
argued for its instrumentality, suggesting it as the 'foundations for achievement' 
(SEEDHOUSE. 1986): or as that on which human freedom is contingent 
(CAMPBELL. 1976). This latter account. although not entirely clear. seems to 
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propose that freedom itself (rather than health) possesses intrinsic value. In fact. 
supposedly clear- sighted philosophers often appear to conflate ideas about the nature 
of the value of health. For example: 
,[Health] is valued for its own sake; and it is a means to almost all ends ... .' (WIKLER. 
1978: 311). 
For Wikler, at least here, 'health' appears to have both instrumental and intrinsic 
value. Perhaps a reasonable conclusion might be that the nature of health as a value is 
subject to interpretation and is certainly difficult to assess. But for some health 
promotion theorists, the issue does not seem to be at all problematic. Take the 
following, a paraphrase of the World Health Organisation's (WHO) Alma Ata 
Declaration: 
'Health is a basic human right.. .. health is the most important world wide social 
goal .... people have a right and a duty to achieve health ... .' (BARIC, 1986: 367). 
This sort of language confirms Yeo's (1993) view of the power of the 'discourse of 
health'. But in the power of this discourse- natural, given our frequent preoccupation 
with health or its absence-lies the beginning of a difficulty for this component of the 
'moral case'. Health promotion theorists make little attempt to discuss the nature of 
the value. There is a tendency (unwittingly demonstrated above by Baric) to rely on 
the rhetoric of, for example, WHO and therefore to share the assumption that health 
always possesses overriding value. 
Is this assumption reasonable? There are two reasons for believing it not to be so. 
First, in a general sense, the kind of evidence so far gathered suggests the problematic 
in trying definitely to identify the nature of the value. It cannot then always be 
overriding. For example, I might be less inclined to believe in its overriding nature 
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based on an instrumental interpretation of the nature of the value than on one which 
viewed it as intrinsic (or at the very least it is likely there would be competing views 
about the nature of the instrumental value). Second, there are many specific examples 
resulting from this general belief where we recognise difficulties in perceiving of. and 
possibly pursuing, health as an overriding value. Imagine a depressed and confused 
psychiatric patient who is also a heavy smoker and for whom cigarettes are her only 
comfort. By the standard of damage to physical health, we would have to agree that 
her smoking is unhealthy. But can we also agree that the project of encouraging her to 
stop smoking (that is, the pursuit of the value of physical health) must be undertaken 
at any cost? Suggesting that we employ an alternative conception of health in this 
case (smoking is actually the healthy behaviour, at least in the sense of the patient's 
mental health) simply casts epistemological doubt on the moral difficulty. We are 
arguing for dominance of a value, and it is apparent from this one example alone that 
this value 'means different things to different people'. Is it the value of physical health 
or of mental health that should dominate here? (1 will discuss additional problems 
related to the contestedness of health in the next section.) 
Downie, Tannahill and Tannahill (1996) make one of the very few explicit 
contributions on the part of health promotion theorists to the debate about the nature 
of health as a value (as opposed to the nature of health as a concept, which is 
extensively discussed in the literature). Interestingly, they recognise the difficulties 
that might present if health was always to be seen as the overriding value and so they 
allow the possibility of it being in competition with other values. But they, too, cannot 
resist an attempt to assert their position on values and their relative priorities. They 
spend a substantial time (DOWNIE, TANNAHILL AND TANNAHILL, 1996: 158-
161) trying to identify what they call 'necessary social values' which, they believe, 
must be widely shared if society is to survive and flourish. Although these values 
themselves are never made explicit, they are underpinned by general moral principks-
for example, avoiding harm to others and attempting to act so that the best pos,ible 
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consequences are produced for the majority. Downie, Tannahill and Tannahill araue o 
that these principles and adherence to them are intimately connected to societal well-
being. For the writers, well- being (positive health) is the goal of health promotion 
(DOWNIE, T ANNAHll..L AND T ANNAHll..L, 1996: 20). 
What they have done is to claim necessary (that is to say, special) status for a set of 
values they consider contribute to well- being (health). Their argument is clever 
because they have argued for a range of values rather than simply one. They have thus 
avoided accusations of 'forcing' a dominant value- 'health'- plainly difficult in the face 
of clear belief that this value and its nature can be disputed. However, the tactical 
advantage is short- lived. In asserting the dominance of multiple values, they are still 
vulnerable to the criticism, why these values? Why do these values in particular 
contribute to well- being (health)? Why should we construct, and regard as 
fundamentally important, a set of 'contributing to well- being' values? The implication 
remains that well- being (health) actually does have special status as a value and it 
may be possible to consider that it overrides other values. Downie, Tannahill and 
Tannahill are clearly attached to this idea although they recognise the difficulties in 
admitting it. 
In the 'moral case' for health promotion rehearsed above, 'health is a value and 
consequently valuable'. Further, 'health promotion is not obsessed with health at all 
costs'. Yet identifying the nature of the value is problematic and those involved in 
theorising on health promotion have not made significant attempts to do so. There is 
an inclination to view the value as overriding, even when the problems this idea 
contains have been explored. The first component of the 'moral case' for health 
promotion appears, therefore, to be suffering difficulties. 
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ii. The goal of health promotion is 'more health' 
While we may worry about the kind of rhetoric that bestows on health an overriding 
value, it would be strange to deny that health possessed no value at all. Health is 
clearly an important value. Assume for a moment that 'health promotion' is conceived 
of in the way that it is by the theorists who have 'talked up' and defended the value of 
health: Baric (1986); and Downie, Tannahill and Tannahill (1996). For Baric, in this 
particular paper: 
'Health promotion is a movement aimed at the achievement of HF A 2000 [Health for 
All by the Year 2000] .... (BARIC, 1986: 372). 
Downie, Tannahill and Tannahill view health promotion as a broad set of activities 
encompassing health education activities: health protection activities; and illness 
prevention activities; all with the aim of improving health (DOWNIE, TANNAHILL 
AND T ANN AHll..L , 1996: 59). Whether a movement or a set of activities, these 
writers conceive of 'health promotion' as contributing to a state of affairs where more 
of the value of health exists. For them, the value of health is fundamentally important; 
thus health promotion (aimed at achieving 'more health') has instrumental value. It 
does not matter, then, if we do not believe that 'health' possesses overriding value. All 
we have to consider is that 'health' is an important value for 'health promotion' to have 
an instrumental value. 
This view depends, however, on more or less complete certainty that the goal of 
'health promotion' is in fact the achievement of 'more health'. It seems perverse to try 
and deny this. Yet if we return to theorists' understanding of what 'health promotion' 
actually is. it is possible to identify the potential for ambiguity within the supposedly 
clear- headed goal. Downie, Tannahill and Tannahill propose that a range of 
protective, educational and preventive activities constitute 'health promotion'. Banc 
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sees it as a movement for Health for All's achievement. The writers reviewed in 
Chapter One broadly conceptualise it as involving activities based on a medical 
model (for example, didactic advice giving): on an educational model (such as 
teaching and learning promoting informed health choices); on a participant- centred 
or empowerment model (where individuals or communities, rather than professionals. 
take the lead in identifying health 'needs' and plan to meet these); and on a social 
change model (in which legal, policy or fiscal change, for example, alters social 
structures for the benefit of health) (BEATTIE, 1984, 1991: EWLES AND 
SIMNEIT, 1992; NAIDOO AND WILLS, 1994; TONES, 1983, 1986a, 1986b, 1990: 
TONES, TILFORD AND ROBINSON, 1990; TONES AND T~FORD, 1994). 
As I have already argued, models can be interpreted as expressions of values. In 
particular, they express the value of health although as I have made clear, discussion 
on the nature of that value (intrinsic or instrumental, for example) is seldom explicit. 
Underlying expressions of the value through the different models are separate 
conceptions of the nature of health itself. For example, the medical model sees it as 
absence of disease; while the empowerment model views it as the capacity to make 
empowered choices. Returning to the supposedly clear- sighted goal of health 
promotion- 'more health'- it now becomes reasonable to ask, 'What might "more 
health" be? Less disease? Greater numbers of properly empowered people?' The goal 
could be less clear- sighted than we thought. 
Extensive theoretical work has been undertaken with the aim of exploring health's 
conceptual contestability (see, for example, HARE, 1986: SCADDING. 1988; 
SEEDHOUSE, 1986). Further, there is a literature based on empirical work aiming to 
assess 'lay' views on the nature of health and its determinants (such as 
BLACKBURN. 1991: CALNAN. 1987: CORNWELL. 1984: HERZLICH. 1973). 
Analysis of this work suggests the complexity of both theory and belief about health. 
However. it seems to be the case that we understand health in broadly two different 
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(but frequently interplaying) ways: in the negative sense of the absence of illness or 
disease; and in the positive one of wellness, well- being or even flourishing. Although 
they hardly do justice to the complexities, health promotion models (as described by 
the theorists above) can be interpreted as owing greater or lesser allegiance to one or 
other of these understandings. Moreover, examples of activities that could relate to 
the individual models could be sharply defined in terms of their understanding of 
health. For example, childhood immunisation (a 'medical model' activity mentioned in 
Chapter One) might be based on the belief that health is the absence of disease (that is 
to say, infectious diseases of childhood). Equally, the 'safe play area' developed by the 
empowered community in Chapter One (an activity connected to the 'participant-
centred! empowerment model') could be rooted in the belief that health is a more 
positive concept. 
This dichotomy of understanding over the nature of the concept of health spreads still 
further. There is evidence of at least some theorists being attached to the concept of 
positive health (BAELZ, 1979: SEEDHOUSE, 1986; WILSON, 1975). But the 
overwhelming sense from looking at contemporary or near- contemporary guidance 
and policy on health promotion is of an attachment to health in the negative sense of 
disease absence (HEALTH EDUCATION AUTHORITY, 1993b: PRIEST AND 
SPELLER, 1991; SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HEALTH, 1992; SECRETARY 
OF ST ATE FOR HEALTH, 1998). Given this, it is even more important to doubt the 
clear- sightedness of health promotion's goal of 'more health'. 'Health' in what sense? 
Why should this doubt about clarity of goal be important? Surely so long as the goal 
is 'health', it doesn't matter whether this is illness absence or positive well- being or a 
mixture of the two. Health is being promoted. If 'health' itself is a value (which it 
seems necessary to agree), then 'health promotion' has at least instrumental value. But 
the conceptual confusion surrounding 'health' has at least two important effc(ts on the 
'moral case' for health promotion. 
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First and most simply. If the nature of the concept of health is disputed, it is likely 
there will also be dispute, at least in some cases, about the value of the particular 
'good' produced by health promotion activity. At best, value may be seen as 
insignificant or marginal; at worst, it could be that no value at all is perceived. For 
example, the adherent to the participant- centredJ empowerment model may see little 
value in increased levels of childhood immunisation where this has been achieved 
without the full involvement of the community concerned. An uncomplicated view of 
the instrumental value of health promotion will thus become hard to take. In a 
particular situation, some people will perceive health promotion activity as possessing 
instrumental value; others, viewing exactly the same activity, will imagine it has little 
or no value in an instrumental sense. 
Hare (1986) suggests a way out of this kind of problem. We should allow, even 
encourage, separate evaluative perceptions of 'health'. For health promotion, the 
implication is that we should also encourage general agreement on the value of health 
promotion activity across its range: from that based on the medical model~ to that 
premised on the participant- centredJ empowerment model. 
This 'softly softly' response might initially appear a happy solution to the difficulty. 
However, there are two reasons to doubt its likely success. First, there is little 
evidence of those involved in health promotion being prepared to adopt this 
'reasonable' approach to the nature of the 'more health' being sought. The disputes that 
characterised my history- telling in Chapter Two and Chapter Three were frequently 
about- or were underpinned by- disagreement on the nature and causes of health and 
illness (and consequently on what needed to be done to create 'more health'). Recent 
policy times have in particular witnessed profound division on the measures required 
for 'more health' (TOWNSEND, DAVIDSON AND WHITEHEAD. 1988)- a di\'ision 
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not removed by recent UK changes in political control (HEALTH SERVICE 
JOURNAL, 1999a). 
Dougherty (1993) conceptualises this division by offering two opposing models of the 
relationship between individual behaviour and health status: the Freedom Model 
(within which a person has free choice and thus responsibility for her or his health); 
and the Facticity Model (in this, behaviour is a result of genetic and environmental 
facts and so lies beyond an individual's control). The product of this division is a 
world divided into 'victim blamers' (subscribers to the Freedom Model) and those 
with 'bad faith' (in the ability of people to play at least some part in shaping their 
health, subscribers to the Facticity Model). Dougherty asserts that: 
'U nderstood as a problem of metaphysics, as the freedom versus determinism debate, 
there is little hope for resolution of the conflict between the Freedom Model and the 
Facticity ModeL .. ' (DOUGHERTY, 1993: 116). 
Dougherty'S conceptualisation is a further buttress against the idea that those involved 
in health promotion can accept and work with separate evaluative perceptions of 
'health'. 'Bad faith' versus 'victim blaming' is added to 'absence of disease' versus 'well 
being' and the tangled conflict between separate models of health promotion. The net 
effect is to reinforce the sense of dichotomy of understanding and belief over 'more 
health' as the goal of health promotion. 
The second effect of the conceptual and practical confusion that exists over 'health' is 
even more worrying in tenns of assessing the nature of the goal of health promotion. 
Reference was made earlier to empirical work that had identified the complexity of 
private 'lay' beliefs about the nature of health. Take an example from this work: 
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'It doesn't matter what you do, you could go out and jog every day and have a heart 
attack for no reason. You know? I mean, you've got to live life the way you want to 
and the way you feel you can push yourself .... The way I look at it, if you're going to 
die of cancer or anything else, you're still going to die of something. You can't be a 
health fanatic all your life, can you .... ?' (CORNWELL, 1984: 165-7). 
It is worth reflecting on the rich ambiguity of this and similar statements. There seems 
to be little match between it and the clear- sighted goal of 'more health' identified in 
the 'moral case'. There is certainly the potential for conflict between 'lay' and 
'professional' conceptions of health. Health promotion activities are more often than 
not planned and delivered by 'professionals' (health promoters and health promotion 
specialists). So there is also at least the potential for this group to be acting for a 
version of 'health' of little or no interest or value to those they are supposed to be 
serving (GRACE, 1991). Unwittingly or otherwise, health professionals may be 
supporting the maintenance of a set of health- related values that have little to do with 
the values held by the individuals or communities for whom they work (Wll..SON, 
1986). 
It has so far been assumed that the goal of health promotion is, in fact, 'more health'. 
Objection to this component of the 'moral case' has centred around the conceptual 
ambiguity of 'health' itself: in particular; what exactly does 'more health' mean?: and 
is the value of 'health' the same for health professionals as it is for their clients? As if 
these objections weren't sufficient, there is a further possibility which must be 
explored- that the goal of health promotion is something completely different to 'more 
health'. 
What is meant by this? How can 'health promotion' be about anything other than 
'health', albeit that this concept is highly contested? In Chapter Two and Chapter 
Three, the history of health promotion was discussed in relation to a number of 
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dimensions, including the wider social and political context in which its activities 
have taken place. Health promotion activity itself is undeniably political in the sense 
that it is concerned with the authoritative allocation of values within a society 
(EASTON, 1953). Arguably the primary value of concern to health promotion is the 
value of 'health'. However, the (necessary) intertwining of health promotion policy 
and activity with other kinds of political policy and activity offers at least the chance 
that the clear pursuit of this value may be difficult. Indeed, 'health promotion' policy 
and activity may actually be implemented for non- health ends. If this is so, then we 
need to examine what goods, or values, are being pursued in order to determine their 
morality and that of the activity concerned. 
Against this point, two things could be suggested. First, supporting 'evidence' would 
be hard to come by and anything that was available would be subject to interpretation; 
that is, any activity could be re- interpreted- for ideological reasons- as being 
primarily undertaken for non- health ends. Moving a little from health promotion 
specifically to the broader health care arena, take the example from Chapter Two of 
Will Hutton's (1995) commentary on the conversion of the NHS into a quasi- or 
internal market. Hutton's argument- part of a much broader analysis of UK society's 
direction in the early 1990s- was that the changes were inspired by economic 
considerations and the ideology of libertarianism rather than any desire to improve 
the Health Service for its own sake. But Hutton's analysis is itself ideological; 'events' 
could be re- interpreted in a completely different way. Second, and closely linked to 
the first point, isn't it the case that governments frequently have multiple objectives? 
Continuing the example of the marketisation of the NHS, economic motivations were 
also likely to have been connected to considerations more directly to do with health 
and health care. Wikler (1978). as part of an exploration of possible limits to 'health 
behaviour reform' (health promotion) identifies two possible goals of such reform. 
apart from health as a goal in itself. These are the goal of fair distribution of burdens 
(reducing the burden of illness so that I do not have to pay- unfairly- for Sl)meOne 
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else's imprudent health behaviour); and the goal of public welfare (health promotion 
reduces levels of ill health so that economic function or state defence, say. are 
improved). Wikler's identification of the possible nature of 'other goals' might suggest 
that, say, the mUltiple goals of health, fair distribution of burdens and public welfare 
objectives are not necessarily incompatible. 
I would agree, but at this point it is necessary to return and consider exactly what is 
being claimed for the 'moral case'. The claim is that 'health' is a value; and because 
'health promotion' has as its goal 'more health' it also has (at least instrumental) value. 
The contingency of the value of 'health promotion' on the value of 'health' is clear. If 
health promotion activities can have mUltiple goals then the relationship of 
contingency is destroyed. It is no longer possible to suggest that health promotion is 
valuable in a prima facie sense because it is about the pursuit of health. The value of 
health promotion can only be determined on a much stricter, possibly only case- by-
case, basis. The requirement for this might be supported by an example. A 
government might invest in health promotion activity because it believes that the 
savings from reduced ill health will be substantial. At the moment, goals for this 
policy might relate to health, but also to fair distribution of burdens (savings devoted 
to lowering national insurance contributions, particularly for the prudent, say); and! or 
to public welfare (assume that savings are devoted to improving education). What if. 
however, the major goal in reducing expenditure on illness treatment was in order to 
increase investment in weapons of mass destruction? My assertion is that it is possible 
to have non- health goals for health promotion which have greater or lesser moral 
acceptability- and even goals that are unacceptable. Given this, it is over- simplistic to 
argue the 'moral case' for health promotion on the grounds that the goal is 'more 
health'. Even if this were only and always the goal, conceptual confusion requires 
debate about what exactly the value is and whether in particular instances its pursuit 
(and the nature of that pursuit) is appropriate. 
114 
iii. A principal strategy of health promotion- empowerment- increases the 
likelihood of 'more health' being achieved and underpins the morality of acti\·it~· 
At this point, the 'moral case' appears somewhat under siege. 'Health' certainly is a 
value but its nature is open to dispute; and the claim that the goal of health promotion 
is the value of 'more health' is far from clear. Yet the third component of the 'case' 
may still be proven. Recall again this part of the outline of the 'case' from above: 
'The values central to health promotion include, for example, a concern to respect and 
encourage autonomy. Indeed the task of supporting self- empowennent is a practical 
necessity for health promotion: if individuals are empowered, they are more likely to 
make "healthy choices"; if they are not, the effectiveness of the whole enterprise of 
health promotion is put into question ... .'. 
The importance of self- empowerment as a strategy to increase the morality of health 
promotion cannot be underestimated. It will be clear that in itself this part of the 'case' 
for the morality of health promotion has two connected components. One is that 
empowerment is a moral value of central importance to health promotion (what I will 
call the value- in- itself argument). The other is that those involved in health 
promotion activities must of necessity attempt to empower because empowered 
people (or communities) are more likely to adopt health enhancing behaviours. Those 
planning and implementing activities must 'buy into' empowennent if they desire 
effectiveness and success in what they are doing (what I will call the effectiveness 
argument). I will describe each of these components in tum. At this stage it is worth 
noting, however, that if this part of the 'moral case' is to hold water, what must be 
demonstrated is that empowerment is not only a value of central importance to health 
promotion; but also that it is a value without moral ambiguity or difficulty in the 
context of this field of activity. If this cannot be shown, then both components of this 
part of the 'case' fall into disarray: the value of empowennent becomes disputed (in 
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the same way that it has been shown to be so with other values connected to health 
promotion, notably the value of 'health'); and the idea of the requirement to empower 
in order to be effective becomes a red herring. (,Effectiveness' in itself cannot be a 
moral value, although it may be connected to such values- for example, the value of 
health. This point is demonstrated when thinking about why those involved in health 
promotion might want to be 'effective'. Of course, a reason for desiring 'effectiveness' 
might be to achieve more of the moral value of 'health'- although from the lengthy 
discussions above it should be clear there is a need to recognise the ambiguities and 
difficulties inherent within the pursuit of this value. However, there are lots of other 
non- moral reasons for wanting health promotion activities to be 'effective'- for 
example, the desire to secure promotion, prestige or more performance related pay.) 
The central importance of the value of empowerment to health promotion is fairly 
easy to identify. There is, after all, a participant- centred or empowerment model of 
health promotion (it is necessary to remember my assertion, from Chapter One, that 
models function as expressions of ideology or value and not simply or most 
importantly as descriptive of activity). A variant of one sort or another of this model 
appears in the taxonomies constructed by all the theorists cited above. In a succession 
of articles, one especially prominent UK theorist has argued the case for the centrality 
of self- empowerment to health promotion (TONES, 1983, 1986a, 1986b, 1992). This 
case has frequently been expressed in terms of the effectiveness argument (although 
important connections have been made with the value- in- itself argument). I will 
return to it later. 
One of the most articulate expressions of the value- in- itself argument has been that 
of Michael Yeo (1993). (It is important to note that this argument is seldom explicitly 
expressed by health promotion theorists. The impression most frequently gained is 
that empowerment as a value appropriate for, and important to, health promotion is 
taken as read.) Yeo begins his argument by asserting the two kinds of characteristic 
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(and opposing) approaches to health promotion ('approach' is used here as a noun, the 
means of approaching activities or interventions designed to promote health). The 
first kind of approach is that based on the individual; and the second is that based on 
systems (environments). Interventions yielded by the individual approach centre 
around encouragement of individuals voluntarily to change or adapt their health 
behaviour; while those prompted by the systems approach tend to rely on measures 
that may be non- voluntary (even coercive, at least in the sense of not getting 
indi vidual agreement for the changes being promoted): 
'Viewed in these terms, it becomes apparent that the difference between the two is an 
ethical difference, and that the individual- versus- the system debate is essentially a 
moral debate. Indeed, one hears in the health promotion debates today the echoes of 
an ancient and persistent quarrel between two different ethics: an individualistic or 
libertarian ethic and a collectivist or comrnunitarian ethic ... .' (YEO, 1993: 228). 
For Yeo, this 'ancient and persistent quarrel' is tiring and dispiriting. His 
conceptualisation can be traced against that of Dougherty (1993). The individual 
approach aligns somewhat with Dougherty's Freedom Model; and the systems 
approach with that of the Facticity Model. For Yeo, like Dougherty, the problem lies 
in failure adequately to understand the relationship between freedom and health 
choices. The advocate of the individual approach possesses an over- optimistic view 
of our capacity with regard to free will. This in tum leads to a 'it's down to you' style 
of health promotion activity and consequent 'victim blaming' when things fail to work 
out. The supporter of the systems approach, on the other hand, denudes the individual 
of freedom and opens the door to 'non- voluntary' or even coercive health promotion. 
Both approaches are inadequate as ethics for health promotion. 
Yeo's solution to his conceptualisation of the health promotion dichotomy is to assert 
the centrality of empowerment as an approach to. and ethic for. the field of activity. 
117 
There is a need to recognise (as the systems supporter does) that community is a value 
and a key task of health promotion is to build community. Equally, individual 
freedom and responsibility are values. The appropriate way to see the relationship 
between individual and community is as mutually supportive and reinforcing, and the 
way to encourage this relationship to develop is through empowerment, the 
appropriate attribution of prospective responsibility: 
'Attributing responsibility in a prospective and empowering sense encompasses a 
wide range of empowerments from moral exhortations and inspirational messages to 
giving (or even relinquishing) responsibility. To attribute freedom and responsibility 
in the sense of giving people control over solutions to problems may involve giving 
powers and resources in order for them to do so. Attributions that do indeed empower 
people to assume greater control in matters of health are a vital part of the health 
promotion philosophy I am sketching here and are to be prized in so far as they serve 
to promote not only health, but also freedom and community ... .' (YEO, 1993: 232). 
Yeo's effort to draw together competing approaches to health promotion by positing 
an 'ethic of empowerment' bears very close resemblance to Dougherty's conclusions. 
From his Freedom and Facticity Models of health, Dougherty argues that while a 
health promotion policy framework should 'maintain public sympathy for those in 
need' (DOUGHERTY, 1993: 118); importantly it should emphasise peoples' 
capacities to choose health improving behaviours: 
'Not only does this seem to be the honest truth, it is also empowering. Compared with 
the alternatives of avoiding individual health education or freighting it with qualifiers 
about the social context, this approach makes direct appeal to the dignity of each 
individual. It addresses people as persons with some say over their destinies. It denies 
that people are merely passive vehicles for their own habits and offers a degree of 
control and therefore self- esteem ... .' (DOUGHERTY, 1993: 118. italics added). 
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At this point, there is not a great deal of distance between the value- in- itself and 
effectiveness arguments. In different ways, both Yeo and Dougherty relate 
empowennent to allowing the assumption of control, necessary because of our belief 
in the values of individual freedom and of community. Because these values are 
fundamental, any attempt to limit or deny them is to deny human aspirations and 
therefore ultimately likely to be self- defeating. 'Blaming' and 'removing control' are 
unlikely to change health behaviour; supporting and enabling individual freedom is. 
Tones writes: 
'It would be generally accepted that empowerment involves (i) having a range of 
competences which provide individuals with experience of controlling their lives and 
their environmental circumstances and (ii) having a conviction that you are in fact 
mostly in charge of your life. Beliefs about control are often described in such terms 
as "self efficacy beliefs" and "perceived locus of control". The former is represented 
by a belief that a particular course of action is not only worth undertaking (e.g. 
stopping smoking) but that you can actually do it! Those individuals who have 
accumulated a large number of specific self efficacy beliefs will develop a generalised 
expectation of effectiveness. In other words they will have an "internal" locus of 
control. Those who have experienced failure, on the other hand, are likely to be 
governed by "externality", i.e. to believe that any good or bad fortune which they 
experience will be due, either to "powerful others" or "chance"- or both ... .' (TONES, 
1992: 135). 
It becomes clear that the more belief I have in my own self- efficacy, the more likely 
it is that I will positively control my own behaviour for my own ends. This does not, 
of course, necessarily mean that my behaviour will always be 'healthful' (whatever 
might be understood by this). However. there is much more chance of it being so than 
if I was 'controlled' because in the latter case I would be the helpless subject of a 
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range of forces, many of which are likely to be 'against health'. Further, there is a 
sense in which empowerment is itself 'health'. Tones writes thus about health 
education (which he sees as the fundamental building block for health promotion): 
'It seems clear that child- rearing which provides a high level of nurturance together 
with an emphasis on independence will facilitate autonomy and genuine informed 
decision- making .... Similarly, primary socialisation which is future- oriented and 
emphasises the value of deferred gratification will facilitate acceptance of behaviours 
which have long- term benefits at the expense of immediate pleasure or relief from 
stress. For all of these reasons health education must seek to provide self 
empowerment both for individuals and communities ... .' (TONES, 1983: 124). 
Self- empowerment based health education (and health promotion), then, represents 
the value of individual freedom. It increases the likelihood of 'more health' being 
achieved; and means that health education and health promotion enacted in this way 
will be moral. Moreover, empowerment extends beyond work with individuals to 
work with communities: 
'Another key aspect of importance to health promotion .... [is] community 
participation. Community participation is facilitated by the possession of appropriate 
lifeskills together with beliefs about efficacy and control. Community participation is 
also a context in which life skills may be acquired and self efficacy beliefs acquired. 
It also seems likely that community participation is a major source of self esteem ... .' 
(TONES, 1992: 135). 
The relationship between individual self- empowerment and community 
empowennent is essential and reciprocal. Effective health promotion depends on both 
empowered individuals and empowered communities because they are sources of 
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strength and learning for each other. The moral value of empowerment health 
promotion to both individuals and communities is clear. 
Here, it might seem that we have turned the tide back in favour of the 'moral case'. It 
does not matter, we could argue, that 'health' is a disputed value and that there is equal 
dispute about the goal of health promotion being 'more health'. Health promotion's 
principle strategy of empowerment increases the likelihood of it being effective; but it 
also underpins the moral value of activity. Freedom and community are fundamental 
values; empowerment supports both. 
It must be admitted that the 'case' at this point does appear strong. It is not particularly 
weakened by any claim that health promotion activities are at least sometimes not 
based on strategies of empowerment. It could be argued in return that these activities 
may well present moral difficulties but that 'authentic', empowerment- based health 
promotion does not. (Remember that I am building and challenging a case for health 
promotion as a primajacie, rather than an unambiguous, good.) 
This would be a perfectly reasonable position, except it is allowing the advocate of 
empowerment health promotion to claim a moral high ground to which they are not 
entitled. The assumption made by a writer such as Yeo, and others asserting the 
'value- in- itself argument, is that empowerment is an uncomplicated moral value. It 
is necessary to remember that in order for this component of the 'moral case' to retain 
its strength, it must be shown not only that empowerment is a value of central 
importance to health promotion; but also that it is a value without moral difficulty in 
the context of the field of activity. 
Fielding (1996) argues it is possible to construct two key accounts of empowerment. 
The first (and dominant) is the 'process' or 'neutral' account. This account centres on 
the idea that those who have power decide appropriate others should have greater 
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power and so 'transfer' or 'give' this power to these others. Although not explicit. it 
seems to be in part this kind of account of empowerment that Tones ( 1992) is 
constructing. When he talks (from above) of 'having a range of competences .... ' and of 
'having a conviction ... .'; the implication is that somewhere along the line. these 
competences and convictions have at least in part been developed by allowing the 
'competent' person access to education and so forth. 
The second account is the emancipatory account. Here it is argued that empowerment 
cannot be characterised simply as a 'give and take' process. Transfers of power are 
often problematic and value- laden: 
'Empowerment. ... is a struggle in difficult and often hostile contexts .... The point of 
the struggle is to realise a view of social justice and the development of the 
democratic way of life ... .' (FIELDING, 1996: 405). 
It is hard to be clear about which account of empowerment is accepted by those 
involved in health promotion. I have suggested that Tones implies a view of 
empowerment as process. Yet there is also an emancipatory ring to the following: 
'[An empowered participating community] may offer a fundamental challenge to 
government, t~e status quo and the existing power base. It is based on the notion that 
only community action and the ballot box offers a prospect for such radical change as 
is involved, for instance, in dealing with problems of unemployment, poverty and 
general inequity. The .... process is essentially one of "critical consciousness raising" 
(to employ Friere's seminal term) accompanied by the provision of empowering social 
and general life skills .... ' (TONES, 1992: 135). 
Let us assume for a moment that those involved in health promotion activity are 
inclined towards a process view of empowerment. Power is 'transferred' between 
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different parties. But this notion holds a number of inherent difficulties. First. the idea 
of 'power' being parcelled up and changing hands is both ontologically and 
epistemologically problematic, especially if we accept Foucauldian notions of power 
as constantly shifting and circulating rather than as a commodity 'held' by individuals 
or groups. Second, and more importantly given our concern with health promotion, 
empowerment as process implies particular kinds of relationships; powerful 
individuals or organisations bestow through largesse some of their power on those 
who previously had none, or at any rate, less. This kind of relationship does not sound 
'empowering' at all. Conceiving of empowerment in these terms will pose special 
difficulty for those involved in health promotion activity, given that health promotion 
can be regarded as: 
'The process of enabling individuals and communities to increase control over the 
determinants of health and thereby improve their health ... .' (NUTBEAM, 1986: 114). 
The difficulty is that if the powerful bestow power on the powerless, control is always 
in the hands of the former group. If empowerment is indeed process, who decides on 
'balances of power' and on what grounds are such decisions made? If those involved 
in health promotion activity see power as a transferable commodity, then they must 
enter debates about when and why transfer of power from individuals or groups to 
others should begin and end. These debates will involve conflicting values (for 
example, the value of 'social stability', as it might be seen through the eyes of the 
powerful, against the value of 'social justice', and the need to increase this, as it might 
be perceived by those with less power or those working on their behalf). Even on a 
process account, empowerment starts to take on the appearance of a problematic 
value. 
If it is assumed that those involved in health promotion activity understand 
empowerment as emancipation. the possibility of debate does not disappear- it 
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simply becomes more explicit. According to Fielding, the emancipatory account 
views empowerment as 'a struggle .... to realise a view of social justice'. This might 
appear attractive to those involved in health promotion activity but again it renders 
the value of empowerment problematic. Views of what constitutes 'social justice' are 
bound to differ: struggles are unlikely to be divorced from values conflicts. 
A more detailed account of empowerment, therefore, exposes its problematic nature 
as a value. Transfers of power between individuals, groups, communities and 
populations are highly unlikely never to be disputed. And as soon as the potential for 
dispute emerges, the 'value- in- itself argument for empowerment underpinning the 
morality of health promotion is substantially weakened. This, as I have made clear, is 
all that needs to be demonstrated to shake the view that empowerment guarantees the 
morality of health promotion as idea or field of activity. 
4. Conclusion 
I have put forward a 'moral case' for health promotion as a prima facie good with 
three key components: health is a value; the goal of health promotion is 'more health'; 
and a principle strategy of health promotion- empowerment- increases the likelihood 
of 'more healtli' being achieved and underpins the morality of activity. But each of 
these components can be challenged. The nature of health as a value can be disputed. 
The goal of health promotion as 'more health' can be challenged (both in terms of 
potential argument about the nature of the 'health' being sought and in terms of 
whether activities and interventions are actually about 'more health' at all). 
Empowerment (contrary to its presentation by theorists) can also be seen as an 
ambiguous and problematic value. 
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The difficulty is this. While it might superficially appear reasonable to claim the 
prima facie good of health promotion; there is substantial evidence to belie\'e that in 
key areas supporting the qualification of that good, major problems exist. Health 
promotion cannot automatically be seen even as a prima facie good because there is 
little sense that other things relating to that notional good (such as the values of health 
and empowerment) are ever likely to be equal. They contain far too much complexity. 
I began this project convinced that health promotion as concept and set of activities 
held substantial ethical difficulties. I was impelled to this view by my own 
perceptions and experiences. Analysis of the history of the field of activity 
demonstrated substantial conceptual, political and practical dispute. Reflection on this 
supported my view that here was an area ripe for moral probing. I then began to listen 
to the voices of theorists to understand (albeit often through interpretation) how a 
'moral case' for health promotion might be made as a way of responding to my initial 
concerns. Yet the theorists' voices have so far failed to convince me. 
Are my worries shared by others? Do my doubts about the morality of activity and the 
ambiguity of key concepts underpinning it find expression elsewhere? In order to 
address these questions, I need now to listen to another set of voices- those of some 
who are involved in the practice of health promotion work. 
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CHAPTER FIVE- THE MORAL PROBLEMS OF HEALTH PROMOTIO~: 
PRACTITIONER PERCEPTIONS; (1) CONTEXT AND METHODOLOGY 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I describe and discuss the context in which I heard practitioner 'voices' 
on the moral problems of health promotion, and the methodology I employed to do so. 
I took and analysed writing produced for assessment by two cohorts of health 
promotion Masters level students, the great majority of whom were also practitioners 
in the field of activity. The writing related to a taught module on 'Philosophy and 
Health Promotion' held at South Bank University, London during academic years 
1995-6 and 1996-7. Textual analysis is a methodology applied reasonable commonly 
in academic consideration of health care and the field of health promotion 
(particularly at policy level). Examples of such application include Schuklenk, Mertz 
and Richters (1995): Wilton (1995); and Lupton (1998). To my knowledge, however, 
the technique of analysing student writing to illuminate practices within, and 
theoretical roots to, the field is novel. I begin this chapter with a description of the 
research context; together with my own, and my participants', places within it. 
2. The Context of the Research 
As already indicated, I analysed a number of assignments produced for assessment by 
two cohorts of students undertaking Masters level postgraduate studies in health 
promotion at South Bank University. London. The students had been required to 
write: 
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'A critical report reflecting on the philosophical basis of an ongoing programme in a 
health promotion establishment.. .. '(SOUTH BANK UNIVERSITY, 1995b: 16; 
1996b: 17). 
The assignment related to the philosophy and health promotion (PHP) unit of the 
South Bank postgraduate programme in health promotion. The complete brief for the 
assignment appears as Appendix One. (From here on, the terms 'report' and 
'assignment' are used completely interchangeably.) 
Overall, the postgraduate programme aims to encourage the development of 
knowledge about, and critical awareness of, theory and practice related to the 
'dynamic field' of health promotion (SOUTH BANK UNNERSITY, 1995a: 4; 1996a: 
4). Specifically, learning outcomes for the PHP unit include the student being able to: 
, Identify philosophical and ethical issues in our own health promotion practice ... .' 
(SOUTH BANK UNIVERSITY, 1995b: 1; 1996b; 1). 
I analysed the writing of some of the cohorts of students who studied the unit during 
academic years 1995-6 and 1996-7. The unit syllabus for these years appears as 
Appendix Two. 
It is not necessary to say very much about the syllabus other than to note that, 
although the unit title is philosophy and health promotion, its emphasis is clearly on 
ethics, and on moral philosophy. There is much less explicit concentration on other 
aspects of philosophy arguably of great relevance to the field of health promotion; for 
example, epistemology and political philosophy. This focus is largely explained by 
the teaching interests and expertise of the staff involved. 
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Seventeen students registered for the PHP unit during academic year 1995 - 6. I asked 
permission from all of them to analyse their assignments through a letter with a 'tear-
off reply slip (appearing as Appendix Three). Four did not reply to my request. 
leaving 13 from whom I did receive pennission. Two of those who had given their 
permission either did not complete the assignment, or their work was mislaid before I 
was able to see it, meaning that I eventually received 11 completed reports for 
analysis from this first cohort. 
For academic year 1996 -7, 10 students registered for PHP. Seven students agreed to 
me using their work (I wrote to them and asked them to reply in the same way as 
before). One of these pieces of writing was mislaid so I had six assignments from this 
second cohort to analyse and thus 17 in total from across both. 
All 17 in my eventual sample were registered for part time study at the University 
(full time students on the programme are relatively rare). All the students whose work 
was analysed combined this part time study with at least part time paid work, 
although the actual time commitment to, and permanence of, this work did vary 
considerably among the sample. But this work always had at least some kind of health 
care and! or health promotion focus. Following the distinction made through this 
thesis, nine (or just under half of the total sample) were health promotion specialists; 
the rest were health promoters. 
l. 
3. 'Voices' of the Research- the 'Cast of Characters' 
Here is the 'cast of characters' in the sample that eventually emerged from the two 
cohorts- the 'voices' that I am now hearing speak about moral problems of the field of 
health promotion. Names have been changed, and any particularly distinguishing 
features either altered or removed. to preserve confidentiality and anonymity. 
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Although described in the present tense, my participants' occupations and other 
circumstances are those at the time when they were studying on the unit and writing 
the assignment. 
David works for the public health directorate of a commissioning NHS health 
authority in South London. He has particular responsibility for substance misuse 
contracts. David chose to write his assignment about the moral implications of 
'Tackling Drugs Together', the former Conservative Government's national strategy 
for drug misuse control and prevention (HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE. 
1995). 
Liz is a health promotion specialist working in a NHS health promotion department 
serving a wide area of rural East Anglia. She decided to write about 'Drinkwise', the 
national sensible drinking campaign (HEALTH EDUCATION AUTHORITY, 1992). 
Melanie is also a health promotion specialist who works in a NHS department in one 
of the home counties. Melanie wrote about ethical difficulties associated with local 
work on smoking and pregnancy. 
Patricia works as a freelance health promotion consultant. She has undertaken quite a 
lot of work for a North London NHS specialist health promotion service. Her 
• 
assignment was about epistemological and moral difficulties associated with a general 
practice- based needs assessment she undertook for this service. 
Carol is a health promotion specialist, working in a NHS department in an English 
south coast town. She has particular responsibility for outreach work, the ultimate 
focus of which is HIV and sexual health. She decided to write about ethical problems 
connected to outreach work with young people. 
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Mandy is another health promotion specialist working in a NHS department to the 
west of London. Her work includes responsibility for supporting schools health 
promotion and she chose to write about a self- esteem project developed within a local 
primary school. 
Sophie is also a health promotion specialist, working in a NHS department based in 
an English south coast seaside resort town. She wrote about the ethical problems 
associated with local implementation of the national breast screening programme 
(FORREST, 1986). 
Alison is a lecturer at a further education college in South London where her 
particular responsibility is for teaching a range of health and social care- related 
courses. In her assignment she addressed issues associated with the introduction of a 
no- smoking policy by the college management. 
Iris is a community dentist employed by a NHS Trust in one of the home counties. 
She wrote about local decisions and action in relation to fluoridation of the public 
water supply. 
Moira is a nurse teacher. She works in a college of nursing linked to a London 
teaching hospital. She looked at understandings of the concept of 'autonomy' and the 
A. 
principle of 'respect for autonomy' held by some of the students she teaches. 
Donna works as a health promotion specialist for a local district council in Southern 
England. She wrote about the link between ethics and politics in health promotion 
work, based on her experience of involvement in the council which employs her. 
John is a health promotion specialist, working for a NHS department serving a wide 
area of rural and coastal East Anglia. He has particular responsibility for work on 
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smoking prevention and chose in his assignment to write about the introduction of 
smoking policies in schools. 
Judith is also a health promotion specialist, employed in a North London NHS health 
promotion department. She too works on smoking prevention issues and looked, in 
her writing, at local work training midwives to be effective health promoters on the 
issue of smoking and pregnancy. 
Tim is the HIV and sexual health team leader of a NHS specialist health promotion 
service located in an East Anglia university city. He decided to write about a Christian 
voluntary group with which he has a lot of professional contact. This group offers 
help and support to local female sex industry workers. 
Anthony is a clinical nurse specialist for HIV, employed by a NHS Trust serving a 
large South Coast seaside resort and its surrounding area. Anthony looked in his 
writing at moral issues associated with advising HIV positive patients about anti- HIV 
combination therapy. 
Jennifer is a midwife practitioner working for a South London NHS Trust. She 
chose to focus in her assignment on the ethics of the UK National Breast Feeding 
Initiative (DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 1995a). 
~ 
Julie is a health promotion specialist working for a NHS health promotion department 
in one of the home counties. She has particular responsibility for supporting health 
promotion work with young people and decided to write about a local peer education 
project. 
To my knowledge. all of the health promotion specialists in the sample were 'second 
career migrants'; they had come to the specialism from another 'first career' 
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occupation (RAWSON AND GRIGG, 1988). Occupations from which they had 
migrated included teaching and nursing. 
4. Methodology 
It is important to note- a point which may be guessed from the above- that all the 
sample chose to focus on ethics in response to an assignment requirement that could. 
in theory, have elicited responses connecting health promotion to other branches of 
philosophy. The fact that it didn't perhaps relates to the nature of the teaching 
students experienced. As I have already indicated, this leant heavily in favour of the 
application of ethics, and of moral philosophy, to the field of health promotion. I have 
also suggested that one of my key concerns at this stage of my thesis is to determine 
whether the kinds of moral worries I have identified in relation to health promotion 
are shared by any others- in particular, by practitioners. 
It could be argued that asking questions about ethics- even, as I was effectively doing, 
indirectly- of students on what was essentially an 'ethics and health promotion course' 
is bound to result in expressions of moral concern. To expect otherwise is rather like 
building a motorway in the expectation that no traffic will travel on it. I am therefore 
almost guaranteed supporters in my worries . 
• 
I acknowledge this is a methodological tension which will be discussed in more detail 
later on. However, what I am deliberately not doing here is directly asking any kind of 
question at all of my participants. I am analysing, remember, writing responding to 
the set task~ to produce a: 
'Critical report reflecting on the philosophical basis of an ongoing programme in a 
health promotion establishment. ... '. 
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This is a key reason for my choice of method; not asking questions myself will mean I 
cannot be accused of seeking allies for my own 'case'. Against this, though, it could be 
argued that while not asking questions directly, the combination of heavily weighted 
teaching and an assessment diktat mean my sample will be substantially biased in my 
favour. I do not necessarily agree with this but assuming it to be the case, the 
expectation would be that at least some of the assignments would be 'artful 
constructions' of a morally ambiguous fictional world which is not actually reality for 
the respondents. Indeed, some of the constructions would possibly not be artful at all. 
but easily seen as fictions. As I will show in the following chapter, my 'voices' are 
frequently talking in challenging ways about practice being undertaken in response to 
national, regional or local priority and direction. 'The Health of the Nation', 'Tackling 
Drugs Together' and so on actually existed at the time my participants were writing 
(and they have been replaced by similar kinds of policies and priorities). These 
students/ practitioners are responding with 'real world' reflections to a requirement to 
'write philosophically'. 
The implication is that in constructing my methodology, I am interested in finding out 
about not only whether my moral doubt is shared; but also about how ethical 
ambiguity or difficulty emerges and is demonstrated in practical activity. I readily 
agree. Indeed, this part of my research represents a switch from critical examination 
~ 
of an abstract theoretical case for the morality of the field; to how such theoretical 
weakness impacts on practice. Later, I will return to theory- this time explicitly moral 
philosophical theory- to see whether it can provide 'solutions' to the kinds of problems 
identified by my participants. Indeed I will come back, towards the end of this thesis, 
to the 'voices'- my participants- themselves to hear whether they believe moral theory 
can help. Thus in this research I chart my way around- in a similar fashion to my 
participants, I argue- a 'reflective cycle' based on the assumption that it is possible to: 
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'Reveal, describe and interpret the past experience of individuals in order to illuminate 
the present and make manifest the potentialities of the future ... .' (JP Powell. quoted in 
HARRISON, 1992: 5). 
My method, then, has been devised to explore three intimately connected questions: 
are others worried about the morality of the field of health promotion?; how does 
moral difficulty emerge in practice?; and how is it dealt with? In Chapter Six, I chart 
my participants' response to the first two questions; and to the third in Chapter Nine. 
The method- textual analysis of a specific kind- and the methodology have been 
employed in part because they allow me to 'ask' these value-laden questions from a 
distance. 
There are, of course, other reasons for my methodological choices. I have already 
mentioned the interesting and helpful tradition of textual analysis in the area of health 
care and health promotion at policy level. My interest particularly in practitioners' 
perceptions and experiences means that traditional sources used in textual analysis (in 
the main, mass media) are unlikely to be of help to me. The apparent worth of such 
analysis as a method: and the desire not to be seen to be overtly asking questions 
(other than in a very general sense); prompted me to consider use of student 
assignments produced on the unit I was involved in teaching at the time. It was also, 
of course, the case that access to this material and these 'voices' proved to be relatively 
~ 
easy. Further, the 'voices', given their circumstances, were likely to be interested in 
the issues which were of concern to me. It was hoped they would prove to be not 
simply a source of data, but a rich and insightful source. I needed to encounter as few 
difficulties as possible as I moved from the theoretical to the empirical. At this point 
in my research, the majority of my working life was being spent in an uncertain. 
unsympathetic and non- academic work environment. It is important, as Williams 
says, to be honest about personal influences on the researcher and their impact on 
decisions made: 
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'There is a strong argument which says that it is important to acknowledge personal 
experience, in terms of your location in society, as a lens through which you make 
sense of the world and reshape existing knowledge ... .' (WILLIAMS, 1993: 12). 
I was reshaping for myself in the context of other quite considerable pressures. 
However, it is also important to be clear about limitations to methodology and 
method. 
First, my sample was obviously one of convenience (COHEN AND MANION, 1989). 
Its nature as such means that it will be impossible to infer any generalisations from 
these 'voices'. This did not worry me unduly as I made my decisions. To my 
knowledge, health promotion practitioner views on, and experience of, moral 
difficulties has been poorly researched, if at all. (Although there is an emerging trend 
towards 'empirical ethical research' in other areas of health care and with regard to 
other health care- related occupations or aspects of occupation. See, for example, 
Carter (1998) and Soafer (1995).) This suggested to me that my work should be 
oriented towards developing understanding rather than its capacity for generalisation. 
I was committed, quite reasonably, to methods grounded within the qualitative 
paradigm (GREENHALGH AND TAYLOR, 1997). 
Indeed, it is important to emphasise the limited claims I am making for the data 
resulting from this part of my research; and presented in the following chapter and in 
Chapter Nine. These are views and expressions that I have connected to the three 
questions of fundamental interest to me in the context of my research as a whole: do 
others share my moral worries?; how does moral difficulty emerge in practice?; and 
how is it dealt with? They are views from a small number of practitioners with 
particular backgrounds and interests. However. drawing out limits to claims being 
made on behalf of the data should not dilute the importance of what was in fact 
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discovered. Up to this point of my research, I have gathered significant historical and 
theoretical data that has been interpreted as confirming my initial moral unease. In 
planning this next stage, I wanted to have another 'point of reference' for what has so 
far been theoretical work infonned by personal experience. My participants provided 
this, showing that others did share my worries: that there were ways in which 
difficulties emerged; and, ultimately, that there were routes to dealing with problems. 
I undertook my analysis of the reports following assignment submission by the second 
cohort of students to whose work I had access. Analysis was done during the period 
between March and October 1997. Prior to this I had developed a clear sense of the 
general nature of the kind of data I was about to analyse. In particular, I was aware 
that writing is a fundamentally important way in which students in higher education 
make sense of the subject they are studying; and in which academic staff assess the 
development of that understanding (CREME AND LEA, 1997). Further, student 
writing takes place in distinctive social structures (LEA AND STREET, 1999: LEA 
AND STREET, UNPUBLISHED). Academic institutions are sites of discourse and 
power (LEA AND STREET, 1999). It was clear that students would be responding to 
these demands and the nature of the structure in which they were operating. However, 
while it was important that I recognise this, it should not overwhelm my analysis. I 
was taking their writing for the purpose of asking my own questions. As I have 
already made clear, I was 'asking the questions' implicitly and at one remove. Because 
~ 
I had not been involved at all in the process of assessing the assignments: and because 
of the nature of my relationship to the course (an hourly paid lecturer with a 
temporary contract); I was also rather removed from the structural context within 
which they were writing. My task was to interpret their writing to infonn questions 
relating to my research at this point, albeit acknowledging the nature of the specific 
context from which the writing had emerged. 
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I began my analysis by reading through all the reports and making notes on them. in 
order to get a broad sense of the topics being addressed. the settings within which 
activity was taking place, main protagonists within each of the stories being told 
through the writing, and so on. Then I read through each of the reports in more detail 
and at this stage attempted to 'code' the writing. I employed a process of open coding, 
breaking down the data, analysing it and then trying to 'reconstruct' it according to 
putative categories or 'themes' which appeared to emerge as a result of this process of 
sifting (STRAUSS AND CORBIN, 1990). To begin with, I was dealing with a large 
number of themes- anything up to 20- which sought to categorise both what students 
were writing about (content); and how they were writing about it (process). Gradually, 
as I developed greater and greater familiarity with my participants' 'voices' and the 
stories they were telling; the categorisation of what was being written about as 
opposed to how it was being written about became less important. I began to see the 
stories as complete again and representing a small number of singular themes. (For 
example, I finally presented the data relating mainly to my frrst and second questions-
are my worries shared and how does moral difficulty emerge in practice?- according 
to just four themes.) In my final presentation and discussion, I regarded the stories as 
complete- expressions of rich and complex thoughts on the part of skilled and 
know ledgeable practitioners. 
For purposes of clarity, my presentation of the analysis results and discussion moves 
~ 
in the following chapter from description of the background of the 'stories' through to 
identification of moral difficulties. In Chapter Nine, I move to consider and discuss 
ways in which participants dealt with difficulties as part of a broader attempt on my 
part to construct the grounds of a methodology for dealing with the moral problems of 
health promotion. I connect these ways of dealing with problems more specifically to 
the process of reflection the writing seems to me to demonstrate~ and suggest that this 
process might be a helpful way of coming to terms with the ethical difficulties 
presented by health promotion. However. it should be noted that this separation 
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between 'difficulties' and 'resolution' is a form of mediation on my part between my 
participants and the reader of this thesis. Those whose writing I analysed wrote about 
engaging things in engaging ways; artificially separating what was written about 
should not in any sense belie the richness and complexity of these 'voices'. In order to 
maintain that sense of richness as fully as possible, I have quoted from the writing of 
my participants without altering what they wrote in any way (unless, of course, 
confidentiality or anonymity needed to be protected). Sometimes I have 'connected' 
quotations together in order to aid understanding, but the writing itself has not been 
changed. 
s. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have identified my purpose in analysing the critical reports produced 
by two cohorts of students studying on the South Bank University Postgraduate 
Programme in Health Promotion during academic years 1995-6 and 1996-7. I have 
~cscribed the context of r:1y analysis. I have also described my methodology and 
discussed some of its inherent limitations. Overall, however, the methodology offers 
important possibilities for helping me with the central questions of this research. 
I now move to present and discuss the results of my analysis in relation to my first 
~ 
two substantive questions: do others share my moral worries about health promotion?; 
and how does moral difficulty emerge in practice? 
138 
CHAPTER SIX· THE MORAL PROBLEMS OF HEALTH PROMOTION: 
PRACTITIONER PERCEPTIONS; (2) RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I present the results of my analysis of student writing in relation to the 
first two broad issues this part of my research is trying to explore: is the 'moral doubt' 
I constructed for myself about the field of health promotion shared by others?; and 
how do moral difficulties emerge in practice? 
After describing and discussing the contexts and activities about which my 
participants were writing, I identify a sense of 'moral unease' among them, connected 
to difficulties both with those contexts and with those activities. Problems seem to 
emerge for my participants because of the following closely linked reasons, each of 
which I explore in some detail: 
* Diverse perceptions on the part of different people involved about the nature of 
health promotion priorities, needs and values; 
10 
* Competing views resulting from these diverse perceptions about what constitutes 
justifiable activity; 
* A lack of shared understanding about the nature of concepts believed to be centrally 
important to the promotion of health; 
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* A lack of agreement about what constitutes acceptable knowledge of the 
'effectiveness' of activity when its potential for harm (or for benefit) was being 
considered. 
Discussing the moral problems of health promotion at this stage of my research begs 
the same question encountered at a number of earlier points: 'What is health 
promotion?' As before, I intend to hear the voices of others, rather than my own, 
responding to it. The voices this time are those of the practitioners whose writing I 
have analysed. At least superficially, their response seems clear. Remember that they 
are writing a: 
'Critical report reflecting on the philosophical basis of an ongoing programme in a 
health promotion establishment.. . .' (SOUTH BANK UNIVERSITY, 1995b: 16; 
1996b: 17). 
It would be reasonable to assume that for the writers, 'health promotion' is a set of 
activities that includes among other things strategic work for drugs misuse prevention; 
sensible drinking campaigns; advice for reducing or stopping smoking during 
pregnancy; and breast screening (because these are some of the subjects my 
participants chose to write about). However, it will become clear that one of the many 
tensions within much of the writing is the question of whether the activity being 
.. 
considered (say, breast screening) is 'authentic' health promotion. As I have 
mentioned, one of the 'problem themes' I uncovered in my analysis was that of 
competing views about what constitutes justifiable health promotion activity. I will 
suggest that for some participants at least, what they perceived as unjustifiable 
activity could hardly be regarded as 'health promotion' at all. 
It is also necessary at this point to mention the issue of time. All my participants were 
writing during the period between the end of 1995 and the beginning of 1997. They 
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were describing and discussing activities that were being undertaken either directly 
within this period or shortly before it. The middle years of the 1990s were the era of 
'The Health of the Nation' (SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HEALTH, 1992) and the 
point at which an oligarchy was beginning to realise that the power it had enjoyed 
since the end of the 1970s- and which it had used to change society in ideologically 
driven ways- was likely to slip away. The contemporary nature of the writing I 
analyse will become clear but interestingly it is possible to note that many of the 
practical issues encountered and described by my participants remain, even after 
political changes. The 'problem themes', I argue, are enduring. 
2. The Moral Problems of Health Promotion: Results and Discussion 
2. 1 Health Promotion Topics: Signs of the (Particular) Times 
Of the reports considered, 12 out of 17 explored work on a particular health or disease 
prevention topic. These were: drug misuse; HIV (prevention or treatment); sexual 
health; sensible drinking/ alcohol misuse; breast cancer; smoking; infant feeding; and 
dental health. These topics were linked to what were then current national or local 
strategic initiatives related to health (SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HEALTH, 
1992; DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 1993a; HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY 
.. 
OFFICE, 1995; HERTFORDSHIRE HEALTH AGENCY, 1995; DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH, 1995a, 1995b). 
Most of the participants had been expected- through mechanisms like contracts and 
job descriptions- to work on the topic about which they were writing. For example: 
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, It was expected that I work in my capacity as a Health Promotion Adviser to meet 
the targets set by the Health of the Nation Document. This included .... promoting the 
breast screening programme .... ' (Sophie). 
'As the Public Health Officer responsible for substance misuse contracts, I was asked 
to put the necessary local arrangements in place [for implementing the national 
"Tackling Drugs Together" strategy] and produce the required reports to central 
government via the Central Drug Co-ordination Unit .... ' (David). 
'From a contractual point of view our programme is intended to meet the Health of 
the Nation target specifically related to alcohoL .. ' (Liz). 
Even 'mission statements' were cited as imperatives to activity: 
, S .... Community Health Care NHS Trust in its mission statement states that "the 
main purpose of community health services staff is the promotion of health, the 
prevention of illness and the provision of treatment, care and services to meet the 
needs of individuals, their families and carers" .... ' (Carol). 
Frequently, this organisational or political requirement for action appeared to be 
independent of any thought about whether there was actually local need for the topic 
I. 
to be addressed: 
'Why Tackling Drugs Together, why the priorities and why now .... ?' (David). 
I interpret David's questions as rhetorical. He made it clear that he was asking them 
knowing the answer would be that his organisation was obliged to become involved in 
implementing the strategy. There was no invitation to participate- it was a 
requirement. 
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If there had been discussion about the relative priority of the topic concerned. it was 
usually in relation to organisational capacity and expectation. rather than local health 
need: 
, It should be noted that this area [sensible drinking] has been given low priority in 
the wake of staff shortages .... ' (Liz). 
, In E .... Health Authority's Cancer Prevention Strategy .... targets were set for the 
number of midwives trained [in giving smoking cessation advice] .... ' (Judith). 
However, four of the reports did suggest that a version of 'need' was being considered 
in relation to the activity being discussed. Their reference is largely to nonnative 
conceptions of need (SEEDHOUSE, 1994): 
'Incontrovertibly, water fluoridation is usually the most cost effective way of 
preventing decay. It reaches all members of the population and has life long 
benefits ..... ' (Iris). 
'Last year in N .... E .... [district], ten secondary schools competed the [Exeter 
University Schools Health Education Unit] Health Related Behaviour Questionnaire . 
.. 
One school's individual results showed at year 10 almost 500/0 of pupils were regular 
smokers .... ' (John). 
, I have chosen to examine an outreach project in L ... , a small town on the edge of 
D ... Marsh. With a large population of young people. L ... was seen to be an area of 
need due to lack of easily accessible health services, few recreational facilities and a 
higher than average teenage pregnancy rate .... ' (Carol). 
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'Although [work with local sex industry workers has been] identified as [emerging 
from] a normative need, the approach has been, from the outset, client- centred .... ' 
(Tim). 
2.2 The Reports and Health Promotion Activities 
All 17 assignments described and discussed a particular activity or set of activities 
that were being undertaken either in a generic sense or in relation to a specific health 
or disease prevention topic. These were: 
* Health policy and strategy implementation and development; 
* Environmental regulation; 
* Campaigns; 
* Screening; 
* Advice- giving/ counselling; 
* Outreach work; 
* Training (to enable other health professionals to become more effective health 
promoters); 
• Peer education; 
• Self- esteem development: 
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* Generic needs assessment. 
Clearly, in some cases there was cross over between activity. For example, outreach 
work might also involve training, or self- esteem development, or peer education. But 
I was able to interpret each report as having one clear activity focus; in some cases, 
further kinds of activity stemmed from this. It is interesting to note that the activities 
described and discussed by the writers as 'health promotion activities' broadly 
correspond with the kinds of things understood by my 'voices from theory' (in 
Chapters One and Four); and my 'voices from history' (in Chapters Two and Three). 
Up to this point, at least, it appears that in talking about 'health promotion', historical, 
theoretical and practitioner 'voices' are to some extent at least referring to the same 
kinds of things. 
2. 3 The Reports and 'Settings' for Health Promotion 
The writers were all discussing activity taking place in particular 'settings'. (1 
understand setting to mean either a catchment area for approaching a specific 
population group: or a locational framework for planning activity; or a combination of 
these (BARIC, 1996).) The settings were: local authorities; health authorities; NHS 
~ 
'provider' Trusts; primary health care; schools; colleges of further education; 
voluntary organisations; and 'communities'- that is, a group of people bound by 
geography or some other defining interest (CALOUSTE GULBENKIAN 
FOUNDATION, 1984). Again, a writer might have been discussing work taking place 
in more than one setting (for example. primary health care and the community), 
although it was generally possible to identify a 'lead' setting. 
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Settings were almost always seen by the writers as neutral backdrops, against which 
activity problematic in itself was undertaken. For example: 
, The client may contact her GP surgery for advice but there is not any standardised 
advice given, and no requirement for practice nurses to become involved with the 
breast screening service since the service is contracted out to a local Breast 
Screening Service. So the next port of call is at the actual screening mobile where 
there is very little time for information giving. With a target to screen 60,000 women 
within three years, very little time is left for discussion at these busy screening 
mobiles ..... ' (Sophie). 
As Sophie continues to discuss, the activity of screening- at least in terms of how it 
was done here- caused her severe moral worries. However, the setting (in this case, 
primary health care and the community) did not appear to contribute to the difficulty. 
Occasionally, a setting was identified as something more than a neutral background, 
but where this was so it was seen as a positive moral force, with the potential to 
convey and nurture the growth of appropriate values: 
'Schools .... are a place of safety and learning for young people, and often they are the 
most stable factor in a young persons life as more and more pupils come from 
~ 
unstable backgrounds. Young people while they are of school age spend more awake 
hours with their teachers than with parents or guardians during term time. 
Consequently the school setting has a big influence on young people during their 
formative years ... .' (John). 
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2.4 Identifying Moral Doubt and Difficulty 
Through my analysis, I identified four closely connected themes which represented 
the moral doubt and difficulty experienced by my participants: 
* Diverse perceptions on the part of different people involved about the nature of 
health promotion priorities, needs and values; 
* Competing views resulting from these diverse perceptions about what constitutes 
justifiable activity; 
* A lack of shared understanding about the nature of concepts believed to be centrally 
important to the promotion of health; 
* A lack of agreement about what constitutes acceptable knowledge of 'effectiveness' 
of activity when its potential for harm (or benefit) was being considered. 
Each of these themes will be presented and discussed in more detail. 
2.4.1 Diverse Perceptions of Priorities, Needs and Values 
l. 
Perceptions of priorities, needs and values related to health promotion activity were 
seen by the writers to differ between: central government and local (health and local 
government) authorities; between practitioners and their managers; between 
practitioners from different disciplines or different fields of activity or with different 
interests; and between practitioners (as individuals and as representatives of 
organisations) and the people they served (patients, pupils, residents and so on). 
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Although this division between conflicting groups appears clear, in fact the nature and 
levels of conflict were rather harder to discern. For example: 
, The perception of substantial numbers of young people is that they can safely take 
drugs recreationally .... It is highly likely that the recipients of [drug prevention] 
messages do not see their drug use, if they do use drugs, as problematic .... ' (David). 
It is possible to identify two levels at least of actual or potential conflict here. First, 
between government ministers and part of the population they were elected to serve. 
For ministers (presumably), being healthy involves leading a drug - free life. For 
some or many young people, being healthy involves having a good time and a good 
time could include the use of drugs. 
But there is also actual or potential conflict over priorities, needs and values between 
different people involved in constructing and then implementing the strategy about 
which David is writing- 'Tackling Drugs Together' (HER MAJESTY'S 
STATIONERY OFFICE, 1995): 
, During Drug Action Team and Tackling Drugs Together conferences in 1995 there 
hung in the air a strong shared feeling of- yes, this is all very laudable, but what are 
we supposed to be doing and how? The following quote from a colleague in a senior 
l. 
position in a local Social Services department seems to cut through much of the 
debate: 
, " It's all such a lot of hot air isn't it?" .... ' (David). 
Government ministers and health and social care professionals in David's area might 
agree that misusing drugs does not constitute leading a healthy life. However, it is 
clear that a values dispute has the potential to emerge because of where and why the 
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initiative is placed on the map of priorities. So it can be seen that dispute mayor may 
not actually or potential exist between any or all of the groups listed above: and in 
relation to any or all of the identified areas of priorities, needs and values. This is 
exemplified in a further account: 
I I would argue that the Sensible Drinking campaign is really only ultimately 
concerned with the prevention of disease. I would not deny that at times it may be 
appropriate to focus on a specific aspect of health, but I do not believe that we should 
lose sight of the person as a whole .... It is almost impossible to [maintain a holistic 
perspective] when dealing with a mass media campaign .... ' (Liz). 
Alison, who works as a lecturer in a college of further education, identified a 
particularly sharp values conflict as she was researching and writing about the 
college's no smoking policy. In an interview with the vice- principal: 
, He highlighted his concern about passive smoking and the worry of being sued by a 
student for ill - health in later years. [He] also hoped that the policy would lead to 
lower insurance premiums on the building and thus the college could save money .... I 
(Alison). 
For Alison, her priorities and values (the importance of staff and student health) 
lo 
contrasted very sharply with the business values of the college management. Both 
parties might value' health' (that is, not smoking), but their fundamental reasons for 
doing so differed dramatically. 
Conflict over needs, priorities and values also occurred between practitioners. 
Sometimes these crossed disciplines. Judith. discussing smoking and pregnancy 
training, had approached local midwifery colleagues to talk about some of the issues 
raised by this kind of work: 
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, I was unable [to do so]. .... the Director of Midwifery was reluctant for me to talk to 
midwives for research purposes and also because she did not want me to produce any 
findings that may show midwives' practice in a negative light. This was despite my 
assurances that this was not my intention .... ' (Judith). 
It is possible to interpret this response as demonstrating values conflict in two 
different ways. First, the Director of Midwifery did not want discussion of the actual 
activity, suggesting her anticipation of actual or potential conflict over the nature and 
worth of the work itself. Second, that she evidently did not want such discussion 
might be understood as a reluctance in general to engage in the process of ethical 
deliberation. Thus there are separate views about the value of this kind of process. 
Values conflict also existed between members of the same profession or occupation: 
'Not all teachers are against the principle of autonomy and respect for the pupils as 
people. Many try to put into practice [their beliefs in the value of respect for 
autonomy]. But just as I face conflicts of values with other health professionals in 
trying to implement my project. so do they in trying to share with other teachers the 
value of the work .. Within the project the only antagonism faced was with the 
teachers .... '. (Mandy) . 
.. 
Anthony demonstrated the significant chance of values conflict existing between the 
'health professional' and her or his patients or clients. He was one of the minority of 
writers with direct 'patient' contact. Working as a clinical nurse specialist for HIV, he 
frequently had to counsel his patients about whether to embark on anti- HIV 
combination drug therapy. While such treatment might prevent disease progression 
and death, there is still considerable uncertainty about its effect long term (ALCORN 
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et al, 1998: CALDECOT CENTRE, 1997). Anthony was therefore in the position of 
having to ask himself: 
, Should I be encouraging patients to take anti - HN drugs. or should I be 
encouraging self - empowerment! autonomy ... ?' (Anthony). 
Of course, the autonomous patient might well not choose combination therapy: 
, G .... was vehemently opposed to taking zidovudine [an anti- HIV combination 
therapy]. However, while staying in London his symptoms of dementia became so 
severe that he was admitted to a hospital which, unaware of his view, started 
zidovudine. His improvement was rapid and remarkable but it was important to be 
truthful about his medication, even though he might have declinedfurther treatment 
at a risk of allowing his dementia to return .... ' (Anthony). 
The potential for values conflict between Anthony as the health professional and G .... 
as the patient becomes disarmingly explicit in the following sentence: 
, It is illuminating for me to reflect that I would very much have regretted a decision 
by G .... to stop zidovudine, indicating to me a strong faith or value which I place upon 
anti - HIV drugs in certain circumstances .... ' (Anthony) . 
• 
The conflicts over priorities, needs and values identified so far has shown itself in 
engagements between organisations, hierarchies and people. Iris appears to 
demonstrate a different level of engagement. She is building a case for water 
fluoridation. In doing so, she tries to represent the argument as based on an 
incontrovertible body of dental public health knowledge. Local health authorities are 
unable or unwilling to respond to this, mainly she argues for reasons of finance: 
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, Because of the number of sources of water supply, each requiring a fluoridation 
plant, and the low levels of tooth decay, [fluoridating the supply] would be "beyond 
the resources of the health authorities for the present". The most effective public 
health measure for preventing decay is being denied the residents of B .... on grounds 
of cost .... ' (Iris). 
The 'conflict' then is between supposedly objective epidemiological evidence and 
organisations far more preoccupied with economic considerations. 
2.4.2 Competing Views about What Constitutes Justifiable Activity 
In almost all of the writing analysed, it was possible to discern a tension between on 
the one hand the writer's perceptions about what counted as 'justifiable activity'; and 
on the other, those of their organisation or employer (usually represented by direct 
line managers). This tension emerged as a result of different views of what was 
valuable, and where :1eeds and priorities actually lay. Carol, it will be remembered, 
was reflecting on sexual health outreach work with young people: 
, The outcome led emphasis of this work has moved me to question the ethics of the 
intervention and the perception held by purchasers of services that people are the 
.. 
means to an end, the end in this case being the achievement [of] targets. I feel that 
this is in direct conflict with my belief that health promotion needs to value processes 
and that people should be regarded as ends in themselves. Outcome led interventions 
based on perceived vulnerability as indicated by the AIDS Control Act (1987) could 
compromise autonomy .... ' (Carol). 
Carol's questioning was apparent from the beginning of her involvement with the 
activity but for Alison. the process of finding out more about the intervention she was 
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writing on led to the realisation that her values did not in fact correspond with those of 
the organisation. She begins her assignment: 
, Smoking is not an activity I participate in and when the college became officially 
designated a "Smoke- Free" Zone, I accepted this ruling without comment. Students 
and staff could stand outside the building to smoke and with the onset of the bad 
weather, they may choose to quit smoking, which would be better for everyone's 
health- including their own. I therefore accepted this paternalistic intervention 
without question .... ' (Alison). 
But during the research for her writing, she discovers the motivation of management 
for introduction of the smoking policy. These were to avoid any future claims for 
passive smoking- related health damage by fonner students; and the desire to reduce 
the cost of buildings insurance premiums. After this discovery she writes: 
, I state again that the policy in its present format is unethical and ideally should be 
withdrawn .... ' (Alison). 
Thus the intervention (policy implementation) ceases to be justifiable to Alison. 
Almost all of the writers were similarly concerned to demonstrate moral dubiousness 
about activities in which they had been directed by their organisation to engage. 
However, when a writer actually appeared to support a particular activity in an ethical 
sense, their defence of it was often highly elaborate. Julie was writing about peer 
education with young people. In the 'Socratic dialogue' forming the framework for her 
discussion, she counters moral arguments against this kind of activity- arguments 
around. for example, indoctrination and inequality of access: 
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, [The project is] a very effective use of resources because [it]involves the 
development of skills, as well as the giving of information, and through the fieldwork 
a large number of young people are reached by the project .... 
, Young people have the right to relevant, accurate and understandable infonnation 
which this project provides .... 
, [The young people] don't have to commit to the project until after the introductory 
day, which gives them time to think it over. They contact us if they want to go ahead 
and it is therefore concluded that they are willing to accept the responsibilities given 
them .... ' 
Even in this example of sustained and effective defence, it could be argued that its 
elaborateness conveys implicit recognition that the activity is not morally 
straightforward and could be regarded as 'difficult' or even by some as unjustifiable. 
For at least one writer, inaction was as hard to justify as activity, even though 
intervening might be problematic: 
, My view is that legislation, including fluoridation, impinges on autonomy .... 
[However] in the case of fluoridation, the benefits [reduction of caries] outweighs any 
lo 
impingement on autonomy .... ' (Iris). 
Whether an organisation was acting or not, the identification of competing values, 
priorities and needs almost invariably led to different views on the acceptability and 
justifiability of activity. Given the writers were all employed to act as directed, the 
discomfort in this exposing of tension is clear: 
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I I have come to realise that my own values are often quite different to others who 
frequently have much more power, influence and ability to control than I do ..... 
(David). 
2.4.3 Lack of Shared Conceptual Understanding 
Without exception, it is possible to identify in the writing a lack of shared conceptual 
understanding between the writers and others (for example, employers) which 
contributed to powerful senses of moral unease. Concepts about which the absence of 
shared understanding was clear included: health; health education; health promotion: 
autonomy; empowerment (including self- empowerment); personhood; and 
democracy. Frequently the concepts were seen as intimately connected, with lack of 
agreement spilling over from one to another. Conceptual muddle was never seen as an 
esoteric problem in itself, but as having a profound impact on practical activity. 
Mandy, for example clearly saw 'health' as strongly linked to the concept of self -
empowerment. 'Health' is that which the individual creates for herself or himself 
through becoming empowered. But she recognises this conceptualisation is often not 
shared by others: 
.. 
'Freedom to choose and health [may be seen] as incompatible, that is if you are 
empowered and you choose an "unhealthy" behaviour then the teacher and you have 
''failed''. I disagree .... ' (Mandy). 
She continues: 
'What is happening [through the project] is a giving or developing of tools [of 
empowerment], how they use the tools is up to them. That is freedom .... We all have 
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different values as to what constitutes health so what is important is to give an 
individual the tools to create their own health .... ' (Mandy). 
Though as Mandy has already freely admitted, there are risks and disputes attached to 
this view of the nature of 'health'. Perhaps because they are acutely aware of 
difficulties attached to this and other relativist conceptions, many of the writers 
seemed wary of getting bogged down in detailed attempts to conceptualise health, 
referring vaguely to it as being 'holistic' (Carol) and 'humanistic' (Donna). Writers 
sometimes relied on 'official' definitions to carry them through- in particular those of 
the W orId Health Organisation (1946, 1984). 
Some of the writers also saw 'education' as a disputable concept. Mandy noted two 
sharply contrasting views of education. For some it might be seen as encouraging: 
'Positive self - esteem .... [Producing those] who can think critically, synthesise and 
transform, experiment and create .... ' (Mandy). 
But there is also: 
'Traditional education of rigidity, formal education .... [which encourages a] move 
away from education that develops critically analytical people .... ' (Mandy). 
~ 
Mandy aligned herself with the first view. However, in declaring for a particular 
conceptual affiliation. it is apparent from what she has said above that this leads to the 
risk of dispute and moral difficulty, a point emphasised by Moira: 
, [According to Freire) "Education is either for domestication or liberation." The 
former accepts the values and norms of the culture and the laner where education for 
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libe ration challenges students to think critically and challenge the status quo .... ' 
(Moira). 
It could be argued that the distinctions drawn by Freire in relation to education are 
paralleled within health education (and health promotion). Although neither Moira 
nor any of the other writers actually draw them, the parallels are with two competing 
models of health education and health promotion. These are on the one hand, the 
positivist and persuasive medical model; and on the other, the co-operative. relativist 
empowerment model. Many of the writers explicitly discuss these competing models 
in relation to the topic or activity about which they were reflecting, sometimes at 
length: 
, Case- control and longitudinal studies may reveal an association between increased 
alcohol consumption and decreased health which is then used as justification for a 
public health campaign. Health tends to be considered almost exclusively in its 
physical sense .... At the other end of the spectrum we have a model of health 
education which is derived from humanist theory. Humanists believe that people are 
autonomous and capable of self - determination .... Thus in any health education 
initiative, people rather than disease prevention become the focus of attention and the 
role of health educators is to empower. In its purest form it is left to the client to set 
the agenda and, therefore, the subject of alcohol may never be broached .... ' (Liz) . 
• 
It is important to note that Liz was so carefully drawing these distinctions at the time 
of the disease reduction- target driven 'The Health of the Nation' (SECRETARY OF 
ST ATE FOR HEALTH. 1992). It is highly likely that a group of health promotion 
practitioners committed to the empowennent model would find some tension in 
working to a strategy so clearly favouring the medical model. Indeed. the writers 
unanimously favoured the empowennent model: 
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, I would suggest that my expertise .... is in helping patients to identify what is best for 
them. I cannot help patients .... unless I empower, enfranchise, listen .... ' (Anthony). 
This translated into Anthony's particular practice: 
, I seek neither to encourage nor to discourage the use of anti - HIV drugs but to help 
patients clarify what is best for them ..... ' (Anthony). 
It has already been identified, however, that within his assignment Anthony actively 
reflected on the 'strong faith' he puts in anti- HIV drugs, suggesting again a tension 
between his own desire to operate according to an empowerment model; and the 
overwhelming dominance of the medical model within the health care system where 
he works. 
The suggestion so far has been that lack of shared conceptual understanding exists 
particularly between health promotion practitioners and others who (either explicitly 
or implicitly) are controlling or directing their work. Moira, though, provided some 
empirical evidence underlining the existence of poor conceptual understanding or 
confusion between health promotion practitioners themselves. She undertook a small 
scale study exploring the understanding held by nurses in education of the concept of 
autonomy, and reported on the results: 
~ 
, Nine nurses gave the answer [to the question, "What do you understand by 
autonomy?"] "make own decision based on knowledge- responsible for own actions ". 
Five said "having power over others", others said ''freedom to offer the best choice 
for patients". "responsible for care of patients", "give power to the patient", "choice 
of an individual" .... ' (Moira). 
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In undertaking her study, Moira was working on the hypothesis that if nurses and 
nurse educators possessed a clear understanding of the concept, they would be more 
likely to promote the autonomy of their patients. They would also be more likely to 
recognise circumstances in which individual autonomy was being breached. The 
identification of separate understandings suggests that what is seen as morally 
appropriate action and practice might well differ between the individuals sampled. 
2.4.4 Lack of Agreement about what Constitutes Acceptable Knowledge of 
'Effectiveness' of Activity when its Potential for Harm (or Benefit) was being 
Considered 
The fourth theme discovered was connected to the belief expressed by most writers 
that if an activity could be seen as 'effective' (that is, if in some way it 'improved 
health'), then there was a greater chance that it could be adequately defended in a 
moral sense: 
, Promoting the well - being of patients is surely the purpose of my health promotion 
work .... ' (Anthony). 
The implication in Anthony's writing is that if an activity is 'effective' (that is, 
promoting of well- being), then it is supporting his purpose which is a moral one (at 
a. 
least in a prima facie sense). Julie writes: 
, Evaluations [of the peer education and young people project] are largely positive. 
The self - learning reported seems to indicate that young people have become more 
empowered and have increased self - esteem, as a result of being involved with the 
project .... 
, Empowerment is a health benefit .... ' (Julie). 
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The relationship between the project's activities and the young peoples' increased 
feelings of self- esteem and empowerment suggest to Julie that it is 'effective' and 
therefore morally defensible. This does of course depend on constructing 'health' as 
'empowennent'. A central argument of this thesis so far is that both these concepts are 
deeply contested and the relationship between them strongly infused with problems. 
Inadvertently, perhaps, Mandy exposes the difficulty in relying on 'effectiveness' to 
confinn the morality of activity, simply because there is no single authentic version of 
health and consequently of 'effectiveness' in its promotion: 
, We all have different views as to what constitutes health so what is important is to 
give an individual the tools to create their own health, whatever that is for them and 
for us to feel comfortable with that .... ' (Mandy). 
But this pluralist approach (probably shared by significant numbers of people 
concerned to promote health) means that the simple equation, Activity plus 'Evidence 
of Effectiveness' equals Moral Activity, is implausible. Thus lack of agreement about 
what constitutes 'effectiveness' (and consequently about levels of harm or benefit 
emerging from activity) becomes a central part of the moral problematic facing the 
writers. 
Arguably, tension resides in the commitment to pluralism. Leaving aside the 
conceptual difficulty in treating 'health' as simply the 'absence of disease', would it not 
be possible to claim greater moral justification for activity which actually reduced the 
incidence of illness or disease? Assessment of the activity's harm or benefit becomes 
clearer if- perhaps not unreasonably- it is supposed that 'more disease' is harm and 
'less disease' is benefit. 
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Many of the writers were unhappy with this simplicity, in a general sense at least 
because of their distrust of the 'medical model' it represented. A focus on 'benefit' 
interpreted as 'disease reduction' might tempt policy makers and managers to endorse 
activity that was clearly difficult in an ethical sense. Sophie, writing about breast 
screening in her local health district, reported that she was working to targets of 
numbers of women to be screened (60,000 over three years). To her managers, if this 
target was achieved, she would be regarded as 'effective'. Yet: 
, [With the target] very little time is left/or discussion [of the issues and complexities 
associated with breast screening] at these busy screening mobiles .... ' (Sophie). 
Paradoxically for Sophie, screening interventions would take on a less mechanistic 
(and therefore more moral) form if the target wasn't being met!: 
, If screening uptake is particularly poor in a specific area, " all hell breaks loose"! 
Health promotion is called on in a big way to do something about it. Only then is any 
major effort and resources put into working on a grass roots level, through women's 
groups, churches etc ..... ' (Sophie). 
Worry about this background of frenetic activity and immutable targets, caused 
Sophie to return and reflect on difficulty with the evidence base for breast screening 
~ 
per see From Skrabanek (1988), she writes: 
, Breast screening cannot prevent breast cancer, nor can it promise a cure; it is rather 
an attempt to gain better control over the disease .... ' (Sophie). 
Thus Sophie identifies rather more complexity in the notion that 'benefit' equals 
disease reduction. Applied naively. the idea may result in activities which fail to 
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respect autonomy and which in any case might not actually reduce disease (or at the 
least, their capacity in this respect could be disputed). 
Liz also reflected on lack of agreement about 'evidence of effectiveness': 
, A recent development has been the publication of a government report on Sensible 
Drinking which reviews the drinking message (Department of Health, 1995) ... One of 
the conclusions of the report was that benchmarks for sensible drinking should be 
redefined .... The conclusions of the report fly in the face of evidence from a number of 
medical bodies and individual experts including the British Medical Association .... 
and the Royal Colleges [of Physicians, Psychiatrists and General Practitioners] .... ' 
(Liz). 
What was only implicit in Sophie's writing- that constructions of 'evidence of 
effectiveness' and consequently notions of harm and benefit were strongly connected 
to policy and social context- becomes very clear in Liz's work: 
, The Chancellor of the Exchequer chose not to increase alcohol taxation in the 
November [1995] budget and actually decreased the price of spirits. However, 
presumably it was hoped this would be off - set by increasing consumption due to the 
new guidelines .... 
• 
, Of course. there is another very influential player in this issue, namely, the drinks 
industry. It is well known that various breweries pay money into the Conservative 
Party's coffers although some big names actually withdrew their support in 1995 .... ' 
(Liz). 
Finally. Anthony altered the focus of potential lack of agreement about acceptable 
knowledge of effectiveness away from professionals and policy makers. For him, 
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notions of harm and benefit, and consequent views on the value of activity. were 
deeply contestable, a mine field to be trod by patients themselves: 
, The spectrum of anti - HN drugs which is available continues to expand. Patients-
as well as clinicians- need to understand the mode of action. potential side - effects, 
problems of resistance. most effective combinations, optimum starting time, best 
sequence etc. of an array of nucleoside analogues, protease inhibitors and non -
nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitors .... 
, Even within an orthodox western medical model the optimum time to start treatment 
with anti -HIV drugs is open to debate .... ' (Anthony). 
My analysis, then, reveals powerful strands of dispute about knowledge of 
'effectiveness' in relation to the activities and practices discussed by my participants. 
In turn, this leads to the near impossibility of holding incontrovertible views about the 
levels of harm and benefit likely to accrue from a particular intervention. Recourse 
through such notions to simple moral defences of activity and practice cannot, then, 
work. (I would argue that this applies not just to those things my participants were 
describing, but to many other kinds of activities that could be called 'health 
promotion'. I will extend my argument in this respect in the following chapter.) 
The argument against the possibility of taking a unified view of 'evidence of 
effectiveness' applies whatever view of health (and thus of health promotion) is 
adopted. Pluralists can most easily be seen to have difficulties, but as Sophie. Liz and 
Anthony demonstrated, the positivist medical model also faces problems. These 
emerge not only from competing individual and political preferences over 
interpretation, but also from the nature of the evidence itself. 
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3. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have listened to the 'voices' of my research participants as they have 
identified moral doubt and difficulty they believe to be associated with the activities 
in which they are involved. I have identified four intimately connected key themes 
which represent ethical problems and their nature: diverse perceptions of priorities. 
needs and values: competing views of what could be regarded as justifiable activity: 
lack of shared understanding of central concepts related to the promotion of health: 
and lack of agreement about what constitutes acceptable 'evidence of effectiveness' of 
activity. 
In Chapter Nine, I return to my participants and consider the third question I am 
asking myself of their writing; how might it be possible to understand and deal with 
the tensions that have been identified? In asking this question- and as part of the 
answer- I more explicitly connect how they were writing (process) with what they 
were writing about (content). In doing so I construct, as part of my proposals for 
understanding and dealing with problems, a case for seeing the process of writing my 
participants have engaged in as providing an opportunity for understanding through 
reflection. Process and content are thus helpfully unified. 
For the time being, however, I return to theory and consider the help it might offer to 
• 
me in understanding and dealing with the moral problems of health promotion. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN- RECONSTRUCTING HEALTH PROl\'IOTION: CA~ 
BIOETmCS HELP? 
1. Introduction 
I have so far argued that significant moral difficulties exist for health promotion as it 
appears to be understood conceptually and theoretically. Further, these theoretical 
difficulties are confirmed when considering the reflections on practice of those who 
participated in my 'empirical' research. Conceptualisations, theoretical constructions 
and activities identified as 'health promotion' have attached to them major ethical 
questions and doubt. 
Simply to identify doubt, however, is not particularly helpful. Given many people 
are obliged, by virtue of their profession or occupation, to engage in activities with 
the aim of promoting health, it is unfair simply to raise the issue of moral risk and do 
no more. Besides: 
'If we can really understand the problem, the answer will come out of it, because the 
answer is not separate from the problem ... .' (Krishnamurti, quoted in COHEN AND 
COHEN, 1980: 190) . 
• 
Having prospected the territory this far, building on the understanding achieved up 
until now may lead to some sorts of 'answers' to the difficulties faced. 
The rest of my thesis, then. is an exploration whose aim is at least that of increasing 
our capacity to deal with the moral problems presented by health promotion. There 
are essentially three stages in this exploration. The first is a review of the extent to 
which bioethics can support understanding. if not actual resolution of problems. 
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Bioethics may be interpreted as a genre of moral philosophy. It overlaps with another 
genre- that of professional ethics. In the second stage of my exploration. I review a 
broad and possibly convincing argument from within the genre of professional ethics 
for conceiving of professions as ethical. I consider the extent to which this kind of 
argument could be applied to those (health promotion specialists and health 
promoters) who 'do' health promotion work. While I assert there is some difficulty in 
application of the argument to this particular area of endeavour; nevertheless. in the 
third stage of my exploration, I propose taking account of it- along with aspects of 
bioethics- as 'markers' to be considered if health promotion is to be reconstructed in a 
moral sense. At this stage, I also listen again to the 'voices' of the practitioners whose 
writing I have analysed and consider how they have understood and dealt with the 
ethical problems they identified from their practice of health promotion. 
To begin with, in this chapter I consider the help that might be offered by bioethics in 
a moral reconstruction of health promotion. I begin by describing and discussing the 
enterprise of bioethics. What is it? What is its purpose? How and why has it 
developed? I then move to consider the application of bioethics to health promotion. 
Finally, I develop arguments proposing that while bioethics can certainly offer 
important help to health promotion in understanding and dealing with the latter's 
moral difficulties; there are limits to the assistance it can provide. 
2. The Bioethical Enterprise 
I understand the bioethical enterprise to include areas of activity that others have 
called 'medical ethics': 'philosophical medical ethics'; and 'health care ethics'. It is 
possible to view the enterprise as essentially an analytic one in which the assumptions 
and values of those engaged in work to treat illness and restore and improve health 
are critically examined. Critical examination would extend beyond individual 
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assumptions and values to those of the systems in which people operate (either as 
receivers or givers of 'health care'). This initial description has been adapted from 
Gillon (1990b: 2). I use the terms 'the bioethical enterprise' and 'bioethics' as 
shorthand for the array of work implied by this sort of description. Above this arrav 
of work is the essential and overarching idea that the enterprise as a whole is one of 
conceptual and values analysis. 
Of course, it cannot be denied that within this broad understanding there will be 
employed many different analytic techniques and approaches; and many different 
kinds of activities and interventions subject to analysis. As will become clear in the 
course of considering the material in this chapter, this is empirical fact. One issue to 
be raised later is the extent to which a particularly prominent, plausible approach of 
bioethics can be applied to activities that can be understood as 'health promotion'. For 
the time being, it is necessary to move forward on the basis that bioethics is the 
application of ethics- and of moral philosophical methods of conceptual enquiry- to 
health care practice and systems. 
What then is ethics? In the history of western philosophy, two traditions have 
emerged, with alternative (though possibly overlapping) conceptions of the purpose 
of ethics. One tradition proposes that its purpose is the recommendation of life goals 
and the specification of ideals of personal excellence; of what it is to lead a good 
• 
(valuable) life (FEINBERG, 1969; NORTON, 1976). The other suggests that the 
purpose of ethics is to determine in what sorts of ways we should act, and why; and to 
establish general obligations for action (LACEY, 1976). Arguably, the focus of the 
first tradition is on developing valuable individuals. In the second, the focus is on 
developing individuals whose conduct respects other individuals. I will later argue for 
distinctive difference between the traditions as they are represented in bioethics. 
However. it is possible to accept that they may be understood in some senses as 
overlapping. If I am attempting to develop my own valuable life. part of that project 
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will involve my undertaking certain obligations (for example, to educate myself). 
Equally, in recognising other lives as valuable, obligations will be placed on me as to 
how I treat those other lives. 
In terms of the influence of meta- and normative ethical theories emerging from these 
broad traditions, it is the second- establishment of obligations for conduct- which has 
dominated, at least since the enlightenment. Rowing from the tradition suggesting the 
purpose of ethics is to frame obligations for conduct are first, deontology; and second. 
consequentialism. (As will be seen, these theories have widely differing views on the 
nature of moral obligation; it is thus necessary to be careful that framing them as 
flowing from the same tradition does not erroneously suggest a happy unity.) I will 
briefly introduce each of these theories but my main concern at this point in my thesis 
is to argue that because of their general influence in recent historical times, many of 
the roots of bioethical thinking lie in deontology and consequentialism. (Trying to 
establish bridges between them has, additionally, been a concern of some of the 
central figures in the bioethical enterprise.) While there has been some interest in 
developing the idea that the purpose of bioethics is to encourage the 'development of 
valuable lives', this has been very much of second order importance. I will return to 
this idea later on. 
In the history of moral philosophy, the work of Immanuel Kant can be seen as 
paradigmatic of deontology- the brand of ethical theory concerned to argue that duty 
is the basis of moral action. Kant's theory is most importantly set out in 'The 
Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals' (PATON, 1948). His moral argument is 
intimately connected to his epistemology. For Kant, there exists a reality independent 
of the causal world. Evidence for the existence of this independent rational reality lies 
in his view that we possess the capacity to make choices (moral and otherwise) 
through free wilL we are not helplessly subject to causation. Reason is thus the basis 
for moral action. Kant asserts that action is only moral if we are able to will that the 
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maxim underlying it is capable of becoming a universal moral law. Rational beings 
possess absolute moral value and are therefore entitled to be treated as 'ends in 
themselves' (and not means to ends). The only moral action is that which is based on 
the duty we owe to all other rational agents. Any other kind of action- for example. 
that based on thought of consequences- throws us back, helpless again. into the causal 
world. 
Probably the best known version of consequentialist theory is utilitarianism. The most 
famous advocate of this is perhaps John Stuart Mill. Indeed, Mill's fundamental 
statement of utilitarianism has a resonance which comes from frequent exposure: 
'Utility, or the greatest happiness principle, holds that actions are right in proportion 
as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of 
happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by 
unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure .... ' (Mll..L, 1962: 257). 
As a normative theory of ethics. utilitarianism has been subject to particular 
refinement. For example, some of its supporters have argued that importance lies in 
considering the consequences of breaking or keeping to action- governing rules, as 
opposed to individual actions. Certainly in a nonnative sense this kind of refinement 
renders the theoI[' rather less problematic (URMSON, 1967). 
There are two starting points for my claim that the roots of the bioethical enterprise 
lie in deontological and consequentialist theory. The first lies in historical 
examination of the enterprise; and the second in what those working on it are actually 
doing and saying. 
The practice of applying ethics to the 'real world' of professional and occupational 
action- a broad project within which the bioethical enterprise is highly significant- has 
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grown exponentially over roughly the last quarter century. (In writing about this 
phenomenon, I am confining myself in a geographical sense to the British Isles 
particularly.) For bioethics, this growth is demonstrated in several ways: through the 
rapid rise in numbers of 'health care ethics' courses: through growth in publications 
related to the area (for example, journals such as the 'Journal of Medical Ethics' and 
'Health Care Analysis' were established within this period); and through proposals for 
the inclusion of ethics in the education and training curricula for health care workers 
such as nurses (ENGLISH NATIONAL BOARD, 1987); and doctors (GENERAL 
MEDICAL COUNCIL, 1993). This last policy direction has resulted in an increase in 
'tools' to support the learning of health care professionals in relation to ethics and 
moral decision making (for example, SOAFER, 1995: VAUGHAN, 1999). More so 
in the United States than on this side of the Atlantic, there has developed a pattern of 
employing professional ethicists to support the moral decision making of hospitals 
and other health care institutions (GOROVITZ, 1990). 
Taking Russell's view that philosophy and philosophers are both 'causes and effects' 
(RUSSELL, 1979: 7) of their social times; why did the bioethical enterprise emerge 
when it did? A number of connected reasons are suggested. First, health care in 
general and medicine in particular were beginning to be exposed, from the early 
1970s onwards, to sustained scrutiny and objection in a way they had never 
previously experienced. Critics such as nlich (1977), Kennedy (1983) and McKeown 
.. 
(1976) challenged both the historical and scientific accuracy of viewing medicine as 
the bringer of health to the 20th Century; and the proposition that medical practice 
was an unassailable good. 
I have already argued, in Chapter Two, that challenges such as these were key 
elements provoking the development of the so- called 'New Public Health' (and thus 
of the theoretical discussions and descriptions from which the idea of 'health 
promotion' emerged). Another of their effects was to make health care more open to 
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public questioning. It is argued that bioethics developed in part as a response to this 
questioning. (How it was used, by whom, and who can be seen to have received the 
most advantage in the playing of the 'bioethics card' are all interesting issues but 
outside the scope of this present narrative.) But doubt about medicine and health care 
was not related, simply, to elegant ideological or historiographical polemics on the 
worth of their practices. The practices themselves were rapidly changing- the second 
reason for the rise of bioethics. By the historical period under review, medicine had 
the technological capacity to end life, to sustain it, to begin and modify it 
(DWORKIN, 1995: HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY 
AUTHORITY, 1994; KITCHER, 1997). Again, public worry about this seemingly 
unstoppable capacity and the challenge it provoked to traditional ways of 
understanding and respecting or valuing human life was an impetus to the 
development of bioethics. 
The final reason for the rise of bioethics is possibly fortuitous and certainly 
pragmatic. Most prominent bioethicists- at least in the British Isles- are (or were) 
academic philosophers by trade (although some have emerged from professional 
health care backgrounds). Very arguably -and a point challenged by Maclean (1993)-
a training in philosophy gives special expertise in thinking about moral matters. From 
the late 1970s onwards, many British university philosophy departments were under 
threat as a result of public expenditure reductions made by the then Conservative 
government. Potentially out- of- work philosophers- with their supposed expertise-
were likely to be interested in a field where that expertise seemed to be called for by 
both professionals and the public. A body of academics with an eye on employability 
were available to write journal articles, present papers, design new courses and solicit 
for media attention. It is more than coincidence that the rise of bioethics occurred at 
about the same time as a period in the decline of 'traditional' philosophy departments 
in the United Kingdom. 
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These, then, are reasons for the emergence of the bioethical enterprise: the increasing 
critique of medicine and health care; concern over health care- generated 
technological change; and the crisis in philosophers' employment. And it is this 
history which provides the first support for the view that the roots of bioethics lie 
predominantly in consequentialist and deontological theory; meta- and normative 
ethics of obligation. 
The challenge afforded by the critique of health care essentially implied (or actively 
advocated) limits to the power of professionals in this area (aLICH, 1977). Concern 
to restrict more effectively aligns with 'obligation ethics' than with 'individual 
development ethics', at least at that point where there is crisis of confidence. Anxiety 
over technological change- fundamentally about changing our understanding of 
humanity- is again more likely to be met by considering obligations to (and 
restrictions on) action. (At a time when the nature of humanity is being challenged, it 
would arguably be much braver to ask questions related to 'individual development 
ethics' but also much less likely to happen.) Finally, if bioethicists are likely to be job-
threatened philosophers, they will make the most of the expertise they have; 
supposedly an expertise in thinking about moral matters but, given the longer 
historical dominance of 'obligation ethics' already argued for, moral matters firmly in 
the context of consequentialist and deontological theory. 
The second reason for my claim that the bioethical enterprise has its roots largely in 
theories of obligation lies in examination of what bioethicists generally say. Take the 
following statements made by some key proponents of the enterprise: 
'[Scientific, technological, and social developments around the middle of the 
twentieth century] challenged many prevalent conceptions of the moral obligations of 
health professionals and society in meeting the needs of the sick and the injured. The 
objective of this book is to provide a framework for moral judgement and decision 
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making in the wake of these developments ... .' (BEAUCHAMP A. '-"D CHILDRESS. 
1994: 3). 
'Can we fonnulate any general principles to tell us which acts of killing, if any, are 
right and which are wrong? This is the central question of this book. But discussion of 
this problem is less fruitful when carried on in isolation from other related questions. 
Are there any general principles to tell us when, if ever, it is morally obligatory to 
save life .... ?' (GLOVER, 1977: 19). 
'[ Philosophical medical ethics is] the analytic activity in which the concepts, 
assumptions, beliefs, attitudes, emotions, reasons and arguments underlying medico-
moral decision- making are examined critically .... Its primary purpose is to construct a 
comprehensive and coherent moral theory for medical practice based on universal 
principles applying to all and capable of justifying particular lines of conduct in 
individual cases ... .' (GILLON, 1990b: 2). 
'Individual interests and individual rights are the basic ingredients out of which the 
structure of morality is built.. .. Individuals are entitled to be and do as they see fit, so 
long as they do not violate the comparable rights of others ... .' (GOROVITZ, 1985: 
36). 
'Discussions about medical ethics tend to be not so much about what ought to be done 
or about what is being done as about the relationship between them ... .' 
(KARHAUSEN, 1987: 33). 
It is important to note the tone of this writing as much as what is actually being said. 
Talk of 'critical examination', 'universal principles' and 'rights and entitlements' (with 
implicit reciprocal responsibilities) provides a sense that these key proponents of the 
bioethical enterprise are chiefly concerned with the justification of action in particular 
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ways, or the relationship between practice and responsibility. This is the territory of 
obligation ethics; Beauchamp and Childress and Glover all talk specifically of 
obligations. It is not particularly the territory of moral thinking based on the notion of 
the development of individual valuable lives. 
John Harris (1985) appears to set out on a different track: 
'This book, like the practice of medicine itself, is about the value of life ... .' (HARRIS. 
1985: 1). 
But not much later in 'The Value of Life', he writes: 
'I have said that this book is about the value of life. I shall endeavour to present and 
defend an argument about how we are to understand just what it is to value life and 
about what is involved in respecting the lives of those we do conclude have valuable 
lives ... .' (HARRIS, 1985: 5). 
If Harris's concern is to show the value of life, it is not so much to demonstrate how 
we can develop and lead such a life; but rather to establish the nature of the lives to 
which we ought to owe respect. In other words, we are back in the territory of moral 
obligation. His slipping from one to the other, however, is instructive as it 
• 
demonstrates a point made towards the beginning of this chapter. The alternative 
purposes of ethics- development of the valuable life on the one hand and construction 
of obligations on the other- may well overlap. 
Establishing that the roots of bioethics lie mainly in obligation theory- particularly 
consequential ism and deontology- is the beginning (as some of the quotations above 
have started to demonstrate) of identifying the sorts of projects in which the bioethics 
enterprise has been engaged. Bioethics in general has been concerned to estahlish 
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broad principles (capable of acceptance by as many as possible) by which 
professional action can be judged and to which health care professionals should 
adhere. Attempts have been made to reconcile the conflicting demands of 
consequentialism and deontology through such principles, in particular the so- called 
'famous four' principles (BEAUCHAMP AND CHILDRESS, 1994: GILLON. 1990b; 
1994; GILLON AND LLOYD, 1994; HARE, 1994). Others have tried to construct 
approaches to bioethics that are primarily consequentialist (HARRIS. 1985). Strong 
elements of deontology can be found particularly in work which attempts to assert the 
central place of the obligation to respect autonomy in health care actions 
(CAMPBELL, 1976: FAULDER, 1985; GOROVITZ, 1985). Consequentialism 
manifests itself in discussion particularly on health care resources allocation (CRISP, 
HOPE AND EBBS, 1996; GOROVITZ, 1994). Debate about obligation to action-
stemming from commitment to either consequentialism or deontology- is frequently 
pursued in relation to specific issues such as the beginning and ends of life 
(DWORKIN, 1995; GLOVER, 1977). Discussion on the possibilities and limitations 
of codes of conduct as professional devices for understanding and committing to 
obligations of one sort or another is also a feature of the enterprise (EDGAR, 1994). 
A further kind of project in which bioethics has been engaged is attempts at the 
clarification of concepts important to its apparent central purpose of determining and 
justifying obligations and conduct. Exactly what is understood by 'life' , 'death'. what 
.. 
it is to be human and so on are all of concern to the bioethicist particularly as, in a 
descriptive sense, the nature of these things is being changed by powerful 
technologies (DWORKIN. 1995: HARRIS, 1985; KITCHER, 1997). There is also a 
tradition- which could be encompassed within bioethics- of conceptual examination 
of 'illness' and 'disease' (BOORSE, 1975: ENGLEHARDT. 1975, 1976; SCADDING. 
1988); and of 'health' (HARE. 1986; SEEDHOUSE. 1986). 
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It is perhaps this broader project of conceptual examination which comes closest- in 
'mainstream' bioethics- to the nature of the other ethical tradition identified earlier. 
That is to say, the tradition of recommending life goals and specifying ideals of 
personal excellence, of providing insight into what might constitute a good (valuable) 
life and how such a life might be led. After all, for example, if we agree that: 
, Health is a goal which is desired universally ... .' (SEEDHOUSE, 1986: 10). 
Then it makes sense to see the value of 'health' as one of the components of a good 
(valuable) life. Exploring and confirming the nature of the value might be one aspect 
of an enquiry into how the good life might be led. It has already been seen that 
assumptions about the nature of the value of health create a major flaw in the 'moral 
case' for health promotion. Shortly I will suggest that the field of activity's overall 
concern with obligation ethics has been at the expense of what could be a useful 
preoccupation with exploring values associated with the good life. Bioethics in 
general has had little such preoccupation. 
Enquiry into the nature of the good life is a fundamental concern of Aristotle's Ethics 
(ARISTOTLE, 1955). Empiricism drives his argument that we become virtuous (and 
lead the good, or valuable, life) through performing virtuous actions. For Aristotle the 
virtuous action is the moderate action, leading to what Russell characterises as 'the 
• 
doctrine of the golden mean' (RUSSELL, 1979: 186). Every virtue is a mean between 
two vices: for example, generosity is the mean between the two vices of, on the one 
hand. tight- fistedness; and on the other, profligacy. For Aristotle, while the 
identification of the virtuous in human action is of great concern, what is still more 
important is a commitment to reflection and contemplation in order that we can 
develop our lives so that we know how to act virtuously (morally). We thus become 
more 'expert' at being human. with reflection and consequent performance 
determining what it means to lead the good (valuable) life. 
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At this point it is possible to identify a significant difference between theories of 
obligation ethics (deontology and consequentialism); and Aristotelianism. Obligation 
theories are concerned to identify principles which should be followed as guides to 
right conduct. For such theories, virtue plays a secondary role in moral human action; 
it becomes something like having the right kind of general disposition which enables 
an individual to apply the 'right' ethical principle when required. Virtue is thus 
explained 'from the outside in' (DAWSON, 1994); we have the capacity to act 
morally because we know the principles and how to use them. The second order 
importance of virtue in obligation ethics is clear; if there were no principles. we 
would not be able to act morally because the disposition to virtue alone is not enough. 
(A reasonable extension of this interpretation is that without principles there would be 
no such thing as virtue.) For Aristotelianism. however. it is through development of 
the person (and her or his commitment to appropriate action through reflection) that 
virtue emerges. Virtue is thus explained 'from the inside out' (DAWSON. 1994). 
A number of voices have argued that 'inside out'- Aristotelian- ethics should occupy a 
more central place in the bioethics enterprise. Haldane (1986). for example. makes a 
distinction between traditional conceptions of bioethics- what he terms 'ethics in 
medicine'- and the alternative approach of a genuine 'medical ethics': 
l. 
'The application of general moral principles or ethical approaches to the special 
problems arising from medical treatment. ... is best described as ethics in medicine, 
rather than as medical ethics. for it makes no claim to be a special kind of moral 
philosophy originating in examination of questions about the nature of health and its 
value. On the contrary it presupposes that the philosophy is developed independently 
and is then introduced into the consideration of particular issues ... .' (HALDANE. 
1986: 145). 
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Haldane's alternative approach has as one of its central purposes the consideration of 
the kinds of questions of value he mentions. He argues for the Aristotelian idea of the 
human person as a 'unity- of- parts- in equilibrium' (body, mind and spirit). This 
metaphysics of the person implicitly rejects reductionism (one of the grounds of 
ethics in medicine); from its holism emerges the concern of Aristotelian ethical theory 
with the development of the valuable life. So: 
'Medical ethics .... should be built around the attempt to answer two questions: what is 
man and what constitutes goodness in life .... ' (HALDANE, 1986: 149). 
Again, Fulford (1993), as part of a wider protest against the 'blindness' in some 
respects of bioethics, argues for it to engage itself more fully with clarification of 
value concepts; and from this, with broader philosophical theory, in particular 
philosophy of action. The implication here seems to be that in connecting values to 
action it will be possible to move towards an explanation of the part played by health 
in the valuable (moral) life. 
This brief survey has no intention of being comprehensive; rather its purpose is to 
gi ve an impression of the kinds of concerns and projects which appear to define the 
bioethical enterprise. The general impression is of a broad territory, nevertheless 
generally characterised by a desire to develop, understand and justify principles or 
~ 
obligations on which to base or defend action. Even those who assert the problematic 
in this kind of project (for example, MACLEAN, 1993) can be seen as committed to 
the bioethical enterprise. In the case of Maclean, the commitment is to liberate its 
projects from the grip of professional philosophers (her arguments will be returned to 
later). Doubtless 'anti- bioethicists' such as Maclean would find equal problem with 
the sorts of Aristotelian notions of the purpose of the enterprise that I have just 
described. It is clear, however, that these alternative ideas of purpose are of second 
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order importance to the dominant concerns of bioethics and its primary relationship to 
ethics of obligation. 
3. The Application of Bioethics to Health Promotion 
It is now possible to move to the territory of bioethics as applied to health promotion. 
To begin with, however, a general question needs to be raised which should actually 
help to begin to introduce the nature of the territory. One of my methods in the 
construction of this thesis has been to try and listen to different 'voices' as a way of 
understanding what might be meant by the nebulous and contested idea of 'health 
promotion'. This has been at least in part so that I am prevented from undertaking my 
own artful construction of health promotion and thus rendering it more problematic in 
a moral sense. My arguments have been based on what both theorists and 
practitioners have actually said. The voices have had a mediating function to some 
extent. 
I continue to listen to voices in this section of my work and now I am mostly hearing 
professional moral philosophers and applied ethicists. But it is important to remark 
that- with just one or two notable exceptions- I am hearing a different set of voices. It 
seems as if the people who are articulating the moral problems of health promotion 
), 
are not the same as those who have engaged in its theoretical construction. 
I do not intend to explore in detail why this should be the case. There is, though, 
much of potential interest here. Is it because the academic traditions of health 
promotion and of philosophy are particularly difficult to cross? If there is this 
difficulty. does it relate to the existence of skills deficits and a belief that these would 
be hard to rectify? Or is it because of a more general and possibly deeper seated 
reluctance to cross between the traditions? These are particularly interesting questions 
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given my suggestion that both health promotion and bioethics can be interpreted as 
emerging, from a historical perspective, as new paradigms; and this emergence 
following cumulative unease with the paradigm represented by traditional medicine. 
If they emerged together, as it were, how and why have they had so little to do with 
each other? 
I have to tum from these interesting questions to one that is rather more fundamental 
to my project. Assuming the voices from health promotion on the one hand. and those 
from bioethics applied to this on the other, are by and large different; how can I be 
confident that they are talking about the same thing? Is there the possibility that 
bioethicists- for this is who they mainly are- have constructed a deliberately morally 
problematic version of health promotion in order that they can wage a fruitful 'cold 
war' against it? 
Broadly, there are two ways in which bioethics has been applied to health promotion. 
(This classification should not be seen as watertight. Some work, of course, crosses 
the boundaries I have artificially created for mapping purposes.) First, there have been 
projects attempting to assert and map out in detail the values believed by their authors 
to be important to this field. These kinds of attempts at understanding (and even 
constructing) values generally align more easily with Aristotelian conceptions of the 
purpose of morality- understanding what it is to lead a good (valuable) life. Downie, 
l. 
Tannahill and Tannahill, for example, specifically identify a major part of their 
purpose in 'Health Promotion: Models and Values' (DOWNIE, TANNAHll..L AND 
TANNAHILL, 1996) as analysis of the nature of values and valuing: the nature of 
values necessary if an individual or a society are going to flourish; and the bearing of 
health promotion on such values. In common with bioethics in general, these 
Aristotelian- like projects tend to have had significantly less energy applied to them. 
(As will be seen, they also stray rather easily into the territory of obligation.) 
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The second way is through the more particular expression of obligations. most often 
by reference to action- guiding principles, and the application of these to very specific 
activities. (See, for example, Gillon (1990a).) 
Given these different ways in which bioethics has been applied to health promotion. I 
return to the question I posed: is there the possibility that bioethicists have 
constructed a deliberately ethically difficult version of health promotion in order that 
they can besiege it? In terms of the first, value- mapping, way. What these bioethicists 
are essentially doing, I will shortly argue, is describing or constructing values in order 
to justify a particular position on health promotion. They are actually using bioethics 
(and of course its techniques) in order to state preferences about what health 
promotion is and how it should be conducted. Indeed, one prominent set of theorists 
engaged in this kind of project has already been reviewed as a contributor to the 
'moral case' for health promotion set out and deconstructed in Chapter Four 
(DOWNIE, TANNAHILL AND TANNAHILL, 1996). If those engaged in this sort 
of project are besiegers. it is with the purpose of claiming more ground for their own 
version of health promotion. Given the contestability in general of the field, it seems 
unfair to claim that bioethicists constructing versions of health promotion (or those 
using bioethical techniques in order to do so) are building anything more or less 
'authentic' than are health promotion theorists. 
As for the second way. Here, specific activities are assessed against frameworks of 
principles, usually representative of obligations. Examples of particular activities 
discussed include screening (SHICKLE AND CHADWICK, 1994): health education 
advice giving in primary health care (GILLON, 1990a; DUNCAN AND CRIBB. 
1996); legislative and policy activity for the promotion of health (WIKLER, 1978: 
1987): and HIV prevention and care (WESTRIN et al. 1992). These bioethicists are 
examining a range of activities sounding very much like many of those spoken about 
by my practitioner participants. How Shickle and Chadwick describe screening. for 
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example, draws attention back to the voice of Sophie who it will be remembered 
wrote about problems attached to a population approach to breast screening. It does 
not appear, then, that the bioethicists are inventing an unusual- or an unusually 
problematic- set of activities. 
It therefore seems there is little ground to believe the bioethics enterprise has artfully 
reconstructed health promotion so that the field has become more ethically difficult 
than in reality it is. The question now is: can the work of bioethicists help in dealing 
with the moral problems of health promotion? 
In Chapter Four, I set out a 'moral case' for health promotion. This had three 
components: first, that health was a value; second, that the goal of health promotion 
was 'more health'; and third, that health promotion's key strategy of empowerment 
increases both the likelihood of 'more health' being achieved and the morality of 
activity. In essence those engaged in health promotion, the case claimed, were both 
pursuing a valuable (moral) goal and undertaking this pursuit in ethically acceptable 
ways. 
I challenged this theoretical case. I argued against its f1l'st component by asserting that 
the nature of the value of health was problematic and disputed. Those engaged in 
health promotion work had a tendency to view its status as a value as overriding, 
~ 
when sometimes- possibly of ten- this wasn't the case. I disagreed with the idea that 
the goal of health promotion was 'more health': partly because there was difficulty in 
identifying one uniformly acceptable account of 'health' (professional and lay 
conceptions, for example, may differ); and partly because those controlling or with an 
interest in health promotion might actually be pursuing 'non- health' goals (such as 
economic advantage). I argued against the uncomplicated position health promotion 
theorists took on the strategy of empowennent there will always be problems 
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attached to supposed transfers of power, partly because these are undertaken in 
contexts laden with values. 
I then moved from the theoretical and sought the views of practitioners on ethical 
difficulties associated with the activities in which they were engaged. These appeared 
to confirm my theoretical worries. My participants felt moral unease because they had 
different perceptions of the nature of health promotion priorities, needs and values to 
others- particularly powerful others such as managers and those with political 
influence. These diverse perceptions led to competing views between practitioners 
and others as to what constituted acceptable and justifiable activity- and also of what 
ought to be understood by 'effectiveness' and 'knowledge of effectiveness'. Further, 
my participants were worried in a moral sense because there seemed to be a lack of 
shared understanding (between themselves and others) as to the nature of the concepts 
believed to be centrally important in the promotion of health (for example, 
'autonomy', 'empowerment' and indeed 'health' itself). 
Can then bioethics help in dealing with these difficulties? At first glance, it appears 
that it might be able to do so. I have identified two ways in which bioethics has been 
applied to health promotion. First, through the mapping or construction of values 
important to the field: and second, through developing and applying principles (to be 
seen as expressions of moral obligation) to particular activities. Given the nature of 
I. 
my moral worries, attempts to become clear about values, assumptions and the 
problematic within activities might be seen in a general sense as very helpful. But 
exactly how helpful? My plan now is to assess the use of each of these ways of 
applying bioethics to health promotion to my theoretically and empirically based 
statement of the field's moral difficulties. 
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3.1 Attempts to Map or Construct Values Believed to be Important to the 
Field of Health Promotion 
A number of writers have attempted to map, construct or clarify the values that appear 
to be important to the field of health promotion and their nature. These include 
Campbell (1976,1990), Cribb (1993), Cribb and Dines (1993), Dougherty (1993), 
Nordenfelt (1993) and Yeo (1993). Much of this sort of writing demonstrates a 
general belief in the value of health, then proceeds to construct an account of- and 
justification for- other values contingent on this general belief, together with a 
description of what acceptance of these values might imply for how health promotion 
work is done. Campbell (1976), for example, argues (from Illich) that health is 
contingent on the presence of freedom (autonomy). Thus strategies for health should 
be centred around attempts to enhance freedom. Campbell sees this being achieved 
largely through processes of education. Yeo (1993), as was discussed in Chapter 
Four, argues for the centrality of freedom to both individuals and communities if they 
are to be perceived as 'healthy'. This kind of work again represents the possibility of 
overlap between 'valuable lives' (Aristotelian) and obligation (deontological or 
utilitarian) ethics. I am obliged to respect the freedom of individuals and communities 
because in doing so I will be contributing to the creation of healthy (valuable) lives. 
There is undoubted worth in these contributions to the bioethical enterprise. Their 
~ 
general orientation is educational rather than problem- solving. They are not about 
seeking answers to specific difficulties emerging from the practice of health care~ but 
rather about raising awareness of the sorts and nature of the values that ought to be 
occupying those engaged in this field. One of the key difficulties that I have identified 
in my theoretical and empirical work is that the nature of the value of health is often 
disputed. This is represented in the existence of diverse perceptions (between. say. 
practitioners and managers) as to what constitutes health promotion priorities. needs 
and values (and thus what might be seen as justifiable activity). It seems there is at 
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least the possibility that this particular orientation of the bioethical enterprise- towards 
clarifying, and educating about, values and their nature- might support understanding 
of this particular problematic I have identified. 
To determine more specifically the helpfulness of bioethics in this respect, I want to 
examine in detail two accounts from the enterprise of health and the nature of its 
value. They are those of Downie, Tannahill and Tannahill (1996): and Seedhouse 
(1986, 1988, 1997). As well as choosing these because they look as if they might help 
in the difficulties I have identified, I am examining them because in both cases the 
ultimate purpose of the theorists is to present and justify an account of health 
promotion which they believe renders the field ethical. The nature of the value of 
health thus becomes integral to the value of the health promotion project. Both 
accounts are also widely influential among practitioners. As a major concern in this 
research has been to listen to practitioners' 'voices', it is sensible also to try and 
understand theoretical work important to them. It will be remembered that part of 
Downie et aI's argument was deconstructed in Chapter Four, as an element of my 
own position against the putative 'moral case'. I return to this now with a more 
developed understanding of the problematic and to see whether- in a Krishnamurti-
like sense- their writing might also hold an element of the 'solution'. 
The arguments of Downie et al and Seedhouse are in many respects quite similar. 
It 
Both can be seen as beginning with the assertion that ethics (Seedhouse) or values 
(Downie et al) form a fundamental part of the fabric of human lives and relationships: 
, "Ethical" and "moral" are words whose significance and meaning enter into all areas 
of human thought and action .... The range of issues that have implications for ethics is 
immense and varied ... .' (SEEDHOUSE, 1988: 18). 
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Seedhouse distinguishes between different types of ethics: dramatic (specific) ethics: 
persisting ethics (the continuing underlying issues)~ and ethics in the general sense 
(ever present and returning questions such as 'How should I Ii ve and act?') 
(SEEDHOUSE, 1988: 20). Those working in health care have their attention claimed-
if at all- by dramatic ethics at the expense of any continual examination of ethical 
purpose and of development in a moral sense. Thus 'ethics' and 'ethical thinking' 
become compartmentalised and rarefied, and we require experts to tell us what in a 
moral sense we should do (SEEDHOUSE, 1988: 117). Both Seedhouse and Downie 
et at want to rescue moral debate from being the exclusive preserve of experts. For 
the latter writers, this concern has strongly influenced their choice of language in the 
argument they are making: 
'We shall use the terms "values" and "value judgement" .... [because] it brings out the 
continuity between the values encountered in ordinary life and those encountered in 
the professional practice of health promotion ... .' (DOWNIE, T ANNAHll..L AND 
TANNAHILL, 1996: 154). 
This shared view between the writers on the all- pervasiveness of ethics or values-
and their belief that turning to 'experts' cannot be enough- is helpful. It locates health 
promotion firmly in the territory of values. Unless values or ethical beliefs are held 
unanimously- which is unlikely, particularly given the differences that have emerged 
.. 
in the accounts of history and theory given in this thesis- there is bound to be moral 
dispute. Assertions by these writers on the central place of (probably disputed) values 
gives strength to a project of moral examination. Both Downie et al and Seedhouse go 
further, however. They suggest that values drive health promotion practice. although 
the extent to which they do so is a point of difference between the writers: 
'Sometimes it is said that traditional medicine and health care are scientific and based 
on fact, whereas health promotion is moralistic .... the truth is that both medicine and 
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health promotion have a scientific basis, and both deal with prescriptions for 
improving the quality of life .... Both points of view strive to be scientific. but neither 
is value- neutraL .. ' (DOWNIE, T ANNAHaL AND T ANNAHaL, 1996: 116-117). 
The impression is of two fields struggling to be rational in the context of values-
related debate and disagreement. The issue implied by what Downie et al suggest, 
however, might lead to a rather more forceful conclusion about the value- laden 
nature of medicine and of health promotion. What exactly are these 'prescriptions for 
improving the quality of life'? What is 'the quality of life' anyway? Trying to define 
and describe these is unlikely to be wholly a rational project, as has been evident 
throughout this thesis. It might not even be rational at all, a more radical position 
taken by Seedhouse which starts to distinguish him from Downie et al: 
'Values drive health promotion- people's values determine what is taken to be good or 
bad health: health promoters' values set health promotion priorities, health priorities 
do not set themselves ... .' (SEEDHOUSE, 1997: 69). 
If that is the case, the question now becomes: What values should drive health 
promotion? In terms of my own moral worries and those of my research participants, 
a reasonable answer to this question is fundamental. If it can be found, then I may be 
reassured of possible resolutions to two central aspects of my theoretical moral case 
.. 
against the field: namely that it is not enough to rely on 'more health' justifications for 
health promotion; and that we need to expose the nature of both 'health' and 'non-
health' values. (It is necessary to remember that 'non- health' values driving particular 
activity might be perfectly reasonable. The problem at the moment is that we do not 
have a rationale for accepting any as such.) Further. answering the question may help 
my research participants. particularly with regard to their key concerns over the 
diversity of values: which of these are justifiable in a moral sense: and what, 
following on from this. might therefore be seen as justifiable activity? 
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My initial assessment, in Chapter Four, of Downie et ai's argument suggested that it 
was problematic. Broadly, they propose that there are a set of 'necessary social values' 
(DOWNIE, TANNAHILL AND TANNAHILL, 1996: 158) which are such because 
they respond to deep seated human needs and nature. For example, stemming from 
human vulnerability to disease is the value of physical integrity and health, from 
which in tum might be derived a moral principle based on the requirement not to 
harm others, either physically or psychologically. Further, there is a set of 'necessary 
individual or personal values' (DOWNIE, TANNAHILL AND TANNAHILL, 1996: 
161) which are important if an individual is to have a flourishing life. The potential. at 
least, to be self- actualising might be one of these and again from this might be 
derived a moral principle based on the requirement to allow people as far as possible 
the capacity to act and develop autonomously. In sum: 
'The values are the source of the empowerment which constitutes true societal well-
being ... .' (DOWNIE, TANNAHILL AND TANNAHILL, 1996: 167). 
Downie et al have earlier made it clear that 'well- being' is health in its positive form 
(DOWNIE, TANNAHILL AND TANNAHll..L, 1996: 18). Thus there are a set of 
necessary social and personal values to which we should adhere if we wish to see 
individual and societal health. To give them due, they have been explicit about what 
j, 
these are. My objection in Chapter Four to their argument was in relation to their 
implicit claim that these 'contributing to well- being values' were overriding. Thus 
they were not that far removed from the very problematic position of suggesting that 
the value of health is always and absolutely overriding. 
I suggest that there is still a difficulty in accepting the necessary nature of the 
particular set of values proposed by Downie et al. I could construct an alternati ve set 
based on a different conception of society and individual need and argue that these are 
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necessary. For example, I could be motivated by the view that human beings are 
primarily driven by a desire for order and security which might lead to the possibility 
that being looked after is a value. This in tum might give rise to the moral principle 
that I should always act paternalistically. The point is that there are competing views 
of the nature of humanity and human well- being. Given this, others with alternative 
views could reject and replace those advocated by Downie et al. 
However, given the more detailed picture of the nature of moral problems that I have 
now built up, Downie et al do offer help in an important respect. I and my 
participants have identified worry about the possibility of competing, 'non- health' 
goals for health promotion work, leading in turn to possible conflict about what might 
be justifiable activity. The argument reviewed here suggests a 'long list' of values that 
might be connected to health; using this might help us more effectively to 
discriminate between 'health' and 'non- health' goals for health promotion work. This 
is a more limited, but more reasonable, claim than to suggest that there is only a short 
set of health- related values. 
If Downie et al cannot be found to be wholly helpful in responding to theoretical and 
practical concerns raised in relation to the nature of health as a value- in particular, 
the perception by some at any rate that it is overriding- it is at least partly because of 
the way in which they understand the relationship between necessary social values 
lo 
and necessary personal values. They argue that both kinds of values hold claims on 
us. Social values hold claims which, if we ignore them, lead to: 
' .... Threats of disharmonious and uncooperative social relationships. Analogously, the 
constraints which make individual values claims are the threats of dishannony and 
disintegration within the self.. .. A sense of coherence and self- esteem. and therefore 
of true well- being, come from the awareness that the personal values we have 
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mentioned are being expressed in a way of life .... ' (DOWNIE, T ANN AHll..L A.'" 1) 
TANNAHILL, 1996: 166). 
Thus, personal and social values are linked because of the need to 'respect human 
nature whether in your own person or that of another ... .' (DOWNIE, TANNAHILL 
AND TANNAHll..L, 1996: 166). If we do not, both the fabric of society, and 
individuals within it, suffer (and of course, given what has been said before. part of 
this suffering is connected to health). 
However, this view that necessary social and necessary individual values tend to align 
is somewhat bald. Remember, for example, Sophie, whose writing on breast 
screening was described in Chapter Six. Those controlling the screening programme 
were driven by values, and it may be that these related to Downie et afs typology-
say, for example, the value of fair distribution of health care burdens. But as Sophie 
graphically recounted, this driven programme may well have conflicted with 
individual values and individual autonomy (which also have an important place in the 
Downie et al framework). This led her to question the justifiability of the activity. In 
terms of the theoretical argument I presented in Chapter Four, the work of Downie et 
at may not have moved us very far in terms of addressing the problem of 
empowerment and autonomy in the field of health promotion. Who should have the 
power, why and with what limits? (Of course, given the preliminary remarks to this 
• 
section that I made above, there is a need to suggest that Downie et al cannot 
necessarily be held responsible for this particular failure to move forward; their 
project is not explicitly one of problem- solving.) 
The potential for health- related values conflict in Downie et afs argument may 
emerge because we fail to agree on the relative importance of the mUltiple values they 
describe: on the one hand. to society; and on the other. to individuals. Would it be 
better instead to concentrate on establishing a single view of the value of health itself. 
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then working out the values and principles that might flow, for both society and 
individuals, from this view? I have so far been sceptical about projects concerned to 
give a single authoritative account of health. This, however, is the direction taken by 
Seedhouse and which I now want to explore. 
His argument, begun in 'Health: The Foundations for Achievement' (SEEDHOUSE, 
1986) works from a number of premises: that the concept of health is contested: that 
existing theories of health centre around the removal of obstacles to human potential; 
and that these obstacles extend well beyond narrow biological and medical 
boundaries. Thus: 
'W ork for health is essentially enabling. It is a question of providing the appropriate 
foundations to enable the achievement of personal and group potentials. Health in its 
different degrees is created by removing obstacles and by providing the basic means 
by which biological and chosen goals can be achieved .... A person's optimum state of 
health is equivalent to the set of conditions which enable a person to work to fulfil his 
or her realistic chosen and biological potentials. Some of these conditions are of the 
highest importance for all people. Others are variable dependent upon individual 
abilities and circumstances .... ' (SEEDHOUSE, 1986: 61). 
From this view of health- against the background of Seedhouse's ever present claim 
}. 
that it is values which drive work for health care (including health promotion)- it 
becomes clear that we must value specifically those things likely to support the 
creation of the foundations for achievement. Key within this is the value of 
autonomy: 
'A study of the practice and theory of health shows the extent to which autonomy is 
central to health work. The idea is such an abiding feature that it makes nonsense of 
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claims that autonomy has no part to play in work for health ... .' (SEEDHOUSE. 1988: 
131). 
We must, therefore, aim both to create and to respect autonomy. These are central 
values for work in health promotion. At this point in Seedhouse's argument. however. 
we run into problems. Doesn't it simply face the same difficulties as Downie et afs 
did? When and why do we limit autonomy? Or do we never do so? If we accept the 
second proposition, how is it possible to understand the sort of sentiments expressed 
by Anthony earlier on in this thesis: 
, Should I be encouraging patients to take anti- HIV drugs, or should I be 
encouraging self- empowerment! autonomy .... ?' (Anthony). 
Seedhouse, I argue, would respond to the dilemma posed by Anthony as follows. 
From the broad view of influences on health suggested by empirical and conceptual 
work, it is possible to identify a range of 'blocks' that might constitute the foundations 
for achievement (that is to say, health) in anyone case (SEEDHOUSE, 1997: 142). If. 
in the example described by Anthony, a 'block' is missing (something like, say, 
cognitive capacity), then work to restore or repair that block is 'work for health' 
because it is work to fulfil worthwhile potentials. Other things being equal, then, the 
block should be restored (adapted from Seedhouse, 1997: 152). The implication of 
~ 
this position- accepting that drugs will help restore the block- is that they should be 
given, possibly at the expense of the immediate autonomy of the patient. 
Seedhouse freely acknowledges that the foundations theory of health and of health 
promotion. together with the associated tool of the 'ethical grid' (SEEDHOUSE. 
1988) may not provide absolute answers or definitive directions. There are always 
alternative possibilities. But those possibilities will only be to do with health. and 
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therefore moral, if they are directed towards creating or repairing the foundations for 
achievement. 
It is clear that in some respects Seedhouse's argument is helpful in the ethical 
reconstruction of health promotion. By more closely detennining the nature of the 
value of health, it is possible to identify circumstances in which action in the name of 
health may not be such at all. It may be helpful to suggest that health does in fact have 
overriding value if those involved in a particular health promotion activity recognise 
it is foundations creating or restoring. (Should there be disagreement about this, say 
between client and professional, then the foundations theory provides the opportunity 
for debate and discussion.) Consequently, as claimed (SEEDHOUSE, 1997). it could 
be the case that the theory allows practitioners to make sensible judgements about 
what actually constitutes justifiable activity. 
But there are difficulties with Seedhouse's argument. Problems appear to me to 
revolve around two important, and related, issues: the culture in which application of 
the foundations theory is likely to be attempted; and the disposition of individuals 
within that culture. 
In Chapters Two and Three, I presented a history of the field of health promotion 
which located it, broadly, in a political world often dominated by the overwhelmingly 
.. 
powerful profession of medicine. Clearly driven by values, medicine attempts to 
frame itself as objectivist and scientific. In recent years, the power of this profession 
has been challenged, although with limited success. The most sustained challenge to 
the dominance of medicine in the field of health has been from those (arguably 
equally eager to frame themselves as scientific and objectivist) who perceive it as 
more socially constructed and determined. Generally, both the 'medical modeller' and 
the 'social modeller' view their competing practices as authentic and strive for control 
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of health. This extends to projects aimed at professionalising health promotion itself: 
or appropriating health promotion work more effectively into existing professions. 
The actual extent of this work is significant and raises an important question for 
Seedhouse's theory: to what degree is it likely to be possible for identification of, and 
negotiation of work on, individual foundations of achievement in a world gripped by 
the power of professions and competing paradigms of health? Even if agreement 
could be reached between individuals, how far could work and outcomes potentially 
very different from those suggested by the dominant paradigms be allowed by those 
professionals ultimately in control? 
This leads to the second difficulty. In an important sense, Seedhouse's argument is 
about individuals (health care workers and clients) having the right kinds of 
disposition (or at the very least, the right sorts of attitude): to recognise that all their 
ideas and actions have moral importance; to recognise the nature of the values with 
which they are confronted and of those which should be fundamental to them; and to 
recognise the foundations for achievement required in particular cases. Yet the 
cultural context in which individuals work may not allow them the opportunity to 
develop these dispositions or attitudes. The training of professionals is frequently 
oriented towards the technical and enabling them to deal with specific problems of 
practice (SCHON, 1990). Development of moral disposition or attitude may be 
lo 
relatively unimportant. If this is so, then it may be hard to acquire the disposition that 
enables someone, for example, to determine the morality of a course of action 
potentially capable of disrupting autonomy in the short term but with the long term 
effect of enhancing it through creating or supporting the 'foundations for 
achievement' . 
In summary, then, these significant projects I have reviewed which aim to map or 
construct the values central to the field of health promotion are useful in the following 
194 
respects. They identify the centrality of values to the field (something that previous 
'voices' from health promotion theory to which I was listening did not do). They 
propose particular values important to the field and attempt to establish a rationale for 
committing to those values (although as I have indicated, not without difficulty). 
However, they are not particularly successful at justifying particular courses of action 
in the case of conflicts (Downie et al); or at resolving the tension between disposition 
and what is required by professional and cultural context (Seedhouse). Of course. as I 
have consistently reminded myself, these sorts of projects have not oriented 
themselves particularly to problem- solving, especially in relation to particular 
activities or aspects of practice. Yet as my participants in Chapter Six made clear. 
specific problems are faced by those engaged in the field of health promotion. Does 
another sort of way bioethics has been applied to health promotion- the application of 
principles (as expressions of obligation) to particular activity- offer greater help in 
understanding and dealing with these kinds of problems? 
3.2 The Application of Principles (as Expressions of Obligation) to Particular 
Activity 
This approach on the part of bioethics to health promotion has arguably been a great 
deal more significant than that of values mapping or construction. It is possible to 
j, 
detect roots of obligation in much of the bioethicalliterature on health promotion. 
Even the writers discussed above- who have been presented as strongly concerned 
with determining the nature of values and valuing in relation to the field- can be 
interpreted as doing so at least partly in order to determine obligations. Thus 
Seedhouse constructs his 'ethical grid' (SEEDHOUSE, 1988). Although he attempts to 
present this as 'a practical and accessible route into the complexity of moral reasoning' 
(SEEDHOUSE. 1988: 128)- no mention of obligation here- it becomes clear as it is 
unpacked that it is a 'tool' with a strong function in this respect: 
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'The requirement to respect persons equally when working for health follows from 
the requirement to create and respect autonomy in all people ... .' (SEEDHOUSE. 
1988: 132, my italics). 
Equally for Downie et aI, values lead to obligations: 
'We shall consider how these values and principles of social life are or ought to be the 
guiding principles or "ethics" of health promotion in various social, personal and 
educational contexts ... .' (DOWNIE, TANNAHILL AND TANNAffiLL, 1996: 161. 
my italics). 
These kinds of statements are representative of the difficulty in disconnecting the 
project of values mapping from that of principles and obligations application. I would 
not dispute that the two projects are connected. However, I think there is worth and 
importance in treating them separately. The kind of work that for example Seedhouse 
and Downie et al are engaged in can be aligned much more closely with the 'inside 
out' view of morality described above. To various degrees, they are attempting to 
establish values (and from these, obligations) based on their understanding of what it 
is to be human. The work under review now has quite different characteristics and can 
broadly be aligned with an 'outside in' view of morality. An example from the 
.. 
literature of 'the ethics of obligation' will help to make the difference clear: 
'At present, State or private bodies conducting mass preventive interventions have no 
obligation to inform the healthy participants that they are subjects of experiments of 
uncertain outcome and potential harm .... For example, in the Breast Cancer Detection 
Project set up in 1973 by the National Cancer Institute and the American Cancer 
Society to screen a quarter of a million healthy women. the possible risks of 
mammography were not explained to them nor were they told about the lack of 
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evidence for the benefit of mammography in women under the age of fifty. In 
subsequent similar trials in different countries, no mention was made in the published 
reports whether the participants received adequate information about the uncertainties 
of benefit. Such information could, of course, jeopardise the "compliance" rate and 
the "throughput" ... .' (SKRABANEK, 1990: 187). 
It is clear that for Skrabanek, 'benefit' and 'harm' are important moral qualities that 
could be translated into principles or obligations; 'act in such ways that you only 
produce benefit' and 'do no harm', for example. And while it could be argued that 
such obligations emerge from an analysis of human nature and the values important to 
us (here, avoiding harm and receiving benefit), there is no evidence of such analysis 
having been undertaken. Harm avoidance and benefit production simply are 'medico-
moral norms' (SKRABANEK, 1990: 189) to which professionals should commit. (Of 
course the fact that, according to Skrabanek, they are not being treated seriously by 
those whose activities he describes is cause for ethical condemnation.) 
This 'outside in' assessment of the morality of health promotion activity can be seen in 
the work of a number of other writers as well as Skrabanek (Gll..LON, 1990b: 
KELLY, 1996; SHICKLE AND CHADWICK, 1994; WIKLER, 1978,1987; 
WESTRIN et ai, 1992; Wll..LIAMS, 1986). Attempts to establish which 'outside in' 
principles (and obligations) are important to the field of health promotion have been 
.. 
more or less specific. An example of a broad approach, citing and defending rather 
general principles can be found in Gillon (1990b). Somewhere further along an 
'obligations continuum' it would be possible to place attempts to develop 'codes of 
conduct' for health promotion work (KELLY, 1996: SOCIETY OF HEALTH 
EDUCATION AND HEALTH PROMOTION SPECIALISTS, 1993, 1997b). It will 
be remembered that attempts to develop such a code were part of the broader effort to 
'professionalise' the occupation of specialist health promotion described in Chapter 
Three. 
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My intention now is to review a particular project along this putative 'obligations 
continuum' and discuss the extent to which it might be helpful in supporting any 
attempt at the moral reconstruction of health promotion. This is the so-called ' four 
principles of health care ethics' approach to ethical problems in health care. 
From the range of ways in which principles (as expressions of obligation) have been 
applied to the field, it is important to justify selection of this project. Choice of the so-
called 'four principles approach' is because it is widely acknowledged as providing the 
basis of ethical guidance for many working in health care. Writing in the British 
Medical Journal (BMJ), its foremost British exponent provides a sense of the breadth 
of acceptability of the principles: 
'Nine years ago the BMJ allowed me to introduce to its readers an approach to 
medical ethics developed by the Americans Beauchamp and Childress which is based 
on four prima facie moral principles and attention to these principles' scope of 
application. Since then I have often been asked for a summary of this approach by 
doctors and other health care workers who find it helpful for organising their thoughts 
about medical ethics .... I have not found anyone who seriously argues that he or she 
cannot accept any of these prima facie principles or found plausible examples of 
concerns about health care ethics that require additional moral principles .... ' 
~ 
(Gll..LON, 1994: 184, 188). 
While Gillon is clearly an enthusiast for this approach, his claims (to my knowledge 
undisputed) in a journal such as the BMJ lead to the belief that it is widely regarded 
and therefore worth particular attention at this stage in my attempt at reconstruction. 
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The four principles of health care ethics and health promotion 
What are the four principles? The general account given here is adapted from Gillon 
(1994). 
Following Beauchamp and Childress (1994), it is asserted that there are four key 
principles important to those working in the area of health care: respect for autonomy: 
beneficence; non- maleficence; and concern for justice. The principles are primafacie-
each is binding, unless it conflicts with another, in which case a choice must be made 
between the competing principles. 
A number of central claims are made on behalf of the principles. Regardless of 
personal background, those working in health care should find no difficulty in 
committing to the principles, together with a 'reflective concern about their scope of 
application ... .' (Gll...LON, 1994: 184). It is proposed that the principles encompass 
most of the moral issues arising in the field of health care. The principles cannot 
provide absolute answers to moral dilemmas (even if this were the purpose of ethics, 
which supporters of the approach might argue it is not). However they can, through 
providing a common moral language and set of commitments, allow the opportunity 
for debate and reflection. Agreement might possibly be a result of these processes . 
• 
Gillon describes each of the principles as follows: 
Respect for autonomy 
Autonomy is the capacity for 'deliberated self- rule' (GILLON, 1994: 185). an 
attribute of individuals that in a Kantian sense renders them moral agents. The 
concept can be further divided into autonomy of thought (the capacity to think and 
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reason for oneself, hold moral views, aesthetic preferences and so on): of will (the 
capacity to intend to perform an action as a result of thought and reason); and of 
action (the capacity freely to act upon one's intentions). The principle of respect for 
autonomy can be described as the moral obligation to respect the autonomy of others. 
to the extent that this respect is compatible with the autonomy of all those actually or 
potentially affected by the action being considered. 
Beneficence 
This is the moral commitment to produce benefit for those with whom, or on whose 
behalf, interventions are undertaken. 
Non- maleficence 
The obligation 'to do no harm' is inevitably closely connected to the principle of 
beneficence; any intervention or action carries at least potentially the risk that it will 
result in harm as well as produce benefit. In order for a health care intervention to be 
considered as 'moral', it must always produce net benefit over harm (GILLON, 1994). 
Justice 
The principle of concern for justice can be understood as the obligation to act on the 
basis of fair adjudication between competing claims related to health care. Claims 
may relate to fair distribution of scarce resources (distributive justice): respect for 
natural rights (rights- based justice); and respect for morally acceptable laws (legal 
justice). 
Each of the four principles gives rise to more detailed de facto obligations. For 
example, acceptance of the principle of beneficence would commit health care 
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workers, among other things, to a duty to participate in effective, continuing 
education and training in order that they are most likely to act in ways that will 
produce most benefit. Agreeing to the principle of respect for autonomy would entail 
commitment to a set of further obligations such as the requirement to negotiate, and to 
seek explicit agreement for particular courses of action with patients or clients, to 
provide appropriate information and so on (GOROVITZ, 1985). 
A centrally important question relates to the scope of the principles; to whom do we 
owe the obligations they represent? Gillon (1994) suggests that for health care 
workers, obligations are owed to patients or clients by virtue of the special 
relationship they have with them. However, even this relatively broad recognition of 
the scope of obligations poses difficulties. For example, a doctor may feel that the 
principle of respect for autonomy cannot apply in the case of a patient who is under 
the legal age of consent and requesting the contraceptive pill. Gillon argues, though, 
that while there can be dispute around the question of scope (and this can sometimes 
be deeply felt), this does not prejudice the content of the moral obligations 
represented by the principles. In other words, I may disagree about to whom lowe the 
obligations; but it would be qualitatively much more difficult to disagree with the 
principles themselves. 
The final point to be made in this introduction to the four principles is that while they 
l. 
have been applied in the context of the fields of public health and health promotion 
(see, for example, DUNCAN, 1995: DUNCAN AND CRIBB, 1996; GILLON, 
1990a; SHICKLE AND CHADWICK, 1994; WESTRIN et aI, 1992); they largely 
developed in response to the problems faced by acute medicine and health care 
(BEAUCHAMP AND CHILDRESS, 1994). These are the fields in which they have 
also mainly been applied. 
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This poses an interesting challenge for the bioethical enterprise as applied to health 
promotion. Can the four principles of health care ethics- a prominent framework for 
'obligation bioethics'- be applied to the field in which I am interested? I am not 
suggesting here that their application in the acute medical context is unproblematic. 
What I am proposing is a need to test the 'fit' of principles, developed largely in 
another context, to health promotion activity. In order to do this, I have selected an 
example of health promotion work. The test will expose some of the moral problems 
it poses. More importantly, given a project of moral reconstruction of health 
promotion, it will help in assessing the extent to which the principles are of use in 
increasing our capacity to deal with the particular ethical problems of practice posed 
by the field. 
The example from practice- Helping People Change 
The example I have chosen is work on individual health behaviour change, using the 
so-called 'stages of change' model. Widely marketed by the Health Education 
Authority (HEA) through the 'Helping People Change' (HPC) training package 
directed at primary health care professionals; for much of the early to mid 1990s it 
held an important position as representative of a certain type of health promotion 
activity. This could be broadly described as 'lifestyle change', a class of work 
• 
certainly not without its critics (ADAMS AND PINTUS, 1993) but nevertheless 
strongly matching and responding to what during that period was the direction of 
government policy and strategy (SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HEALTH, 1992). 
Two of my 'voices' from health promotion practice were explicitly concerned with 
lifestyle change work represented by HPC; Melanie and Judith, who were both 
considering it as activity putatively supporting the reduction of smoking during 
pregnancy. Lifestyle change work in a broader sense is reflected in the writing of 
some of my other research participants. The extent of its marketing (particularly in the 
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primary health care setting), together with its acceptability to those who then had 
political control and its frequent manifestation in practice, suggests it is a reasonable 
activity to review. Further, 'helping people change' (in the lower case) could be 
regarded as a metaphor for an important general objective of health promotion; it was 
a key element of the unsuccessful 'moral case' for health promotion presented in 
Chapter Four. In places, what follows draws upon the work of two previously 
published papers (DUNCAN, 1997: DUNCAN AND CRIBB, 1996) and on these 
occasions I will quote from the paper concerned directly. 
HPC adopts the premise that those working in primary health care have the 
opportunity, through things like 'health checks', to help patients change 'risky' health 
behaviours (such as smoking, poor diet, physical inactivity and excessive drinking) 
(HEALTH EDUCATION AUTHORITY, 1993b). It proposes the use ofa stage based 
model of health behaviour change (PROCHASKA AND DICLEMENTE, 1984) to 
determine patients' current attitude towards change. (The word 'patient' is used 
throughout this part of the chapter because it is almost always the temi applied by 
primary health care workers to those using the services they provide.) The different 
components of this model are then linked to particular activities designed to promote 
willingness and capacity to change; and to maintain that change when it has taken 
place. 
Taking the HPC training package at face value, the interventions it advocates appear 
to be based on identification of health risk. They aim to encourage the patient to 
identify and accept that risk themselves, and so alter behaviour, with relevant support 
at each 'stage of change'. This encouragement is only acceptable in so far as the 
patient's full right to self- determination is acknowledged and respected. 
However. it can be quickly seen that there is the beginning of moral tension at this 
point: 
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'What is intended by the HPC interventions? ... What is most clearly intended by HPC 
is the encouragement of behaviour change, ultimately for health improvement. 
However, HPC also intends apparently to ensure decisions on behaviour change are 
always conceded to the patient.. .. Can the two separate intentions- allowing self-
determination and seeking health improvement- be reconciled ... ?' (DUNCAN AND 
CRIBB, 1996: 341). 
Arguably, application of the four principles may help both to expose this tension and 
to determine whether and how HPC might be- or become more- morally acceptable. 
To begin with, does the activity produce positive benefit? HPC appears to believe that 
patients and professionals have common cause in 'reducing the risk of unnecessary 
disease and premature death' (HEALTH EDUCATION AUTHORITY, 1993b: 1). But 
this assertion raises two questions: do HPC interventions in fact give rise to benefit?; 
and is it accurate to think of patients automatically allied with health professionals in 
the cause of protecting and improving their health? 
Take the example of smoking reduction. The evidence that lifestyle change activity 
on smoking actually works is slender (HEALTH EDUCATION AUTHORITY, 
1993a: 14). Even current work aimed at developing the so-called 'evidence base' for 
health promotion fails to be specific on this subject (ASHWORTH, 1997; 
LAWRENCE, 1999). Equally, it is not always completely correct to assert that both 
patients and professionals are united in their view of health and what can be done to 
reduce risk and to protect or improve health. It will be clear that one of the themes 
running through this thesis is the contestability of health, which extends from 
practitioners and theoreticians to 'lay' people. In relation to my example of smoking. 
this behaviour can in fact be seen as health risk- eliminating if it, say. protects the 
mental health of a single mother. Cigarettes may reduce stress. they may be the only 
act for self the mother is allowed and so on (BLACKBURN. 1991). Lupton (1993) 
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argues that the concept of 'risk' within the public health arena is impregnated with the 
values of those professionals applying it. Not only, then, is there little evidence of 
'benefit'; but there is also difficulty in obtaining a consensus on what actually might 
be regarded as being of benefit. The moral case for HPC from the principle of 
beneficence might be weaker than originally thought. 
Does HPC cause no harm and thus adhere to the principle of non- maleficence? If it is 
in part about risk- identification, then it could be regarded as a form of screening and 
subject to the well- documented charge against this activity of it having at least the 
potential to cause psychological harm (MARTEAU, 1989, 1990: STOATE, 1989). It 
has been argued that there are at least three possible sources of such harm: 
'First, distress may be caused by being identified as "at risk"; second, distress may be 
caused as a result of behaviour change not in fact being achieved; third, distress may 
be caused as a result of "support" being removed during the interventions process (or 
alternatively not being available) ... .' (DUNCAN AND CRIBB, 1996: 343). 
Again, then, it is questionable to believe that HPC interventions are unproblematic 
and will never cause no harm. Moving to the principle of respect for autonomy, to 
what extent does HPC adhere to this?: 
'There are two main reasons why HPC interventions may not be autonomy-
respecting. First.. .. there seems to be an assumption that patients and professionals 
actually or potentially share the same values, particularly those to do with health. It 
appears to be assumed that patients "want" the health that is being "offered" to them. 
Second, HPC has a highly limited view of people's actual capacity for self-
determination in relation to health in "the real world" ... .' (DUNCAN AND CRIBB. 
1996: 343). 
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The actual or potential dissonance between professional and patient views of. and 
aspirations about, health has already been noted. Given that HPC probably once was-
even if it is not now- a practical expression of governmental policy and values. there 
is at least the chance of the policy and professional version of health dominating 
alternative conceptions. Further, it needs to be remembered that it is the professional 
who is 'in control' in the sense of knowing the full story about the cycle of change 
being promoted. The dominance of professional conceptions gives rise to sometimes 
unrealistic pictures of the levels of control patients have over their lives: 
'[Adopt] a "no smoking" policy in the office so that there is less temptation to smoke 
when under stress .... [fill] the freezer with nutritious and convenient meals .... [fill] the 
fridge with cans of low alcohol beer ... .' (HEALTH EDUCATION AUTHORITY, 
1993b: Handout C8). 
While HPC may not actively set out to disrupt autonomy, its conceptions of the nature 
of health and the ability people have to determine what they can do to improve it lead 
to worries that its concern for this moral principle may be lacking. Certainly what the 
training pack says does not remove the worry with which this exploration began; the 
extent to which the supposedly mutual goals of health improvement and respect for 
self- determination can actually be reconciled. 
Finally, the principle of concern for justice. It is probably reasonable to suggest that 
the notion of legal justice is not applicable to HPC. However, ideas of distributive and 
rights- based justice are relevant. The interventions of HPC may conflict with 'fair 
distribution of burdens' (WIKLER, 1978, 1987) because while they are subject to 
investment on the part of the state (HPC is operating with money allocated to the 
NHS), there is no certainty of return. It has already been argued that the intervention-
benefit link in relation to HPC is far from clear. let alone causal. Thus the longer link 
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of intervention- benefit- economic efficiency that might be made on behalf of HPC 
activities fails to convince: 
'It might even be argued that resources are being used to support work that in fact is 
relatively ineffective and may meet genuine need better if re- distributed elsewhere ... .' 
(DUNCAN AND CRIBB, 1996: 344). 
HPC may also pose difficulties with regard to rights- based justice. Fundamentally, its 
account of health 'rights' is incoherent. It could be imagined that in promoting change 
to 'needy groups' (frequently of lower socio- economic status as indicators such as 
smoking prevalence show (INDEPENDENT INQUIRY INTO INEQUALITIES IN 
HEALTH, 1998)), it is re- distributing health as a right. But this argument becomes 
implausible when the content of HPC is considered. Its unrealistic conceptions of 
choice and its firm focus on individual lifestyle at the expense of a broader view of 
health determinants have already been encountered. Such account of health 'rights' 
that it gives is rendered incoherent by the overwhelming responsibility it casts on 
those to whom its interventions are directed; to choose to act in certain ways when 
such choice may be either beyond them or ultimately irrelevant in its effect on their 
health- or both. In relation to relevant conceptions of justice, then, HPC may well 
breach this particular principle. 
At this point, the application of this version of obligation bioethics to the field of 
health promotion seems to be doing rather well. Assuming acceptance of the 
principles as representative of obligations, it has clearly allowed the identification of 
areas in which those involved in HPC might need to be wary, alter practice or 
strengthen commitment. Yet while this might be a satisfactory conclusion. it is not 
wholly the right one. 
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The essential difficulty relates partly to the nature of health promotion and panly to 
the nature of the principles themselves. I have just constructed an account of the deep 
moral ambiguity of HPC centring on the following: 
* The benefits of HPC activities are far from proven; and it is also far from clear that 
the goods being sought will be regarded as such by all actual or potential parties to 
the intervention; 
* Not only are the benefits of HPC work unclear: but there is also at least the 
possibility that it may cause harm through identification of 'risk' (which in any case is 
likely to be professionally constructed); through difficulties in changing behaviour to 
reduce such risk; and through failure to get access to adequate support for behaviour 
change; 
* HPC may not be autonomy respecting. This is partly because of the potential for 
conflict over the nature of values (especially the value of health) between the different 
parties involved in its interventions. It may also be because HPC appears to take an 
over- optimistic view of the capacities people have with regard to self- determination; 
* Finally, it may be difficult to accept that HPC is concerned with justice both in a 
distributive sense (there is little firm evidence that it will contribute to 'fair 
distribution of burdens'); and in the sense of justice as 'natural rights' (targeting 
marginalised groups with limited abilities to change does not appear to be rights-
respecting). 
Yet it is possible to construct an alternative account of HPC. There will be some-
probably many- cases where the application of HPC interventions is both appropriate 
and desired. It may well be that large numbers of people do want support in reducing 
'risky' health behaviour and perceive that risk is. in fact. continuing to smoke. 
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remaining overweight and so on (KATZ AND PEBERDY, 1997: 25). For such 
people, opening up opportunities to consider change is the course of action likely to 
promote no harm; simply not acting to raise the issues will be what is likely to 
encourage psychological dis- ease and harm. It is perfectly possible to imagine a 
sympathetic and concerned health professional raising the issues sensitively and 
allowing full control to the patient to determine her or his progress towards change. 
Although it may be rather more difficult to account for HPC in terms of encouraging 
'fair distribution of burdens', the replacement of public health goals with individual 
aspirations (given what has just been said) might at the very least make it easier to 
justify activities in terms of 'natural rights'. For someone who is deeply unhappy 
about their smoking behaviour and who recognises its deleterious effect, HPC might 
help in supporting a right to health. 
In my earlier critique, I assumed unequal relationships between patient and 
professional; and dissonance in their values. But why not accept the 'common cause 
of health' argument HPC supporters attempt to establish? And while it remains 
unclear, in terms of disease reduction outcomes, that this kind of activity actually 
works to any great extent; an obsession in this respect may not be helpful. It is 
possible to replace an arguably inappropriate yet persistent demand for 'evidence' with 
other more sensitive assessment criteria; acceptability to individuals and 
appropriateness to target groups, for example (DUNCAN, 1997). 
The point is, of course, that HPC activities can be interpreted in different ways, with 
differing results from the kind of moral calculus that consideration of the four 
principles might inspire. Given that dispute and disagreement has characterised (and 
continues to mark) the field of health promotion in general- what I have sought to 
argue is a major theme emerging from my research at both conceptual and practical 
level- it is likely that different interpretations of the nature of work extend into many 
other parts of the field. Thus when the four principles are applied in an attempt to 
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assess the moral value of a wide range of health promotion activity, it is likely that 
separate conclusions will be drawn by different people. 
The problem then is not just one for HPC, but for the field in general. Its emergence is 
partly a result of the nature of that field, but as I have indicated, it is also because of 
the principles themselves. They can, after all, never be anything other than general 
expressions of commitment, everything else being equal. Their status as prima facie 
requires that they are each binding, unless in conflict with one another in which case a 
choice must be made between the competing principles (GILLON, 1994). Inter-
principle conflict is likely to be frequent. Even taking an uncomplicated view of HPC, 
this is easily evident. If, for example, it is understood as promoting the 'natural rights' 
of some (say, a disadvantaged group), there will be others from whom it is removing 
resources (such as those in need of relatively impoverished acute care following a 
HPC- inspired shift of finance to prevention). Health care will always face difficult 
choices (McCORMICK, 1990). The four principles- representatives of obligation 
ethics in health care- can demonstrate the difficulty of choice, but they frequently 
cannot resolve the difficulty or point to definitive courses of action. As I have argued, 
this is particularly so in the field of health promotion, because of the nature of that 
field. 
To assert this is, of course, to do no more than would probably be acceptable to a 
strong advocate of the principles. Gillon, after all, argues that while they can provide: 
'A common set of moral commitments, a common moral language and a common set 
of moral issues ..... [they cannot] provide a method for choosing ... .' (GaLON. 1994: 
184). 
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This is, of course, important help in any attempt at the moral reconstruction of health 
promotion. However, it is also important to acknowledge its limitations, emerging 
especially because of the nature and context of this particular field. 
Obligation ethics and 'outside in' morality 
The central problem I have identified with the application of the four principles to 
health promotion can be summarised as follows. The principles may simply be too 
broad to allow a reasonable assessment of activity, particularly in relation to a field 
such as health promotion, potentially filled with shades and nuances. They might do 
too little to support practitioner understanding and judgement. On the other hand, 
though, attempts to provide a more detailed set of obligations could, paradoxically do 
too much. They could weaken practitioner capacity for personal and professional 
development through moral reasoning. I will explain what I mean. 
I earlier raised the idea of a 'continuum' of obligation ethics, with the four principles 
approach at one point on it; and such devices as codes of conduct at another. My 
history telling in Chapter Three gave an impression of the importance attached to the 
development of a code of conduct for specialist health promotion as part of the 
occupation's project of professionalisation. A code, and related principles of practice, 
finally emerged as the only tangible product of this project (SOCIETY OF HEALTH 
EDUCATION AND HEALTH PROMOTION SPECIALISTS, 1997b). According to 
the Code: 
'The duties of the Health Education! Health Promotion Specialist are based on 
fundamental ethical and professional principles relating to the maximisation of 
health ... : (SOCIETY OF HEALTH EDUCATION AND HEALTH PROMOTION 
SPECIALISTS, 1997b: 2). 
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There are sixteen principles altogether, grouped around three broad areas: the 
practitioner's relationship to the client! recipient of interventions; the place of social 
and environmental influences on health; and the nature of health promotion practice. 
These principles are followed by the Code itself. This sets out a number of duties and 
responsibilities (17 in total) incumbent on the practitioner given their commitment to 
the 'fundamental principles'. The Code and related principles have been supplemented 
by still more detailed guidance and discussion of issues in a series of 'briefing sheets', 
covering such topics as income generation and whistle blowing (SOCIETY OF 
HEALTH EDUCATION AND HEALTH PROMOTION SPECIALISTS, 1998b). 
It will be clear that if the putative 'obligations continuum' is imagined as running from 
left (less specific obligations) to right (more specific obligations): then the four 
principles will be rather more to the left; and the Code (together with the principles 
and indeed the briefing sheets) will be rather more to the right. Does a move towards 
greater specificity actually give more support to any attempt at the moral 
reconstruction of health promotion? 
Despite this enlarged attempt to map moral commitment, there is still the likelihood 
of conflict between both principles and articles within the Code. Take, as just one 
example, the following principles: 
'The promotion of self esteem and autonomy among client groupsl recipients should 
be an underlying principles of all health promotion practice ... .' (SOCIETY OF 
HEALTH EDUCATION AND HEALTH PROMOTION SPECIALISTS, 1997b: 2). 
And: 
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'Health promotion should encourage people to value others whatever their gender. 
age, race, class, religion, culture, sexuality, ability or health status, and attempt to 
counter prejudice and discrimination wherever it occurs ... .' (SOCIETY OF HEALTH 
EDUCATION AND HEALTH PROMOTION SPECIALISTS, 1997b: 3). 
Taken at face value, there could be conflict between these two principles. Autonomy 
promotion, for example, could lead to a particular group failing to value another 
group. For example, unlimited promotion of autonomy of a group of Catholic people 
in Northern Ireland may lead to conflict of values with the Protestant population. 
Unless these two statements are to be incompatible (which is clearly not intended), 
then a further qualification needs to be added: something like, the promotion of 
autonomy to the extent that this is compatible with the equal rights of others. Once 
this has been done, though, there remains the problem of assessing, in particular 
cases, degrees of possible autonomy and their acceptability to others with the same 
rights. 
Even with the relatively greater guidance offered by the Code and its connected 
principles, there is still not enough for anything other than general or provisional 
moral judgement. This is the defining problem of obligation (,outside in') ethics. It 
will be remembered that 'outside in' ethics understands the virtuous person as he or 
she who is aware of- and able to apply- the right moral principle when required 
(DAWSON, 1994). Yet while someone can accept a set of externally generated 
moral principles, they will never constitute enough to provide guidance in each and 
every situation encountered in practice. And the reliance on 'outside in' ethics- on 
'knowing the right principle'- paradoxically has the effect of making intuitive moral 
judgement more difficult. As Edgar (1994) remarks, practice- governing rules are 
incomplete by themselves, their precise application and meaning governed by an 
infinite series of additional rules which are only understood through the member of an 
occupation or profession experiencing that particular 'life world' (EDGAR, 1994: 
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149). It is this gathering experience that is perhaps part of what might be understood 
by developing an 'inside out' ethics. This Aristotelian-like conception of the nature of 
ethics entails moving from the notion of the virtuous person as one who is capable of 
applying the right principle; to the one who through active development of the right 
disposition has the capacity and ability to act morally. Pursuit of 'outside in' ethics by 
those involved in the field of health promotion may have the effect of making it more 
difficult to develop practitioners with moral dispositions capable of dealing with 
individual difficult situations. The greater the degree of specificity pursued in the 
search for obligations, the more possible it is that the practitioner will be unable to 
rely on her or his own judgement. She or he may be engaged in a persistent search for 
the right written article or principle to meet the demands of particular practice 
situations; rather than make recourse to her or his intuitions. 
4. The Futility of Bioethics? 
Having completed a review of key ways in which bioethics has been applied to the 
field of health promotion, some provisional conclusions can be drawn. The bioethical 
enterprise appears helpful to health promotion because it explicitly connects the field 
of activity to moral values, and to dispute about values; promoting health is no longer 
seen as either ethically neutral or necessarily praiseworthy in a moral sense (two 
positions that have sometimes, as seen, been encountered in the course of this 
research). Moreover, some bioethicists have been concerned actually to map, describe 
and develop the values they believe to be important to the field. Again, this appears 
helpful although not without difficulty: how, for example, can the kind of view held 
by Downie et al be of use in understanding tensions between individual and societal 
values; and how is it possible to manage and retain a Seedhouse- like view on the 
nature of the value of health in the context of political and professional environments 
holding contrary positions? Importantly, in addition to these values- related 
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explorations, some involved in the bioethical enterprise have also proposed 
principles- based frameworks for moral commitment and deliberation (although their 
general nature may pose particular difficulties for moral reasoning in individual 
cases). 
It seems, then, that the bioethical enterprise can certainly offer help in an attempt to 
reconstruct, in a moral sense, the field of health promotion. The enterprise's 
identification and discussion of values and obligations should not be ignored by those 
considering health promotion, although there is also a need to be aware of limitations 
to the understanding it provides. The view of limitations so far established has related 
mainly to considerations around the specific applicability of bioethics to health 
promotion. But there is also a need to think about broader criticisms of the bioethical 
enterprise per se. This will support a final judgement about the use of bioethics to an 
attempt at health promotion's moral reconstruction. 
There are two particular general positions against bioethics that will be reviewed here. 
The first emerges from post- modernism. The second can be characterised as neo-
conservati ve. 
The fust position declares itself as being committed to ethical libertarianism 'from the 
perspective of the post- modem condition' (ENGLEHARDT JR AND Wll.DES, 
1994: 136). In their paper, Englehardt Jr and Wildes make a number of distinctions: 
between 'moral strangers' (those who do not share sufficient moral community to be 
able to resolve moral disagreements through rational argument); and 'moral friends' 
(those who do have sufficient community to enable resolution); between' the various 
content- full secular moral visions .... and the canonical secular moral vision of 
modern moral philosophy ... .' (ENGLEHARDT JR AND WILDES, 1994: 136). It 
should be the case that the latter can be shared by all (both strangers and friends). 
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Englehardt Jr and Wildes offer a specific critique of the four principles approach- as 
representative of bioethics- from their post- modem perspective. They argue that the 
failure of modem moral philosophy to offer a convincing canonical vision means that 
the only feature of action that can define it as moral is the extent to which it allows 
individual consent. Thus the principle of respect for autonomy becomes 'the principle 
of permission' (ENGLEHARDT JR AND WILDES, 1994: 137); and the other 
principles- beneficence, non- maleficence and justice- are also recast so that their 
moral importance is credited to the extent that they contribute to individual consent. 
Englehardt Jr and Wildes argue their position from two connected perspectives. The 
first is their assertion that the rationalist project of modem moral philosophy to unite 
both moral friends and moral strangers has failed (presumably evidenced by the 
persistence of dramatic moral disagreement); and thus the moral authority of the 
modern state is limited. This is confrrmed from their second, post- modem, 
perspective which destroys the idea of the 'grand narrative' and throws up: 
'The philosophical difficulty .... to identify one among .... many rival moral accounts as 
authoritative ... .' (ENGLEHARDT JR AND WILDES, 1994: 141). 
Approaches such as the four principles, therefore- operating as 'middle level 
principles' and attempting to bind strangers and friends- cannot do so because there is 
no single authoritative account of morality. Thus: 
'The calculations of benefits [of health care actions] will depend on different views of 
human dignity, responsibility and freedom. Controversies will be irresolvable unless 
individuals come to share a common moral vision. The appeal to the principles of 
health care ethics may help define and sharpen the character of the conflict. But if the 
individuals possess different rankings of values and different understandings of 
exploitation, the appeal to principles cannot lead to resolving such controversies by 
216 
disclosing hidden grounds for their resolution .... ' (ENGLEHARDT JR AND 
WILDES, 1994: 145). 
It is important to note that for Englehardt Ir and Wildes, 'obligation ethics' (as 
represented by the four principles approach) is not a worthless project- it helps to 
draw out the nature of conflict. But the application of principles alone cannot resolve 
difficulties. Only consent- the single authoritative account of morality, both by virtue 
of the failure of moral philosophical rationality and of the post- modern condition- is 
able to do this. 
It seems, then, that Englehardt Ir and Wildes' account does not completely discount 
the bioethical enterprise. Indeed, it is helpful in adding to the picture of its limits and 
possibilities. One of the struggles preoccupying me in this part of my research has 
been that of agreeing- even in the face of some convincing accounts- to a single 
version of the values important to health promotion. This in turn has led to scepticism 
about the possibility of moral reconstruction. Considering the difficulties for modern 
moral philosophy's project, from the Enlightenment onwards, of establishing rational 
foundations for ethics may have explanatory power for the ethics of health promotion. 
If there is no such foundation: and if the post- modem conception of consent being 
the only authoritative principle in a world of multiple traditions is accepted; why 
should there be a single set of values on which those involved in the field of health 
promotion can agree? 
Further, reference to post- modern conceptions sharply yields the strong tension at the 
heart of the field. Foucauldian notions of the pervasiveness and complexity of power 
relations in the 'human sciences' might be a further way of exposing the possibility 
that 'empowennent' as a purpose of health promotion is a myth (DUNCAN AND 
CRIBB, 1996). Such an analysis is complementary to the kind of careful critique of 
activity that can be undertaken through the use of obligation ethics frameworks. 
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Foucault and post- modernism alert us to the risk of taking 'empowennent' at face 
value: the four principles, say, enable debate through providing a moral language 
likely to be reasonably understood; post- modernism again alerts us to the difficulty in 
accepting this is the only moral language. The relationship should be symbiotic. 
A post- modem critique of a major direction the bioethical enterprise has taken, then. 
certainly does not seem to damn it completely. However, the second position against 
bioethics now needs to be considered. I characterised this earlier as neo- conservative. 
One of its key representatives is Anne Maclean. 
In 'The Elimination of Morality' (1993), Maclean argues against a range of positions 
adopted by bioethicists such as John Harris and Peter Singer; positions on, for 
example, abortion and infanticide. But it is the foundation of her argument that is 
most interesting in tenns of questioning the bioethical enterprise as a whole. Maclean 
begins by examining the assumption made by bioethicists (philosophers) that they 
possess special expertise in moral matters. What exactly conveys this expertise? It 
must, presumably, be an education in philosophy, for this is the one thing that 
distinguishes bioethicists from others. But this in turn raises the question: how does 
an education in philosophy convey special moral expertise? 
The response of the bioethicist would be that moral judgements must be based on 
reason, which in tum must be subject to justification. Only philosophers are specially 
trained in examining assumptions. But an education in reason does not by itself allow 
special privilege for the particular moral judgements one makes: 
'When bioethicists deliver a verdict upon the moral issues raised by medical practice, 
it is their own verdict they deliver and not the verdict of philosophy itself.. . .' 
(MACLEAN, 1993: 5). 
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This is because philosophy does not offer such verdicts. The bioethical 'technique' of 
using a general theory (for example, utilitarianism) to support particular moral 
decisions is flawed; the decision is presented as a rational one, yet the underpinning 
theory is not wholly or uniquely rational. Utilitarianism, say, can at best give an 
insight as to how on occasions some kinds of moral thinking could proceed (that is, 
thinking based on notions of consequence). It does not have a unique preserve- or a 
preserve at all- on rational justifications for moral action. 
It is the apparent purpose of Maclean's argument rather than its form and content that 
gives it interest. In claiming that bioethicists are delivering their own personal 
opinions on moral matters, she is attempting to 'reclaim morality for the people': 
'People in generaL .. know how to make moral judgements; these are judgements of a 
sort we are all brought up to make, and not ones for which we require a special 
training or education ... .' (MACLEAN, 1993: 188). 
Of course this is an important point, paralleled in the field of health promotion by 
attempts such as that of Michael Kelly to 'reclaim health for the people' from the 
hands of 'professional health promoters' (KELLY, 1996: 24). Both Kelly and Maclean 
are essentially neo- conservatives. By this I mean they are against the rapid changes, 
the consolidation of 'professional' power and the diminution of the individual that- as 
they see it- are represented by health promotion (Kelly) and bioethics (Maclean). But 
in the case of Maclean's argument against bioethics, aside from her quite reasonable 
reminder of our capacity to develop moral intuition and make ethical judgements, it is 
not clear the enterprise is much damaged by what she says. 
She is claiming that bioethicists do not have special expertise in moral matters. The 
difficulties I have had in reaching towards an authoritative account of the values and 
obligations that should be held by those engaged in the field of health promotion 
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provides confirmation of this. But so long as the kind of bioethical exploration I am 
interested in acknowledges this, it is hard to see how it should affect the worth of this 
sort of project. It is rather like asserting that there is no point in exploring the history 
of the First World War because there can be no single authoritative account. Yet it is 
reasonable to believe there can be a number of different accounts, each of which may 
provide interesting and possibly important illumination of the historical event. 
Equally, in the case of bioethics and its roots in moral philosophy, there are a number 
of interesting accounts to explore, all of which may tell us something about human 
beings and their capacity to engage in thinking with a moral purpose. 
Maclean argues that general moral theory is not based on reason. Yet a broad 
conception of bioethics- which would include post- modem accounts as well as 
multiple' grand traditions'- would not be labouring under this illusion anyway. The 
point is that Maclean is attacking a particular conception of bioethics; a science of 
precision, capable only of being undertaken by experts. This is not the conception 
grounding my approach to thinking about how bioethics can support the moral 
reconstruction of health promotion. Maclean has certainly not made a case for the 
futility of examining bioethics in the context of my field of interest. She has probably 
not made one for the futility of bioethics in general, given the broad way in which it 
can be conceived. Possibly she has made one for the futility of a certain kind of 
approach to bioethics; but this is very different to a general claim that the bioethical 
enterprise as a whole is pointless. (As an aside, it is interesting to wonder whether 
Maclean considers she is undertaking a bioethical project, and the extent to which she 
views her own position as that of the 'expert'.) 
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s. Conclusion 
I began this chapter with the intention of determining the extent to which the 
bioethical enterprise could support an understanding of the moral problems of health 
promotion, if not their resolution. In summary, it has helped in the following ways: 
* Proposing, and providing a rationale for the acceptance of, particular values (and 
their nature) which are argued to be important to the field; 
* Proposing, and providing a framework for the consideration of, particular 
obligations or commitments likely to be felt important by those engaged in health 
promotion work; 
* Recognising the disputability of morality and the sources of that dispute; 
* Recognising the capacity of individuals- as well as moral philosophers- to make 
ethical judgements. 
As discussed, the help offered by bioethics is not unproblematic. It is certainly, 
however, likely to be a useful contribution to an attempt at the moral reconstruction of 
the field of health promotion. The assertion of particular values and obligations- and 
limits and possibilities attached to this- has been an especially important area in 
which help has been received from bioethics. 
Is it, however, possible to move beyond this assertion of a range of particular values 
and particular obligations that might be connected to health promotion and thus 
support justification of some of the field's activities (or alternatively alert us to 
worries)? Is there a sense in which the moral authority of health promotion and those 
who practice it can be more generally but more deeply grounded? This is the central 
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question of my next chapter, in which I move from the territory of bioethics (ethics 
for professions) to the overlapping one of professional ethics (the ethics of 
professions). 
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CHAPTER EIGHT- RECONSTRUCTING HEALTH PROMOTION: THE 
IDEA OF THE 'PROFESSIONAL PLEDGE' 
1. Introduction 
While I have argued for a role for bioethics in a project attempting the moral 
reconstruction of health promotion, there are limits to such a role. Bioethics has 
proposed and discussed values that might be important to the field, but these may 
nevertheless still be disputed. Equally, obligations it proposes may also be argued 
about; and because of the nature of the field, it may be difficult to determine why, 
whether and how they should be pursued. 
There is of course worth in disputability- debate stimulates and extends thinking at 
both academic and practice levels. Meanwhile, however, practitioners have to get on 
with health promotion activity; and their 'clients' (whoever they may be) probably 
have, in some way, to trust that they're doing the best they can. Individual 
practitioners may demonstrate their trustworthiness in countless singular ways to 
clients. These demonstrations might well often be accepted. If practitioners generally 
show trustworthiness: and if there is continued overall commitment to ethical thinking 
and debate with regard to health promotion (in the facilitation of which bioethics 
plays an essential part); isn't this sufficient? Why can't we accept the notion of 'good 
enough' morality? 
The idea of 'good enough' morality is quite a reasonable one. However, there is a 
difficulty with it in the context of health promotion. As has been demonstrated, the 
field has consistently been (and remains) subject to political and organisational 
change. To many. it is also novel (even though I continue with my assertion that it 
actually has a long, if disrupted, tradition). Why should we trust those operating in a 
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novel and fluctuating field- particularly one that has at its heart a mission to change 
both people and structures- on the basis of 'good enough' morality? It may be possible 
to accept such an idea in relation to established professions such as medicine and the 
law, although such acceptance is still not without problems. It is certainly much more 
difficult to do so in relation to a newer occupation or practice. 
More to the point, what seems to incline us to accept in the case of these established 
professions that their morality is sufficient (at least at that point where we go to seek 
the advice or help of a particular doctor or lawyer)? Is our trust reasonable? If in 
general we don't have such trust, should we have it and if so why? If there are general 
grounds for trusting professions, can these be applied to the field of health 
promotion? 
As discussed in Chapter Three, attempts to 'professionalise' the occupation of 
specialist health promotion have been a consistent if difficult feature of its history 
over the last twenty years or so. The questions I want to raise at this stage of my 
project are: 
* Can it be argued in general that professions possess particular moral status or value 
(and consequently that practitioners of professions are likely to be committed to 
particular, ethical, behaviour)?; 
* From this, can it be suggested that health promotion in particular possesses (or 
could possess) the features that make a profession (by virtue of being a profession) 
ethical? 
It is important to be clear about the limits to these questions and to my argument at 
this point. I am not trying to establish the moral case for or against professions in 
general through detailed empirical examination of what they do and how they are 
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constructed. Nor am I trying to determine whether, in an empirical sense, health 
promotion is- or could become- a profession. Rather I am trying to work out whether. 
in thinking about what a profession is (and what it is to be a professional), it could be 
concluded that there exist general grounds for putting moral trusting in them. 
Continuing from this, I am also trying to establish whether, from what we know and 
how we think about health promotion, it does or might possess characteristics that 
could allow for general grounding of trust. 
This latter is, of course, quite different from attempting to establish that health 
promotion actually is, or could become, a profession. My project is in some respects 
more fundamental. If health promotion does possess grounds for trust, then this would 
be an essential foundation to any effort actually to professionalise. In effect, it would 
be possible to say that the general nature of health promotion and its practitioners is 
such that we can trust them. From this would be more likely to emerge a willingness 
(on the part of the field's consumers and controllers) to engage in the characteristic 
process of professionalisation: 
'Individually and, in association, collectively, the professions "strike a bargain with 
society" in which they exchange competence and integrity against the trust of client 
and community, relative freedom from lay supervision and interference, protection 
against unqualified competition as well as substantial remuneration and higher social 
status ... .' (ERAUT, 1994: 2). 
It is clear that ground for trust is a key part of the professional 'bargain'. In trying to 
determine the possibility and nature of such ground, a project of moral reconstruction 
begins to extend from professional ethics in the sense of ethics for professions (for 
example, the bioethical enterprise): into the territory of professional ethics. when 
understood as the ethics of professions. 
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2. Stating Daryl Koehn's Argument for the Ground of Professional Ethics 
In considering the two questions posed above, I have been helped greatly by Daryl 
Koehn's influential book, 'The Ground of Professional Ethics' (1994). Her- to me-
convincing account of how professions might be ethically grounded has been the 
basis for thinking about the first question. This account- which I generally accept 
although with some reservations- has been applied then to the particular context of the 
field of health promotion in order to try and answer the second question. Koehn's 
argument is complex. It is therefore important to provide a general statement of it 
before moving into rather more detail. 
Koehn wishes to establish a ground for professional authority and moral 
trustworthiness, where 'ground' is understood as: 
'A source of standards or norms which are binding on a certain class or group of 
agents ... .' (KOEHN, 1994: 8). 
For a 'grounding' argument to be convincing, it must do the following: 
(1) Specify the source of the standards governing professional activity; 
(2) Demonstrate why the norms identified can be considered only to bind 
professionals; 
(3) Legitimate therefore, in a moral sense, the relationship of trust that exists between 
professional and client. 
In relation to (1). Koehn rejects two possible sources of moral authority- expenise and 
contracts- and argues instead for the public pledge of professionals to service and 
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assistance as that which grounds their legitimacy. With regard to (2), the public 
pledge is a declaration of intent by the professional to serve the good of her or his 
client- a good of which that client has need. Koehn in fact defines 'professional' in 
terms of the capacity to publicly pledge in this way: 
'[ A professional is] An agent who freely makes a public promise to serve persons .... 
who are distinguished by a specific desire for a particular good .... and who have come 
into the presence of the professional with the expectation that the professional will 
promote that good ... .' (KOEHN, 1994: 59). 
For (3), it is in pledging that the relationship between client and professional becomes 
moral. We wish our relationships with professionals to be as with those who have 
made promises to us. This promise- based orientation of professionals to their public 
may centre around explicitly made pledges; but equally it may be implicit 
commitments that are trust- promoting. 
It is important to note that this argument for grounding will not establish that every 
professional relationship examined at any time will therefore be a moral one. The 
argument: 
'Describes the essence of a legitimate profession .... [the claim] is not that any existent 
person or group fully exhibits that essence, but rather that professionals will be more 
legitimate the more fully they do so ... .' (KOEHN, 1994: 11). 
Having given this bald statement of Koehn's argument, it is now possible to reflect on 
some of its detail. 
3. Koehn's Argument: Some Detail- and Some Possible Objections 
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Against the background of pervasive and continuing critiques of professions in the 
last quarter of the twentieth century, Daryl Koehn embarks on a rather unusual 
project. Her intention is to demonstrate that professional activity rests on 'secure and 
morally legitimating ground ... .' (KOEHN, 1994: 1). Historians, sociologists. 
philosophers and organisational analysts have all mounted challenges against 
professions and their power. Yet in the final analysis we still need to trust the 
professions (especially the paradigmatic professions of medicine, law and the clergy) 
because they: 
'Represent the only mechanism we have for collectively providing ourselves with the 
goods of health, legal justice and spiritual peace. If professionals are not trustworthy, 
whom should we trust? ... We cannot simply hope that the sick, the accused or 
injured, and the spiritually needy will provide adequately for themselves .... Given that 
the critics are not proposing any alternative source of help, we will be left without 
recourse if we cease to believe that professionals merit trust under some conditions .... ' 
(KOEHN, 1994: 5-6). 
Thus Koehn begins her project of moral grounding. First, she proposes rejection of 
two commonly held justifications for accepting professional authority. It is often 
believed that professionals possess expertise which is applied to serve the good of 
others. The problem with this belief, Koehn argues, is that expertise creates the 
expert, a role which may well prove so powerful that it relegates the client to a 
position of secondary importance in the professional- client relationship. We may 
seek out professionals because of their expertise, but expertise is not a moral quality. 
If expertise, then, is removed from the 'expertise plus altruism' equation above. we are 
left only with the latter. Altruism, if it is a nonn, does not only bind professionals and 
therefore cannot meet condition (1)- nor indeed condition (2)- for a convincing 
'grounding' argument. 
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A second frequent justification for accepting professional authority is that we often 
contract for the services of a professional (an even more common phenomenon in the 
United States context from which Koehn is writing). Contracting entails the client 
paying and it is therefore incumbent on the professional to respect the client's freedom 
and rationality if this 'service for fee' transaction is to be a moral one. 
Yet again, however, there is nothing about contracts by themselves that promote or 
warrant trust. Indeed, contracts tend narrowly to specify. There must always also be a 
question of doubt in the mind of the 'contract observer'; what is most important to the 
professional in the contract relationship- the client's good, or her or his money? 
If neither expertise nor contracts meet the requirements of a convincing argument for 
the grounding of professional authority, what does? For Koehn, authority is grounded 
by the public pledge professionals make. They: 
'Publicly pledge themselves to render assistance to those in need and as a 
consequence have special responsibilities or duties ... .' (KOEHN, 1994: 56). 
These responsibilities or duties include the willingness to act: to do so in a competent 
way; and to exercise discretion in action according to the individual situations in 
which professionals find themselves. But these are all consequent duties. It is through 
pledging itself that the moral authority of professionals is grounded. Pledging confers 
ethical legitimacy not only because of the professional's commitment to service: but 
also because that service seeks to provide a client with a good they presently lack. A 
professional is: 
'An agent who freely makes a public promise to serve persons (e.g. the sick) 
distinguished by a specific desire for a particular good (e.g. health) who have come 
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into the presence of the professional with the expectation that the professional will 
promote that good ... .' (KOEHN, 1994: 59). 
The pledge functions as a ground for trust precisely because: 
'It meets the objective requirements for a trusting relationship between professional 
and client.. . .' (KOEHN, 1994: 68). 
Both the client and the professional are cast as 'mutually vulnerable' in the context of 
the pledge. The client is in need; but the professional is also potentially in need 
because she or he has committed to help even at personal cost. 
At this stage, two difficulties with Koehn's argument should be noted. The frrst is 
descriptive; the second ideological. The descriptive problem is this. Pledging is not 
just a feature of professional activity. In both our occupational and our personal lives, 
we frequently make pledges (moral commitments) to each other. My plumber pledges 
to fix my central heating: the couple getting married pledge to be faithful to each 
other. 
Asserting this does not damage Koehn's argument in a fundamental sense. The pledge 
still 'meets the objective requirements for a trusting relationship between professional 
and client.' But if pledging is a common experience, then it becomes part of 'ordinary' 
morality and 'ordinary' moral relationships. It could, of course, be argued that there is 
a special moral position attached to professional pledging by virtue of what is being 
pledged (a good central to human well- being such as health or liberty, say); and the 
social context in which the pledge is being made. But there is a risk in this argument. 
Why should, for example, the good of health have greater moral importance than the 
good of faithfulness or even- in some particular circumstances- the good of wannth? 
Simply asserting a special moral position for pledging related to a particular good. 
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without accompanying reasons, is likely to present difficulties. It is less problematic 
to agree that pledging may be the ground for a relationship that could lead to 
particularly important and needed goods, subject to the relationship assuming the 
responsibilities or duties consequent on pledging. Within the complex of pledging, 
consequent duties and needed goods, it may be possible to assert a special moral 
position for the professional who pledges. 
It is now possible to move to the second, ideological, problem with Koehn's argument 
up to this point. According to her, pledging allows, among other things, for 
professional discretion and self- responsibility. But doesn't conceiving of pledging in 
this sort of way simply return us to arguments against the power of professions 
constructed by sociologists, historians and others- the very arguments which 
prompted this attempt by Koehn to try and morally ground professional authority? 
Koehn's counter- argument to this would presumably refer back to the basis of 
pledging: the public pledge to people distinguished by the need for a particular 
(lacking) good. It would be difficult to imagine, say, discretion employed for the self-
interest of the professional emerging from this conception of the ground of 
professional ethics. But there remains a problem. Pledging is sufficiently vague to 
allow different interpretations as to the acceptable limits of action for the client's 
good. And here is where it becomes essential that the pledge does not stand alone qua 
ethical professional practice- but rather as the ground of relationships and more 
detailed duties, all of which should be submitted to moral examination. (To be fair to 
Koehn, her concern, throughout 'The Ground of Professional Ethics', to describe her 
own conceptions of limits to discretion and the nature of goods being sought by 
public and professionals suggests she also wishes to become clearer about the more 
complex picture.) 
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This brings us back to Koehn's original purpose. Given that the critics of professions 
are offering nothing to take their place: and given the goods they provide are arguably 
fundamental; grounding the moral authority of professionals is an essential task. We 
need them, we need to trust them and in some way that trust must be grounded. If 
moral grounding is the identification of a source of standards or nonns binding on a 
certain group, then in a general sense this has been accomplished. Professionals, 
because they are professionals, freely pledge to serve the public good and particularly 
those individuals in need of specific goods. 
But Koehn would want to claim that the ground of the public pledge is only prima 
facie indication of professional trustworthiness. Further, general trustworthiness does 
not indicate morality in specific cases. As I have made clear, more detailed work 
needs to be carried out in order to detennine this. Nevertheless, a ground for general 
trust in professionals has now been determined. The question at this point is whether 
such a ground applies- or could apply- to health promotion. 
4. Can the Idea of the Public Pledge be Applied to Health Promotion? 
Pledging, then, is prima facie an expression of interest in the professional being 
perceived as moral; and a declaration of her or his moral intent. Following Koehn, I 
argue that 'moral pledging', as the ground of professional ethics, is dependent on two 
necessary conditions being met. First, that there is a client need for the particular 
good the profession concerned has the capacity to supply or meet. Second, that the 
profession in general commits itself to helping those who have need of that good. If 
these conditions are met, then pledging will be a ground of the moral authority of the 
profession. Does health promotion meet these conditions? (It is crucial to remember 
here my important initial remark that I am not trying to establish the validity, in an 
empirical sense, of the claim that health promotion is- or could be- a profession. I am 
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trying to work out whether the idea of pledging could be applied to health promotion. 
thus indicating the prima facie trustworthiness of the field.) 
Before addressing this question, some preliminary remarks are required. First, I recall 
the distinction made throughout this work between, on the one hand, health 
promotion specialists; and on the other, health promoters. Health promotion 
specialists are those who have the promotion of health as their main or exclusive 
occupational role. This is the group whose history of attempts to professionalise was 
charted in Chapter Three. Health promoters are those who have the promotion of 
health as part of their occupational role- for example, nurses. Frequently, health 
promoters have been encouraged to develop competence in respect of health 
promotion; in other words, to undertake professional development related to the 
promotion of health. They have not, however, participated in a project of 
professionalisation, of trying to become the profession of specialist health promotion. 
It could be argued here that nurses, for example, constitute the profession of health 
promotion; that the nursing role is, par excellence, about health promotion. This in 
fact starts to bring out a major difficulty in attempting publicly to pledge the 
promotion of health which will be discussed later in this chapter. For the time being, I 
assert that those involved in nursing pledge 'to nurse' (which may- indeed should-
include the promotion of health). Those involved in specialist health promotion 
presumably pledge to 'promote health' (that is to say, it is their primary, and possibly 
only, pledge). 
The second preliminary remark is to suggest from empirical evidence that 'pledging' 
appears to assume some significance in the field of health promotion. Documents 
such as the Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion (WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANISATION, 1986) and the Adelaide Recommendations on Healthy Public 
Policy (WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION. 1988) seem to be full of 'pledges'. 
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Take this example from the latter document, discussing healthy public policy (which 
is understood as a component of health promotion): 
'Healthy Public Policy is characterised by an explicit concern for health in equity in 
all areas of policy and by an accountability for health impact. The main aim of 
Healthy Public Policy is to create a supportive environment to enable people to lead 
healthy lives. Such a policy makes healthy choices possible or easier for citizens ... .' 
(WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION, 1988). 
However, this empirical evidence of pledging- like statements in the field of health 
promotion does not answer the question of whether the two necessary conditions for 
'moral pledging' (client need and profession commitment to helping those with such 
need) are likely to be met by the field. 
The third and final preliminary remark is that in the rest of this section, I most 
frequently refer to the 'clients' of health promotion. This is not because I believe this 
to be the most applicable term. It is simply because it is the one most used by Koehn 
herself. 
Do clients need the good of health, as supplied through health promotion? 
The arguments I presented in Chapter Seven made it clear that 'health' was a good, or 
value. Arguably, there is a need for more of this good, a need expressed in part 
through public policy and strategy (SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HEALTH, 1992. 
1998: DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 1998). Surely, then, health promotion meets 
the first necessary condition- of client need- for 'moral public pledging'? 
Throughout previous chapters of this thesis, I have argued for the disputability of the 
concept of health. I have cited examples of the rich variety in lay interpretations of 
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health (such as CORNWELL, 1984: HERZLICH, 1973). I have also discussed 
difficulties experienced by theorists in reaching agreement on a unified perspecti ve 
(for example, DOWNIE, TANNAHILL AND TANNAHILL, 1996: HARE, 1986: 
SEEDHOUSE, 1986; SCADDING, 1988). There is thus at the very least the 
possibility that perceptions of the need which the client has may be very different 
depending on whose point of view is being taken. 
Compare the field of health promotion with that of the paradigmatic liberal profession 
of law. The lawyer defending a client on a charge of robbery is concerned to serve the 
client's best interests in the face of this legal charge. The lawyer has pledged herself 
or himself to: 
'Render assistance to those in need and as a consequence [has] special responsibilities 
or duties ... .' (KOEHN, 1994: 56). 
The needed good is clear (representation in the face of the charge) and so, therefore, 
are the duties and responsibilities required. They would include the requirement for 
the lawyer to tum up in court on behalf of the client, to present or arrange the 
defence, to interpret the law for the benefit of the client's understanding and so on. 
This clarity about needed good and consequent duties and responsibilities is at least 
sometimes not shared by health promotion activity. As a professional engaged in such 
activity. I may see stopping smoking as an important way of acquiring the needed 
good of health. However, there will be at least some occasions when my clients do 
not share this view. There will be disagreement about the need and therefore about 
my duties and responsibilities. I may see it as my responsibility to provide advice to 
the client about quitting smoking, but the client does not want such advice. 
Admittedly. legal clients also sometimes reject advice from their lawyers. But this is 
not usually because they see no need for the good of legal representation. (Having 
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rejected advice, they assume their own defence, or less dramatically engage 
alternative counsel.) If a client rejects smoking advice, it is likely to be because he or 
she does not see the need for the good being offered. In this sort of case. by virtue of 
the nature of 'pledging', pledging to promote someone's health through helping them 
to stop smoking cannot be a pledge at all. 
But isn't this example very specific and isn't it very often true that health promotion 
practitioners and clients agree on what constitutes good? This could certainly be the 
case, although I would argue that instances where agreement is lacking or not explicit 
are quite commonplace in the field of activity. In any event, even if there were just a 
small number of cases in which disagreement about the needed good existed (and I 
think there is actually quite a large number); this would show pledging for health 
promotion to be only a relative possibility. 'Relative pledging' is not pledging at all, at 
least in the terms established by Koehn. The person promoting health cannot freely 
make a public promise to serve individuals distinguished by a specific desire or need 
for that particular good (health) because its nature is disputed. 
It might be argued that pledging could be made applicable to health promotion by 
trying to frame a more general pledge that takes account of difficulties engendered by 
the nature of the needed good of health being disputable. This would involve, say, a 
general agreement on the good of health and action to promote it being subject to 
negotiation and review between the practitioner and the client. If those involved in 
health promotion activity took such a general pledge seriously, then in specific cases 
there would always be certainty- through agreement and negotiation- that the client 
was in fact distinguished by a specific desire for a particular needed good. Arguably. 
this might not be that different from a model for action entailed by Koehn's 
conception of pledging and the paradigmatic liberal professions. A lawyer or a doctor. 
for example, would presumably want to substantiate their general pledge with more 
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detailed consultation with clients about what in this specific instance was actually 
needed or wanted. 
Here, though, considerations of context become important. For Koehn, the public 
pledge is the ground of trust between client and professional. It underpins a series of 
more detailed moral commitments associated with a specific relationship: orientation 
to action; commitment to assistance offered being ongoing; appropriate degrees of 
professional discretion; and the relationship cast in 'mutual vulnerability' (KOEHN, 
1994: 68). Yet for some involved in the field of health promotion- namely, health 
promotion specialists- this specific relationship frequently does not exist. As I have 
described, this occupational group is often once removed from lay- clients. Its 
members are pre-occupied with such things as developing policy or supporting health 
promoters. For these, any general pledge cannot be connected to the moral detail 
required by a particular relationship. Thus, a general pledge remains just that- general. 
Imagine a statement based on the idea of the general pledge for health promotion 
described earlier: 
'Broadly, we agree that health is a good thing. Subject to that agreement being 
confirmed by all parties, and the agreement being reviewed at regular intervals, we 
will do all we can to promote health ... .' 
At best, this can only be a statement of overall moral intent. It is certainly not a public 
promise to serve those distinguished by a specific desire for a particular good. the 
prima facie ground for trust in professionals. The difficulty is that the nature of the 
occupation of health promotion specialist does not allow for the general statement to 
be supplanted by a more particular pledge. 
Arguably health promoters. by contrast, do have the kind of c1ient- professional 
relationship that would allow for the more detailed moral features described by 
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Koehn. Could pledging ground the relationship between health promoters and their 
clients? Take practice nursing as an example of an occupational role with. at least in 
part, a health promotion function. The role is oriented to action: it is likely to involve 
ongoing relationships with clients, quite possibly with the promotion of health as their 
purpose (for example, ongoing counselling, advice and support for someone who 
wants to give up smoking): and a practice nurse may operate with degrees of 
professional discretion. In this context, is the idea of pledging any more reasonable? 
Imagine Sue, a practice nurse and Mrs Smith, a patient. Sue has met and helped Mrs 
Smith on several previous occasions and knows she is concerned about her health. 
(Mrs Smith was recalled to cervical screening two years ago, is rather overweight and 
has made at least three attempts in the past to quit her 20 per day smoking habit.) 
After a gap of several months since her last visit, Mrs Smith appears at the surgery 
again. She walks into the practice nurse's office and after a few preliminaries, Sue 
declares, 'I will do what I can to promote your health, Mrs Smith.' Such a statement 
might seem more than a little odd. Yet would oddness have been similarly felt if Sue 
had said, 'I will do what I can to help you'; or even, 'I will do what I can to look after 
you.' ? 
Feelings of oddness or otherwise in relation to these scenarios demonstrate that in the 
relationship between Sue and Mrs Smith, it is not the practice nurse's pledge to 
promote her health that is either the most important or the most appropriate. It is what 
I have crudely referred to already as the 'nursing pledge'. Centrally, this is a pledge to 
nurse. If the pledge is unpacked a little, it would include components of the nursing 
role such as caring and advocacy. It would also include the promotion of health but at 
best this would only constitute a part of the nursing pledge. I argue that the promotion 
of health might equally fonn part of the pledge of other occupational groups (for 
example. teachers) but again it is- and can only be- one component. 
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In thinking again about the example of nursing, there is at least the possibility that 
someone could reasonably believe nursing in fact to be health promotion. rvlacleod 
Clark (1993) has presented the case for regarding the fundamental role of nursing as 
'health nursing' (that is to say, the nurse's raison d'etre is the promotion of health and 
would become his or her primary' profession', or pledge). The context of nursing 
(particular relationships between clients and professionals) would thus allow the first 
necessary condition of trust grounding-client need of a specific good- to be fulfilled 
by an important occupational group. Nurses (first and foremost health promoters) 
pledge to nurse (that is to say, to promote health); and their relationships with 
individual clients (patients) allow- at least in respect of this condition- that prima 
facie grounding is the basis for the more detailed establishment of trust in particular 
cases. 
But this position is deeply problematic. Common sense tells us that people most often 
seek the help of nurses because they desire the particular good of being cared for 
while they are ill- or perhaps even when they are dying. While theorists might want 
nursing to be 'health nursing'; for the great majority of people, it is 'sick nursing' (that 
is to say, nursing the sick). The preoccupation of 'sick nursing' with health promotion 
is mainly of a particular kind. This can be understood as rehabilitation or restoration 
of health in those who are ill or diseased (or help to a peaceful death in the case of the 
dying). At best, prevention and positive health promotion are only add- ons to this 
role and may not be regarded as related to it at all. Throughout this thesis, beginning 
in the first chapter. health promotion has been conceptualised by most of the different 
voices to whom I have been listening as more like the latter (that is to say, prevention 
and positive health promotion). There are thus two different conceptualisations of 
'health promotion': the one held by most of my voices from theory and practice: and 
the other that identified as the preoccupation of 'sick nursing'. 
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This is where the problematic lies. The public perception of nursing as I have 
suggested is overwhelmingly one of 'sick nursing', with a very different story to tell 
about 'health promotion' than that which has dominated this thesis. If we wish to 
claim that the needed good supplied by , sick nursing' is 'health promotion'. we have 
to do one of two things. First, we would need to spend substantial time making it 
explicitly clear that the things most usually associated with 'sick nursing' (caring for 
ill people and so on) are in fact what ought generally to be regarded as 'health 
promotion'. If we do this, then we ignore a widespread view from academics, practice 
(and probably the broader public as well) about what 'health promotion' actually is 
(prevention and the promotion of positive health). Alternatively, second, we continue 
with the implicit, unexpressed assumption that what many people consider to be 
'health promotion' is not such at all and that the version supplied by 'sick nursing' 
(caring and so forth) is the authentic one. The deep difficulty with both these 
positions in terms of pledging as a ground for trust is that neither seems honest. Both 
fail to acknowledge important conceptions of, on the one hand, 'sick nursing'; and, on 
the other, 'health promotion'. We would essentially be pledging in the knowledge that 
there were competing views about the nature of the good being pledged. (It doesn't 
work here to suggest that both versions of 'health promotion' can live side by side. 
Remember the claim being made is that nursing (for which necessarily read 'sick 
nursing') is pledging 'health promotion'; as I have argued, 'sick nursing' is strongly 
associated with a particular set of activities that bear little relationship to other 
conceptions of 'health promotion'.) 
I have chosen nursing as the main example within this section because it appeared to 
be the occupation with the greatest potential to fulfil this necessary condition of 
pledging with regard to health promotion. It seems to me that other occupations- for 
example. teaching- face even greater difficulties in this respect. There is no model of 
'health teaching'. Of course, there are those who teach abut health. but this is not the 
same thing. And the idea of teachers who' teach in a health promoting way' faces the 
240 
same problems as the nursing example above, although without the benefit of a 
coherent theoretical model. 
Is there a professional group commitment to helping those who have need for the 
particular good of health, as supplied through health promotion? 
It will be clear, then, that health promotion fails to meet the first necessary condition-
that of needed good- for pledging as a ground for trust. This is because both of the 
disputed nature of the good; and the contexts in which pledging might actually or 
potentially occur. If this necessary condition cannot be met, then health promotion- at 
least as far as pledging goes- cannot have its moral authority grounded. However, it is 
possible to imagine that if certain extra conditions were fulfilled- acknowledgement 
of the disputability of the good and much greater public development of the idea of 
'health nursing' for example- then sometimes, in some cases, the notion of 'pledging 
health promotion' might be less remote than it seems to be at present. Given the 
purpose in this part of my thesis is to examine how health promotion might be 
reconstructed in a moral sense, it is important to consider this as a possibility. Despite 
present failure to meet the first necessary condition, it is thus also important to 
consider how the field might fare in relation to the second condition- professional 
group commitment to helping those who have the need for the particular good of 
health as supplied through health promotion. 
I return again to the distinction between health promotion specialists (at least some of 
whom are attempting to professionalise this occupation); and health promoters (many 
of whom are being encouraged to engage in health promotion- related professional 
development). Those in this latter category are drawn from a number of different 
occupational groups. In an empirical sense then, even at this early stage of 
consideration it looks unlikely that a 'unified professional group commitment' to 
meeting the need for the good of health. as supplied through health promotion. can 
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exist. The simple problem is that 'health promotion', at this stage of the enquiry. is 
understood mainly as a field of activity undertaken by separate occupational groups 
(although sometimes- possibly frequently- working together). Moreover. individuals 
within these occupational groups are likely to have different conceptions of the 
relative importance of health promotion to their work. (It is not unreasonable to 
suggest that not all nurses or all teachers, say, are uniformly committed to promoting 
health.) 
There is, however, one occupational group in which all its members should share a 
relatively equal commitment to health promotion. This is the group of health 
promotion specialists. (Arguably, they come closest to connecting the different senses 
of 'health promotion' it might be possible to employ here- as occupation, as field of 
activity and as practice.) There is, however, a paradox to unfold at this point. A 
detailed story was told in Chapter Three of attempts by at least some of this 
occupational group to professionalise; to take on the values and attributes of a 
profession in order that they also would become members of a 'new' profession of 
specialist health promotion (HOYLE, 1980: ERAUT, 1994). Attributes the 
professionalisers tried to develop included formalised training on which licence to 
practice was contingent, a code of conduct and so forth. Such things are likely to 
place ideological and practical ground between the occupational group of health 
promotion specialists; and the larger body of health promoters. Paradoxically, 
professionalisation renders more difficult the possibility of a unified professional 
group commitment from those in the field of health promotion to helping people with 
need for the good of health. Although possibly unwitting and probably undesired, this 
is certainly likely to be a consequence of professional ising specialist health 
promotion. 
There are further problems to be faced here. Health promotion specialists are reputed 
to be collaborators (RAWSON AND GRIGG. 1988: SOCIETY OF HEALTH 
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EDUCATION AND HEALTH PROMOTION SPECIALISTS, 1997a, 1997c). If a 
putative pledge from this occupational group was to be framed, it would almost 
certainly have as a central feature the requirement for collaboration in the cause of 
health. 
Yet professionalisation is likely to stifle collaboration. This is because it will put 
ground between specialists and health promoters. It will also do this because- despite 
the importance of the relationship between the specialist occupation and health 
promoters- the latter can have no active part in the project. If they did, the project 
would cease to be one of professionalisation because processes would no longer be 
confined to, and under the control of, one distinct occupational group. It is therefore 
at least possible that the end results of professionalisation will not be acceptable to 
(certainly they will not have been agreed by) health promoters. This will affect the 
idea of 'common cause' between specialists and health promoters, likely, I have 
argued to be a central feature of a specialist occupational pledge. If health promotion 
specialists continue to professionalise, they lose an important feature of their putative 
pledge. If they abandon this project, their distinctiveness from other occupational 
groups- and hence of any possible pledge- is lost. 
5. Conclusion 
It appears, then, that there is difficulty with those involved in the field in which I am 
interested meeting the second necessary condition of moral public pledging-
professional group commitment to helping those who have need for the good of 
health. as supplied through health promotion. This is partly because multiple 
occupational groups are engaged in the field of activity, making unified pledging 
certainly very difficult and probably impossible. It is also because the one 
occupational group whose members are likely to possess relatively equal commitment 
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to the promotion of health- health promotion specialists- have engaged in a project of 
professionalisation. This has moved them away from other groups and renders them 
less able to fulfil what ought to be an essential component of their role, most probably 
as well as a major feature of any pledge they might want to make- the capacity to 
collaborate. 
Once again, however, although there are difficulties in the field of health promotion at 
present in meeting this necessary condition for grounding trust; some putative 
features of a more solidly grounded field have been uncovered. These include the 
need to examine the extent to which there is or might be, in fact, inter- occupational 
agreement on the worth of health promotion in helping those who have need of the 
particular good of health. It might also include the requirement for those engaged in 
the professionalisation of specialist health promotion to consider the impact of their 
vision and ideology on a central principle of the work to which they are committed; 
and how ignoring this might reduce the possibility of 'common cause' in the field. 
Koehn's account of pledging as the ground of professional moral authority cannot at 
present, then, apply to the field of health promotion. This conclusion is independent 
of any thought about the actual empirical state of affairs with regard to the field being 
perceived (or otherwise) as 'a profession'. However, her account has enabled 
identification of exactly why 'pledging health promotion' is at present difficult, if not 
impossible. In summary, this is because: 
* Health is a disputed value; 
* The particular context of many 'health promotion relationships' makes detailed 
pledging highly problematic; 
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* The inter- occupational nature of work that could be considered to be 'health 
promotion' prevents or makes difficult a unified voice; 
* Professionalisation also poses a risk to health promotion unity. 
These are valuable conclusions. Together with views already gathered in the previous 
chapter on the limits and possibilities of help available to health promotion from 
bioethics; they will be used in the final chapter of this thesis where- with the help of 
my research participants- I attempt to make a contribution towards the moral 
reconstruction of the field of health promotion. 
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CHAPTER NINE- TOWARDS HEALTH PROMOTION'S MORAL 
RECONSTRUCTION: REFLECTING ON THEORY AND PRACTICE 
1. Introduction 
In this final chapter, I draw together the strands of my thesis. When I began this work, 
it was with the view- based mainly at that point on intuitive feeling- that health 
promotion as theory and practice contained substantial moral problems. However, my 
intuition went little further than a general sense of ethical unease. If my view was to 
be substantiated, I needed rigorously to investigate the development and present 
nature of health promotion as theory and practice. 
Thus I began to listen to, and try to understand, a number of 'voices' providing 
perspecti ves on health promotion. I listened to the voices of key theorists describing 
their typologies of health promotion. On the assumption that historical analysis can 
help in understanding present problems, I sought the descriptions and interpretations 
of historians, both of health promotion in particular; and of the general social and 
cultural context in which it has developed over recent times. I returned to theorists in 
order to understand how they would be likely to construct a moral defence of health 
promotion; then sought critically to examine such a defence. 
To inform my views- and to gain a richer insight into the nature of problems- I got the 
help of a number of practitioners. With problems of theory and practice exposed, I 
then began to seek help as to how health promotion might be reconstructed in a moral 
sense: first from bioethics; then from broader theoretical understanding on the nature 
of professional ethics. 
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Now my task is to draw together these strands of theoretical critique and help- and of 
illuminating practitioner perception- in order to determine what might need to be done 
in order to move towards the moral reconstruction of health promotion. 
2. The Value of Moral Theory in Exploring the Ethical Problems of Health 
Promotion 
After establishing that health promotion faces major moral problems, I sought help 
from moral theory to see how they could be understood and dealt with. This process 
was described and discussed particularly in Chapter Seven. While acknowledging 
some limitations in the assistance that could be found from theory; nevertheless there 
were important ways, I argued, in which it could support the understanding and 
management of moral problems in health promotion. My research participants- the 
student- practitioners whose academic writing I analysed- underwent a similar process 
of learning and understanding through the consideration of ethical theory. My 
intention now is to examine and reflect on this process. 
It will be remembered that my participants had been required to: 
'Demonstrate an understanding of. ... the ethical and philosophical considerations [ of 
the health promotion programme being discussed] ... .' (SOUTH BANK 
UNIVERSITY, 1995b: 16; 1996b: 17). 
It is, though, important to explore how these practitioners used moral theory and what 
they felt its effect to be. While I have argued for value in aspects of the application of 
moral philosophy (particularly bioethics) to health promotion; it is necessary to ask 
whether this sense of value might be conflITlled by practitioners. 
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My participants sought help in the main from moral theories of obligation. There was 
relatively little reference to Aristotelian conceptions of morality as being about 
attempting to determine the nature of the good or valuable life. The nature of the 
moral theory to which participants mostly turned reflects the content of the unit's 
teaching (focused on obligation ethics and frameworks for moral obligation); which in 
tum is a reflection of the dominant Anglo Saxon moral philosophical tradition, at least 
over recent history. 
There was wide use by the participants of frameworks for establishing moral 
obligation; products, as discussed in Chapter Seven, of the bioethical enterprise. Of 
my 17 participants, 13 made use of the four principles framework of Beauchamp and 
Childress (1994), or as adapted by Gillon (1990b: 1994). Three writers referred to, or 
used, Seedhouse's 'Ethical Grid' (1988). Three writers also used a framework I 
developed myself which makes reference to the four principles and emphasises the 
need for knowledge about an activity's aim, approach and effectiveness as moral 
calculus is being undertaken (DUNCAN, 1995). (These numbers exceed 17 because 
some writers used more than one framework. For example, Tim- who was writing 
about the activities of the Christian voluntary group concerned with female sex 
industry workers- used both Seedhouse (1988) and Duncan (1995).) 
Only two of the writers made little or no reference to obligations- based frameworks 
for moral reasoning. These were Patricia, who was considering health promotion 
epistemology, needs assessment and general practice; and Donna, who was reflecting 
on politics, local government and health promotion. It is possible to offer reasons for 
this and I will return to their writing later. 
While frameworks were employed extensively in general by the writers, exactly how 
they were used varied between individuals. Some, for example, chose to layout 
frameworks of principles in a fonnal way; and to use a number of principles as the 
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basis for listing and discussing points 'for and against' the activity they were writing 
about. Frameworks thus took on the appearance of an aid to moral calculus. Iris, it 
will be remembered, is writing about water fluoridation: 
'Does fluoridation compromise autonomy? ... 
'B ..... Health Authority .... accepts that fluoridation would be ideal. i.e. accepting its 
beneficence, non- maleficence and the fact that it impinges on autonomy. but rejects it 
on grounds of cost .... ' (Iris). 
She concludes: 
'Thus in the case of fluoridation, the benefits, beneficence and non - maleficence 
outweigh any impingement on autonomy .... ' (Iris). 
Others chose to concentrate on one particular principle within a wider framework to 
support or reject arguments for an activity. Discussed most frequently and at greatest 
length was the principle of respect for autonomy. Generally, writers took the view that 
adherence to this particular principle confirmed the morality of an activity (and its 
breach suggested at the least an ethical dubiousness). John, however, was slightly 
more circumspect and doubtful about the relationship between autonomy disruption 
and the ethics of an intervention: 
'Not being able to smoke in schools by the over 16s would only appear to infringe 
personal liberty (autonomy) but looking at the issues I have put forward it is certainly 
a benefit for the majority. After all. people are not being stopped from smoking. only 
restricted in where they can for the comfort and safety of all .... ' (John). 
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David, writing about Tackling Drugs Together, represents the characteristic view of 
the fundamental importance of the principle of respect for autonomy: 
'[The strategy J places strong emphasis on control, it promotes understanding of a 
particular and limited type and it attempts to ameliorate certain specific aspects of 
intentionality. It seems clear .... that [the strategy J has no respect for autonomy ... .' 
(David). 
Judith, discussing smoking prevention interventions during pregnancy, is equally 
explicit about the importance of the principle: 
f\s a rational moral agent, the woman's freedom to do as she wishes with her own 
body should be paramount ..... ' (Judith). 
Mandy, writing about the primary schools self- esteem project, extends her thinking 
beyond simply respect for autonomy and argues for autonomy creation as the crucial 
task for schools health promotion: 
'What is our potential for the development of autonomy? 
'How can we foste r autonomy? 
'Whose responsibility is it? State, family, church, self? 
'What does autonomy mean for young people? 
'How can we recognise that someone has acquired or is developing their capacity for 
autonomy .... ?' (Mandy). 
The writers tended to use the frameworks as tools for ethical deliberation and 
decision- making without providing a critical perspective on the frameworks 
themselves. Moira, writing about nurses' understanding of 'autonomy', demonstrates 
her view that frameworks are required instruments for moral decision- making: 
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'However our decisions [about the morality of particular health care interventions] are 
obviously based on personal value judgements which raise the issue of bias and 
therefore the need for a framework, e.g. the 4 principles approach and the ethicaL 
grid ..... ' (Moira). 
In noting that the writers did not provide a critical perspective on the frameworks 
themselves, I am simply remarking on this fact. It is hard reasonably to expect that 
they should have done so. This was a group of practitioners perplexed by moral 
problems in their work and seeking help through theoretical understanding. That they 
used, and appeared to find support in, theoretical frameworks is a sufficiently 
important outcome- let alone expecting sustained appraisal of the frameworks 
themselves. 
The frameworks of obligation discussed, together with the moral theory from which 
they are derived, are largely secular. Most of my participants wrote with no reference 
to religious tradition. However, Tim, writing about the Christian voluntary group 
working with female sex industry workers, was concerned to identify himself early on 
in his writing as a Christian. He connected deontological and consequentialist 
obligation theory to Christian ethics: 
'Essentially, the methods and procedures of Christian ethics appear to straddLe the 
two theories [of deontology and consequentialism] and are no different from those of 
moral philosophy, other than its starting point in the Christian faith ... ' (Tim). 
Two of the reports did not draw on moral theory- particularly frameworks of 
obligation- in any substantial way. This can be related largely to their separate 
focuses. Patricia was writing about epistemological issues emerging from general 
practice health promotion needs assessment. Her work was therefore at one remove 
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from considering the ethics of particular interventions or kinds of interventions. 
Donna was writing about broad issues related to the politics of health promotion in 
local authorities, again without specific reference to particular activity. In both cases. 
the absence of a specific 'activity focus' was likely to have made the use of any 
framework of obligation less applicable. 
The quotations above from the writing of Iris, David and Judith suggest that 
frameworks have supported judgement. Iris has come to the conclusion that the 
likelihood of benefit being produced by water fluoridation makes it an acceptable 
intervention despite the risk that this population intervention may not respect the 
autonomy of individuals or particular communities. David has recognised that the 
limited perceptions of 'health' contained in Tackling Drugs Together is likely to mean 
that it will cause problems in terms of respect for individual autonomy. Judith has 
identified the central importance of freedom of choice as women make up their minds 
about smoking during pregnancy. 
Anthony provides a further demonstration of obligations- based frameworks 
supporting decision- making. His implicit questioning of the value of anti- HIV 
combination therapy- related in part to the uncertainty of its action and effect- was 
evident at the end of Chapter Six: 
'Even within an orthodox western medical model the optimum time to start treatment 
with anti- HIV drugs is open to debate .... ' (Anthony). 
He then introduces and considers the framework offered by Beauchamp and Childress 
and later writes: 
'For Gary with dementia. I value the role of Zidovudine as it reverses such symptoms 
and restores autonomy .... For Clare whose children are not yet autonomous adults. I 
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value the potential of anti- HIV drugs for securing a longer life but I also respect her 
autonomy .... ' (Anthony). 
Of course, the empirical uncertainties related to anti- HIV drugs remain. However. 
Anthony now has a clear framework within which to engage in moral deliberation 
about the potential value of particular courses of action. His enhanced feeling of 
being able to identify the moral nature of his actions and those of his clients is 
replicated in the writing of my other participants. This apparent usefulness of 
frameworks of obligations to this group of practitioners supports some of the claims I 
made earlier on (in Chapter Seven) for the worth of bioethics applied to health 
promotion: that it can provide a rationale for the acceptance of particular values likely 
to be important to the field; and that it can provide frameworks for considering 
obligations, commitments and courses of action. 
What has happened in the cases of Iris, David, Judith and Anthony? Certainly. there 
has been a change in knowledge on their parts. They now have greater knowledge of 
moral philosophical principles and frameworks for decision- making that might be 
agreed on by those engaged in health care activity. But it seems clear that something 
else has happened as well. Accompanying altered levels of knowledge is a change in 
attitude. Anthony, for example, demonstrates doubt and confusion about his role in 
encouraging the use of anti- HIV drugs at the beginning of his assignment. Yet he 
concludes with a clearer perception of both the value of such drugs in some cases; and 
the value of the lives with which he is involved. (This is not to suggest that he failed 
to value those lives beforehand- simply that his perceptions of, and attitudes towards, 
those valuable lives has altered.) 
One of the most marked attitudinal changes was that of Alison, who was writing 
about the introduction of a no- smoking policy at her college of further education. As 
I have already described, her views towards the policy shifted from one of tacit 
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agreement and support to one of suspicion, doubt and even opposition. She had 
uncovered alternative, 'non- health' motives lying behind its introduction: 
'My life now is divided up in to two distinct parts- before Philosophy and after 
Philosophy. If I had to analyse the [smoking] policy in the "Before" part, I would not 
have been able to justify my argument, as my views and ideas would have been cloudy 
and unclear. Having followed the sessions on Philosophy (backed up with further 
reading), I feel that my views and ideas have changed, but more importantly clear 
justification for them can be given, and my thinking has become more formalised as I 
have been introduced to different frameworks and tools to work with. ... ' (Alison). 
Here Alison is expressing the view that related to an increase in knowledge is a 
change in attitude. This is expressed in part through the simple change in attitude 
towards the smoking policy; but also through the greater confidence she has in the 
justifiability of her view as a result of greater knowledge. The relationship between 
changes in knowledge and alterations in attitude is symbiotic. 
Alison's change in attitude is striking and clear. Judith writes rather more diffidently 
about alterations in her attitude towards work on smoking prevention with pregnant 
women: 
'I have to accept that I feel ambiguous about the issue and allow myself the space to 
discuss some of the concerns with colleagues. Although ethical issues have been 
raised, I would still undertake the training but at the same time try to influence those 
decision makers that we should not be solely concerned with the statistics of how 
many pregnant women stop smoking .... ' (Judith), 
Of course. a gap may exist between attitude change and alterations in behaviour 
related to this. For David, writing about Tackling Drugs Together. his change in 
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attitude included a mood of cynicism, anticipated before he began the assignment but 
even more acutely felt as he analysed the ambiguities contained in the strategy and 
work to implement it. Here was an apparently unassailable central government policy 
document, given legitimation through cross- political party support; and fed in tum by 
public and media opinion. Politicians, media and much of the public had 'black and 
white' views on drugs misuse. He writes: 
'Certainly it has bee.n useful to take the time to consider in depth some of the many 
issues raised .... [But] there was a clearly stated riskfor the author at the outset. The 
risk was that deconstruction of Tackling Drugs Together would leave it naked and 
exposed to criticisms of futility. When one is deeply engaged at a strategic level in 
attempting to make such an initiative work, this needs to be underpinned by some 
feeling that, at the very least, more good than harm is likely to result from the 
activity .... ' (David). 
While recognising there may be some benefits in working according to the Tackling 
Drugs Together strategy, he goes on to remark: 
'A more radical approach [than that implied by the strategy] , particularly one that 
used the starting point of social and economic realities underlying drug use, is simply 
not on the political agenda currently .... ' (David). 
David exemplifies the views of a number of the writers that the activities in which 
they were involved were non- negotiable as far as those with political or 
organisational control of health promotion work were concerned. For others. however. 
change in knowledge and attitude might just hold the potential for practice alteration. 
Carol reflects on the young women and sexual health community project with which 
she was involved: 
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'] believe a way has to be found to evaluate and value the process of chosen 
interventions that satisfies the entrenched positions of those in power. This does not 
have to be at the expense of the intuitive and innovative methodology that] believe is 
the bedrock of a profession that values people .... 
'How to do this is beyond the scope of this critical report but will be the beginning of 
the next. The seeds of inquiry have been sown .... ' (Carol). 
For Melanie, writing about smoking and pregnancy interventions, change was not 
potential; she was already trying to achieve it. Her deliberations on freedom, 
autonomy and the nature of the relationship between herself and those with whom she 
worked led her to the following course of action: 
'I requested to change my method of working within the Smoking and Pregnancy 
programme to a community development style and felt that I put a good case forward 
for this request .... ' (Melanie). 
The request was not accepted, but Melanie held out the hope that wider organisational 
change might provide the route to enable alteration to her own practice: 
'From 1993 within our [health promotion] unit we have experienced tremendous 
changes at local, district and county levels. We have had many changes of staff, most 
of our new members are very aware of the benefits of community development, so I 
will have much support in this new area for me. '" My project plans for 1996 involve 
myself working in an area of known deprivation .... ' (Melanie). 
Melanie demonstrates strong certainty of purpose. Rather in contrast, Mandy's 
reflections on the primary school self esteem project showed diffidence about her 
feelings towards practice (and any alteration to it) as a result of change in attitude: 
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'Most importantly [writing the critical report] .... has made me look at my own value 
base- what drives me in health promotion? It has also made me re- evaluate m)' work 
with teachers, in that my bid to be an "advocate" for pupils rights as I see them am I 
denying teachers the right to be treated with respect as ''people''? The debate goes 
round and round in my head but an awareness of this issue enables me to reevaluate 
mine and others motives in school based health promotion. To what end I am not 
sure .... ' (Mandy). 
Generally, the writings presented a far from clear picture of the relationship between 
change in knowledge and attitude, and alteration in behaviour (or even the wish or 
capacity to change in this respect). This was partly because of the complexity of 
feeling inspired by philosophical thinking and writing. Recall Mandy's words: 
'The debate goes round and round in my head .... To what end I am not sure .... ' 
(Mandy). 
In the case of others- David for example- clearly there had been changes in attitude. 
Moral theory had provided him with a framework for critiquing and reflecting on 
Tackling Drugs Together. However, there was little he could do to change his practice 
because of the organisational and political imperatives with which he had to work. 
Attitude alteration could be striking but fail to result in changes to behaviour because 
of the strength of external influences on individuals. 
The political nature of health promotion- and its strong susceptibility to external 
influence (importantly including 'non- health' influence)- has frequently been 
demonstrated during this research. The vulnerability of my research participants to 
intluence- making it hard or impossible to change practice despite changes in 
knowledge and attitude- carries an important point. In Chapter Eight, I reviewed 
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Daryl Koehn's case for seeing pledging as the ground of professional ethics. 
Professionals pledge themselves to ethical action. For a number of theoretical reasons, 
I argued that the professional pledge cannot apply to those engaged in the promotion 
of health. Yet even if conceptual and theoretical difficulties did not exist with the 
notion of 'pledging health promotion', it is still problematic in a practical sense for 
those engaged in the field. 
Much of the writing of my participants clearly demonstrates the difficulty they are 
likely to have in converting changes in knowledge and attitude to alterations in 
practice. Limits to their capacity in this respect relate to political and organisational 
influence; to uncertainty about what action to undertake; or to what might 'work' 
(however that is understood). Carol, for example, talks above about 'intuitive and 
innovative methodology' but admits that she does not know what this might actually 
prove to be. Thus it becomes apparent that a practitioner might want to 'pledge' health 
promotion (crudely put, have a particular attitude towards her or his clients and the 
nature and purpose of their relationship); but be unable to enact the pledge. That is to 
say, he or she just may not have the capacity to tum attitude to action. 
Of course, it may be difficult for many- even those working in the paradigmatic 
professions- to turn pledging into action. But given the uncertainties in the nature of 
health promotion activity and the strong influences to which it is subject; turning 
pledges to action does seem peculiarly problematic for those working in health 
promotion. As already discussed, an important element of Koehn's argument is that 
the general pledge is underpinned by much more specifically detailed relationships 
and duties. Aside from conceptual difficulties for health promotion in the idea of the 
general pledge; there are many practical problems associated with the underpinning 
detail, as my participants have demonstrated in their reflections on moving from 
attitude change to practice alteration. 
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3. What Might be Required in the Moral Reconstruction of Health Promotion? 
In Chapters Seven and Eight, I identified ways in which bioethics, together with 
understanding of the nature of professional ethics, might be of help in establishing and 
dealing with the moral difficulties presented by health promotion. Added to this now 
are the reflections of my research participants on how they have dealt with the 
problematic practice about which they have been writing. I want to build upon this 
theoretical and practical understanding of the potential help for dealing with 
difficulties to mark out what might be required to be done if health promotion is to be 
reconstructed in a moral sense. 
This 'marking out' is in part a series of acknowledgements of the difficulties presented 
by health promotion in a moral sense. These have come, of course, from the 
theoretical and empirical work described and discussed in this thesis. It is also a 
pointing towards some of the sources of help- from bioethics and professional ethics-
that could support moral reconstruction. Thus my 'marking out' is a representation of 
this thesis as a whole: an identification of problems; and an exploration of how these 
could possibly be dealt with. 
In describing what follows as a 'marking out', there is no intention to imply that the 
ethical difficulties within the field of my interest can be dealt with easily. As this 
research has shown, the field is too conceptually and practically messy for easy 
solutions. However, on the basis of the explorations I have undertaken, it seems that 
what follows should be taken into account if the ethical problematic of health 
promotion is to be treated seriously. 
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Markers in the moral reconstruction of health promotion 
The territory of health promotion is ftIled with values. Values are present, and are 
being acted on, in the work of health promotion theorists; and in the practical activity 
of those engaged in or controlling the field. The values of those involved in health 
promotion at theoretical or practical level are not uniform. Moral dispute is therefore 
inevitable. 
Values drive health promotion practice. Because different and competing values exist, 
competing forms of practice will also be driven forward. The question therefore 
becomes one of deciding on the relative acceptability of these competing values (and 
therefore on the approaches and activities they imply). Asking, and attempting to 
answer, this question is of central importance for those working in health promotion. 
It is extremely hard- probably impossible- to construct a case for any value associated 
with health promotion being seen as overriding. It is also probably impossible to 
construct a case for health promotion as a value itself being overriding. However, it is 
possible to construct a 'long list' of values that might be connected to health 
promotion (for example, individual freedom and social justice). Identifying and 
justifying such a list of values is a key task for those concerned with health 
promotion. 
Some of this 'long list' of values will be necessary values. There will be some values 
necessary for the maintenance and development of social structures. There will also 
be some values necessary for the maintenance and development of individual well-
being. There will not always be complete alignment between necessary indi vidual, 
and necessary social, values. There will also, inevitably, always be a need for the 
individual to decide which values are important to him or her. Thus a tension will 
exist- at least sometimes. and possibly frequently- between the goals of health 
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promotion and the wishes of individuals. It is essential that those working in health 
promotion recognise the possibility or likelihood of such tension. 
Disagreement will frequently- possibly always- be evident as to the nature of the 
value of 'health' that is being promoted. Separate conceptions of health- for example 
that it is the 'absence of disease', or the 'foundations for achievement'- are likely often 
to be disputed. The cultural and professional context in which much health care work 
takes place may make it hard for health promotion practitioners to develop the 
professional capacity to promote health in any broad sense; for example, as the 
'foundations for achievement'. This is simply because so much health care work is 
oriented around conceptions of health as disease absence. Again, this may create 
tension or dissonance for health promotion practitioners. 
It is possible to move towards constructing a set of moral obligations for those 
engaged in health promotion work. On the basis of understanding developed in 
relation to the broader field of health care, it seems that the following general 
obligations are likely to be of importance to health promotion practitioners: to respect 
autonomy; to avoid harm; to produce benefit; and to contribute to justice. Framing 
obligations can provide a way for practitioners to focus on and understand the 
dilemmas associated with work in the field of health promotion. However, framing 
obligations may not enable difficulties to be resolved in all (possibly even many) 
morally problematic cases. Obligations may not point to definitive courses of action; 
indeed, there are likely to be occasions when we find it hard to choose between 
competing obligations. 
More broadly, the post- modem context may make it particularly problematic to agree 
on a set of consensus values and obligations for the field of health promotion. 
However, understanding this context may help in developing an appreciation of why 
it is just so hard to agree on 'the values and obligations of health promotion'. 
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As well as reference to ethical theory to support an understanding of obligations that 
might be held by health promotion practitioners; it is important to acknowledge that 
individuals have the capacity to think morally and make ethical judgements. Attention 
therefore needs to be paid not only to the 'outside in' judgements that are made on 
health promotion activities; but to encouraging practitioners themselves to make 
'inside out' judgements on the field. 
There is a need to examine the extent of inter- occupational agreement on the nature 
and purpose of health promotion. There is also a need to recognise that any process of 
professionalisation of the 'occupation' of health promotion may pose difficulties: for 
those working in the occupation; for other occupational groups; and for 'clients' of the 
field. Any process of professionalisation should not be regarded as morally neutral. 
Measured consideration of the worth of professionalising and the extent of agreement 
on purpose may make it possible to frame a provisional 'pledge' for those engaged in 
health promotion activity. Such a pledge- binding the interests of practitioners and 
those they serve- may to some extent help to ground trust in the field. 
4. Banishing the Unexamined Life: (i) The Process of Understanding for Myself 
Recognition of these markers for the moral reconstruction of health promotion has 
been achieved through my thinking in new ways and exploring areas that I may not 
have initially believed would contribute to developing understanding of the 
difficulties in which I am interested. It is this process which has enabled me to move 
from the 'swampy lowland' that forms part of the 'topography of professional practice', 
where 'messy confusing problems defy technical solution ... .' (SCHON, 1990: 3). 
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If I wished to understand the moral problems of health promotion, I needed to 
understand the nature of health promotion itself. This led me to provisional 
formulation of an understanding of the nature of health promotion through theory. At 
this early point, it became clear to me that the lack of a unified conception of health 
promotion- either as theory or practice- meant it was important to hear different 
'voices' speaking. It quickly became clear that in seeking out different voices, they 
were also likely to be offering separate perspectives on the problematic of 
understanding health promotion. 
Seeking a historical perspective was important because in many ways health 
promotion can be understood by the kinds of things it is and does. Establishing the 
nature of how and why 'health promoting things' have been done in the past (and with 
what constraints) is part of building up a picture of how and why there are difficulties 
in the present. The identification of five dimensions of a history of health promotion: 
its social and political context; epidemiology and disease treatment; theoretical 
debate; development in settings; and development as an occupation (or occupational 
element); suggested a high degree of complexity to the historical tale. It became clear 
that the strong political and ideological elements of this history were likely to have 
contributed to the problematic. 
Up to this point in my thesis, I had been listening almost exclusively to theoretical 
voices; and critically examining key assumptions they appeared to be making. Such 
assumptions were exemplified by the 'moral case' for health promotion with which I 
critically engaged. It was important for me now to establish whether the unease I felt 
about the nature of health promotion in a moral sense was shared by others. I was not, 
as it has been made clear, seeking generalisability for my own theorising. My claims 
for the practitioner voices I sought out were limited to confirming that some others 
felt equally that health promotion contained ethical difficulties. 
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The perspectives offered by voices from bioethics and from professional ethics (ethics 
for and of professions) appeared fairly naturally. If myself and my practitioner 
research participants believed health promotion to be facing moral difficulties- as had 
by now been confinned- then bioethics might prove to be a clear source of help. As I 
discovered in Chapter Seven, the 'bioethical enterprise' had been of major importance 
in providing moral re-grounding for the broader health care arena, whose ideology 
and practices had been under strong critical gaze from about the mid- 1970s onwards. 
Moreover, it was clear that my research participants had themselves sought help from 
bioethics; again, it was important for me to understand what might have been helpful 
to them. Equally, it was apparent from my historical analysis that understanding of 
the nature of health promotion as a professional activity (and of the project to 
'professionalise' the occupation of specialist health promotion) had raised substantial 
ideological tensions. These tensions represented competing values. Was there any 
way in which conceptualisations of the moral nature of the professions might support 
a new- ethical- understanding of health promotion as professional activity? So I 
sought help from the broader territory of professional ethics. 
Analysing the possibilities of help offered to health promotion by bioethics and 
professional ethics led me, in turn, to believe that a number of markers could be set 
out to guide any project of reconstructing health promotion in a moral sense. The 
markers contain both acknowledgement of the difficulties faced by any attempt at 
health promotion's moral rebuilding; and an indication of what could be done, albeit 
in the general context of an acutely messy problematic. Their presence towards the 
end, of this thesis is important. They are landmarks developed following exploration 
of a large and uncertain territory. As such, the markers are representations of a 
reflective journey during which I have engaged with problems in order better to 
understand and deal with them. 
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5. Banishing the Unexamined Life: (ti) The Process of Understanding for ~Iy 
Research Participants 
I want now to continue my suggestion that my research participants equally engaged 
in processes of understanding as a result of the writing they did. I have already argued 
that their developing awareness and use of moral theory enabled alterations in 
attitude, on their part, towards the problems they had used their assignments to 
discuss. Now I am going to describe and discuss how the process of writing itself 
supported illuminations of understanding and changes in perception and attitude. My 
participants employed both professional and personal perspectives- wove stories and 
argument through writing using these- to understand the difficulties about which they 
were thinking. 
It is possible to distinguish between two styles of writing in which my participants 
engaged, used to support the stories they were trying to tell and the arguments they 
were attempting to make. Use was made of a rational, technical style to convey what 
can be characterised as a professional perspective; and of a much less formal-
sometimes almost confessional- style to convey personal perspective. While this 
distinction can be made, it is important to be clear that often the two styles were 
intertwined and used interchangeably, with great complexity. 
Iris, however, writing about water fluoridation, confined herself to technical style and 
professional perspective: 
'What is the aim offluoridation? B ..... Health Authority will not consider fluoridation 
unless there is a cost benefit. so it may be assumed that their aim is to save money. 
They are the purchasers of healthcare and have a limited budget which must be 
distributed fairly: The LDC [Local Dental Committee] would see the aim as reduced 
treatment needs and positive attitudes towards dental attendance. happier patients 
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with better health. As dental disease is preventable, I have always thought that 
fluoridation is an ideal way of helping to achieve better dental health and hence 
general health, for all. The dental perspective is one of looking at the consequences of 
not fluoridating and the benefits which would ensue if fluoridation were implemented. 
I have thought that fluoridation might be feasible for the larger conurbations, where 
decay rates are greatest, even ifnot cost effective/or the whole county .... ' (Iris). 
Iris is clearly trying to build rational argument for the intervention being considered 
through use of technical style and professional perspective. Words such as 'feasible' 
and 'implemented': and phrases such as 'the consequences of not fluoridating' and 
'even if not cost effective for the whole county'; are clearly part of the technical 
language of professionals, in Iris's case someone who works in community dentistry. 
The personal as used in 'I have always thought' is quickly followed by a move to a 
more distant consideration of general population health. Interestingly, the writing 
above appears in a section of Iris's report entitled 'Personal Perspective'. Yet the 
perspective is rather more clearly that of a professional commenting on the state of 
affairs. 
Equally Moira, writing about nurses' understanding of the concept of autonomy, uses 
technical style to convey professional perspective: 
'[ agree that nurse teachers have an enormously important role in shaping the future 
of the profession in relation to health promotion, but in many cases we remain 
passive, conservative and hierarchical. Education is more than just the transmission 
of knowledge and skills it is also the acquisition of cultural values and beliefs. 
maintaining the status quo which could cultivate the attitudes and character traits 
desired by teachers .... ' (Moira). 
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Use of the personal pronoun at the beginning of this quote is succeeded by a referral 
back to the impersonal 'we'. Words such as 'transmission' and 'hierarchical': and 
phrases such as 'transmission of knowledge and skills' and 'acquisition of cultural 
values and beliefs'; are academic, technical- the language of the professional. 
On the other hand, there are clear examples of personal perspectives informing 
understanding and reflection, developed through distinctly less formal voices. Liz's 
writing on sensible drinking campaigns is a case in point. From a beginning largely 
about comparing determinism and existentialism as separate philosophical positions 
on the issue of human freedom- and confining herself to an academic, technical style 
in doing so- she quickly moves to the personal. Indeed, she takes centre- stage and 
tells a story about herself: 
'In some ways I find myself identifying with both existentialism and determinism. Even 
as a child I liked to think of myself as "strong willed" and "independent" but it came 
as quite a revelation to me when I realised that my so - called autonomous actions 
were very firmly grounded in my parents beliefs and principles many of which I 
realised I did not ascribe to. However, it took a great deal of introspection and 
growing self - awareness to appreciate this and I believe it is process which can never 
be fully completed .... Conversely, I sometimes feel that we construct our own 
restrictions maybe, for example, out of a sense of fear. When my partner decided to 
end our relationship I felt completely disempowered. However, I am sure that Sartre 
would have argued that, in a sense, this totally opened up my range of choices in life 
rather than diminishing them .... ' (Liz). 
The prominence of the personal pronoun in this extract is striking (in total, there are 
13 uses ofT, 'me' and 'myself within the space of two fairly short paragraphs). There 
is a strong sense of disclosure. This becomes even stronger later in the piece when 
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direct connections are made between Liz's own personal health experience and the 
subject she is writing about: 
'Nearly a decade ago I suffered an episode of both bulimia nervosa and depression. 
The medical profession focused their attention on the bulimia since they assumed that 
this was the cause of the depression and concluded that the depression wouLd 
automatically evaporate once the eating disorder was addressed. Infact, the bulimia 
was only a symptom of the depression. As a consequence, treating the symptoms 
without getting to the root of the problem had nearly fatal results .... The point I am 
trying to illustrate is that alcohol, like food, can playa profound part in people's 
lives .... ' (Liz). 
Thus Liz has made use of her own personal story to support understanding of the 
ethical problem related to health promotion that she is considering. 
Liz's writing on sensible drinking is highly distinctive in the sense of disclosure it 
conveys. However, other reports use personal perspectives to illuminate 
understanding. Here is Tim, writing about the voluntary group concerned with female 
sex industry workers: 
'My Christian ethics include a sense of duty .... not out of legalism but out of love for 
God, and includes Aristotelian eudaimonism poorly interpreted as, "don't worry- be 
happy". Attempts to "do the right thing" have caused problems from time to time, not 
least because the motive cannot always be actioned successfully and is open to 
misinterpretation. I was unhappy when, as I remember, it was labelled, wrongly in my 
opinion, as a "desire to please" at a psychodynamic counselling training assessment 
some years ago. Assumption about beliefs and perceived responses as a result can be 
offensive. "Go easy on morals .... " was suggested at a job interview for my first post in 
health promotion, my application form contained infonnation about my background. 1 
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always have, I'm happy to discuss my beliefs, if invited, but I'm not "out" as a 
Christian because it's important to respect other people's autonomy .... ' (Tim). 
In the writing of Liz and Tim, for example, personal stories underpin moral or 
professional argument. Tim's revelation about his beliefs, and the central importance 
to him of autonomy, coincide in an apparently purposeful way with his reflections 
about the organisation he is involved with. Liz grounds her moral argument for 
recognition of the interests and rights of others in her own personal experience of 
depression. In other instances, personal perspectives are largely unrelated to 
theoretical or professional argument. Here is part of John's assignment. It will be 
remembered that his focus is the introduction of smoking policies in schools: 
'Some people genuinely seem unable to regulate their lives without the support of 
smoking .... The tobacco industry'S advertising plays on these themes although they 
claim their adverts only encourage people to brand switch and do not entice the 
young to smoke. This aspect is very much the evil side of the tobacco industry and 
schools need to develop young people's ability to perceive the more sinister nature of 
advertising .... ' 
'It would seem that all the world is an ashtray. Smokers deposit hundreds of tons of 
ash on the ground, and discard something like three hundred million butts in Great 
Britain every day. Walk down any unswept high street to see atftrst hand evidence of 
this... Why should people, the majority of whom do not smoke, be subjected to this 
carpet offag ends? It does not seem just or fair .... ' (John). 
John's use of words such as 'sinister' and 'evil'- together with the rhetorical question 
towards the end of this extract- show a strongly personal voice emerging. It is quite 
evident that there is personal commitment on his part to the issue of smoking 
prevention. However. the relationship between this strong personal voice and more 
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theoretical or professional perspectives is very slender- simply because the latter do 
not really exist to any great extent. 
On the other hand, Anthony, writing about HIV combination therapy, integrates 
professional, philosophical and personal perspectives through an almost seamless 
switching between different voices: 
'Arguments about distributive justice [in relation to combination therapy] centre on 
the justification I can provide for giving different amounts of time to different people: 
Robert whom I see fleetingly when he visits the Consultant in clinic, Tina whom I've 
visited at home monthly since her husband's death and her subsequent diagnosis two 
years ago. How can I morally justify such disparity ... ?' (Anthony) 
Within this one short paragraph, Anthony has moved from philosophical perspective 
through an element of personal story telling to a question emerging from both. The 
question- and a response to it- will illuminate understanding, which itself has emerged 
from the integration of perspectives. 
The style of Carol's assignment is clearly a personal one, achieved at least in part 
through her focus on the characters in the story she is telling- a story in which they 
play an active part as her interviewees. She is careful in her introductions to them: 
'People I chose to interview: 
'}anie- one o/the young people who visited the [health] mobile, was involved in 
setting up the project and was the last to leave! 
'}ohn- a volunteer worker on the L .... project. 
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'Barry- an outreach worker and volunteer co-ordinator at Health Promotion, working 
with the gay community .... 
'Richard- sexual health programme manager .... ' (Carol). 
Interviews are used to move her story forward; they provide it with a personal and 
compelling quality. There is a strong sense in which listening to, and reflecting on, a 
range of other voices- mediated through her writing- has supported her understanding 
of the moral problematic. Here she is reflecting on what the young people involved in 
her community outreach project valued about it and recalls Janie, articulating the view 
that it had given her a sense of independent direction and autonomy: 
, "You were not the teacher or the boss; you asked us what we wanted and we all 
made the decisions We didn't have to worry about what anyone thought. If we wanted 
to say something we could just say it .... " 
'However it is apparent there were times when autonomy was compromised 
, "1 remember when we went to see the mayor and there was so much I wanted to say 
that wouldn't come out and he asked me something and I went all red. I was thinking, 
oh! Carol, please say something .... " , (Carol). 
lanie's voice supports the development of Carol's thinking: on difficulties faced by 
those promoting health in helping young people make autonomous choices; and on 
the nature of autonomy creation as a gradual process. But what Carol is doing is even 
richer and more complex than this. She is representing, but also articulating on behalf 
of, and empathising with. Janie. She is using these health promotion- related skills 
(KATZ AND PEBERDY, 1997) to draw out a story illuminating understanding of the 
moral problem identified. Carol mediates Janie's voice with her empathy- professional 
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skill and personal quality- and uses it as a way of clarifying problems and detennining 
resolutions. 
6. Conclusion: Towards New Ways of Seeing Moral Problems in the Theory and 
Practice of Health Promotion 
I have argued that for both myself and my research participants, our progress in 
understanding the ethical difficulties of health promotion has been characterised by 
seeing things in new or different ways; and by making connections between different 
parts of our understanding and experience- theoretical, professional and personal. It is 
in the willingness to draw new (possibly previously unconsidered) connections that 
understanding is extended. We both employed- and mediated between- a range of 
'voices' to interpret and illuminate the messy problematics with which we were faced. 
In a crucial sense, new or altered ways of seeing are required of those attempting to 
understand health promotion's ethical difficulties. Schon (1990) argues that when a 
professional is confronted with a unique situation, she or he cannot rely on technical 
competence to frame a solution to the problem: 
'In situations of value conflict, there are no clear and self- consistent ends to guide the 
technical selection of means ... .' (SCHON, 1990: 6). 
The world of practice is complex and may involve both conflict and inherent 
instability. My own accounts of history, theory and practice have demonstrated this in 
relation to the field of my interest- health promotion. My research participants have 
shown the extent to which they struggle with competing values in their own practice 
world. In order to understand and deal with this world, more than simply technical 
competence is required. Schon argues that artistry is also necessary. Artistry is the 
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ability to make skilful and spontaneous judgements, leading to the 'right' action. 
although it will probably not be possible to explain how judgement and action were 
actually made in terms of rules or procedures. This process can be conceived of as 
'knowing- in- action' (SCHON, 1990: 24). 
When knowing- in- action goes wrong, it is possible to respond to error in two 
separate ways: reflection on action; and reflection in action. Reflection- in- action is 
distinguished from other kinds of reflection through its immediate significance for the 
action and, like knowing- in- action, is a process which it may be hard, or even 
impossible, to describe in a rational- technical way. 
Understanding the practice of health promotion requires artistry, 'knowing- in -
action'. But as I and my participants have discovered, 'knowing- in- action' in health 
promotion can go wrong. There is a requirement, then, for practitioners to be able to 
reflect on, and in, action. 
The processes of learning and writing, and the use of multiple perspectives within this 
writing, has enabled reflection on action. Moreover, the process of writing has 
resembled the Schonian notion of reflection in action. Using multiple personal and 
professional perspectives has enabled my participants to see the world in a new or 
different way: 
}\ s a rational moral agent, the woman'sfreedom to do as she wishes with her own 
body should be paramount .... ' (Judith). 
'For Clare whose children are not yet autonomous adults. 1 value the potential of anti-
HIV drugs for securing a longer life but 1 also respect her autonomy .... ' (Anthony). 
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'Most importantly [writing the critical report]. ... has made me look at my own value 
base- what drives me in health promotion .... ?' (Mandy). 
For Judith, Anthony, Mandy and many of my other participants, practice has been re-
seen. Values become central in this new way of seeing the world; and in 
acknowledging the centrality of values, it becomes possible to establish new ways of 
understanding and dealing with the problems of practice. These new ways of seeing 
and understanding have been made possible because writing has allowed the 
opportunity to build rich and detailed pictures of a complex world. Creation of such 
pictures has, in effect, allowed the possibility of practice being simulated. In this 
simulation, a kind of reflection- in- action by proxy has been allowed. Because the 
world has been seen in a new way in simulation, knowing- in- action and reflection-
in- action will be facilitated in the real world of practice. 
Examination of this process will be the next stage of research. It will be supported by 
what has been learnt during this stage: more explicit acknowledgement of the moral 
difficulties facing health promotion and what might begin to support their being dealt 
with; and the value of reflection and writing in understanding and working towards 
resolution of the problematic. There is a great deal more to do, but this research has 
established the foundations for further work. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
BRIEF FOR THE SOUTH BANK UNIVERSITY PIDLOSOPHY AND 
HEALTH PROMOTION ASSIGNMENT 
Assessment 
You must produce a critical report reflecting on the philosophical basis of an ongoing 
programme in a health promotion establishment (formats other than written reports 
need to be negotiated with your tutor). You must demonstrate an understanding of: 
(a) the issues; 
(b) the ethical and philosophical considerations; 
(c) a dialectical analysis. 
These should be investigated through a series of interviews (eg. with a DHEI PO, a 
project worker, a consumer) and autobiographical reflection. 
Written elements should be typed (double spaced) and referenced according to the 
required style (see General Programme Guide- Appendix). The critical report should 
be no less than 4,000 and no more than 6,000 words in length. 
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APPENDIX TWO 
SOUTH BANK UNIVERSITY PIDLOSOPHY AND HEALTH PROMOTI01\ 
UNIT SYLLABUS FOR ACADEMIC YEARS 1995-6 AND 1996-7 
Session A: Introduction to the Module 
This session introduces the key themes of the module, participants to each other and 
to the module's assessment requirements. 
Session B: Approaching Philosophy 
This session introduces some of the key concerns of philosophy and the nature of its 
methods and arguments. 
Session C: The Essential Contestedness of Philosophy and of Health Promotion 
This session introduces the idea of the essential contestedness of many of the 
concepts with which philosophy concerns itself; and relates contestedness to the field 
of health promotion. 
Session D: Introduction to Ethics 
This session introduces key western moral philosophical theories, particularly 
deontological and consequentialist theories. 
Session E: Values, Ideology and the Problem of Knowledge in Health Promotion 
This session explores the values and ideologies that underpin health promotion and of 
those who control or practice it. 
Session F: Ordering Values and Responding to Difficulties: Possibilities and 
Problems with Health Care Ethics 
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This session explores bioethical frameworks for supporting moral decision making in 
health care. 
Session G: 'The Public Health' and Health Promotion: Is What We Do Ethically 
Justifiable? 
This session explores ways in which the supposed contribution health promotion 
makes to improving popUlation health can be used to defend the field in an ethical 
sense. 
Session H: Women, Philosophy and Health Promotion 
This session considers the contribution made by women to the discipline of 
philosophy and connects these to philosophical understandings of health promotion. 
Session I: Autonomy 
This session explores the importance of autonomy and the principle of respect for 
. 
autonomy in the fields of health care and health promotion. 
Session J: Indi vidual ism 
This session considers ethical justifications of health promotion based on the 
proposition that it promotes the health and well- being of individuals. 
Session K: Codes of Conduct- Help, Hindrance or Irrelevant? 
This session explores the value or otherwise of codes of conduct in moral 
deliberation. specifically looking at the code of conduct for health promotion 
specialists. 
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Session L: Ethics Workshop 
In this session, a workshop format is used to explore ethical dilemmas encountered by 
participants in their own health promotion practice. 
Session M: Occupational Philosophy 
This session considers the occupational philosophies and values carried by, 
particularly, health promotion specialists. 
Session N: Personal Study 
This session allows time for personal study and reading related to the Unit, and for 
assignment preparation. 
Session 0: Summary and Evaluation 
In this final session, the Unit is reviewed and evaluated. 
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APPENDIX THREE 
LETTER FROM THE RESEARCHER SEEKING PERMISSION TO 
ANALYSE THE ASSIGNMENTS PRODUCED BY STUDENTS IN COHORTS 
1995-6 AND 1996-7 
Dear 
RE: SOUTH BANK UNIVERSITY PIDLOSOPHY AND HEALTH 
PROMOTION MODULE 
I am writing to all students on the Philosophy and Health Promotion Unit of the 'add-
on' M.Sc. to ask for your help. 
You. might know that I am currently undertaking postgraduate research (hopefully 
leadIng to a Ph.D.) at King's College London. I would value your assistance with my 
studies. 
What I would like to do is to spend some time considering and analysing the critical 
report you are about to submit. My purpose in doing this is to infonn my research by 
trying to detect 'themes' in philosophical and ethical concerns perceived by those 
working in health promotion; and to work out how you have responded to these 
concerns in the context of your involvement in the M.Sc. module. I then hope to link 
this 'empirical' analysis with the theoretical foundations I have been attempting to 
build and which I have tried to share with you during the module. 
I should make it completely clear that my use of your report will in no way be linked 
to the assessment process for the module. This, is an independent exercise for my own 
research benefit. Additionally. I will treat any access you allow me to your report as 
confidential; no views expressed or cases described will be attributed to anyone 
without their express permission. which I will specifically seek if I think attribution is 
required ( I should say that at the moment I thin~ this will be un~ilcely). It may ~ that 
at some point I would like to seek your further vlews on the subject you have wntten 
about and I would be grateful for your pennission to do so if necessary. 
Pam Schickler as Course Director is happy for me to make this request to you. 
I would be very grateful if you could complete the attached fonn and return it to me 
in the stamped addressed envelope provided to let me know that you would be happy 
to agree to my request. It would help me greatly if you were able to do this before the 
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end of January. If you need any more information, or would like to discuss my 
request, I would be very pleased to hear from you. 
I do hope you will feel able to help me in this way with my research and look fOf\llard 
to hearing from you. 
Thank you in anticipation for your help. 
Yours sincerely 
Peter Duncan 
